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Strategies of Prevention: 
Expanding the Concept of Preventive War 
And 
Understanding Its Implications 
 
Steven T. Walker 
 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on prevention in two specific ways. First, it 
broadens the concept of preventive war, developing the idea that dominant states have a choice 
when it comes to dealing with rising challengers. The choice is not a dichotomous variable of 
either war or no war. Instead, there is a range of choices that decision makers within the 
dominant state have at their disposal. This dissertation examines the relationship—over time—
between two conflictual states, one in relative decline and the other in relative ascendance, and 
studies the response of the dominant but declining power. Second, I focus more than others have 
on the perceptions of decision makers and the workings of domestic politics in determining how 
dominant states respond to rising challengers. I use three broad historical case studies to 
empirically test my ideas about the extended concept of preventive action. Using components of 
the method of structured, focused comparison, I examine the internal domestic decision making 
processes of the cases. Finally, I utilize a foreign policy analysis approach and develop a model 
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This dissertation contributes to the literature on prevention in two specific ways. First, it 
broadens the concept of preventive war, developing the idea that dominant states have a choice 
when it comes to dealing with rising challengers. The choice is not a dichotomous variable of 
either war or no war. Instead, there is a range of choices that decision makers within the 
dominant state have at their disposal. This dissertation examines the relationship—over time—
between two conflictual states, one in relative decline and the other in relative ascendance, and 
studies the response of the dominant but declining power. Second, I focus more than others have 
on the perceptions of decision makers and the workings of domestic politics in determining how 
dominant states respond to rising challengers. I use three broad historical case studies to test 
empirically my ideas about the extended concept of preventive action. Using process tracing, and 
other elements of the method of structured, focused comparison, I examine the cases, studying 
the internal domestic decision making process regarding whether to initiate preventive action 
against a rising challenger. Finally, I utilize a foreign policy analysis approach and develop a 
model that illuminates nuances that have been largely overlooked in the scholarly literature.
1
 
Preventive war, as a concept, is rooted in antiquity, has evolved over the ages, and 
remains a prominent perspective in international relations literature on the origins of war. The 
idea of preventive war can be traced back to Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War. The 
actual term “preventive war” was first used by Thomas Fuller in his 1639 book The History of 
the Holy War, which examined the Crusades. More recently, a rich theoretical literature on 
preventive war has emerged in contemporary international relations beginning with the works of 
Hans Morgenthau (1948, 1967), A.F.K. Organski (1958, 1968), and Robert Gilpin (1981). Jacek 
                                                 
1
 The title of this dissertation was inspired by John Lewis Gaddis’ influential book Strategies of Containment: A 
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. 
 2 
Kugler (1980), Jack Levy (1987), and Dale Copeland (2000) contributed to this literature by 
further refining the theory of preventive war. 
A basic concept of preventive war revolves around the idea of a conflictual pair of states 
(or dyad) containing a dominant but relatively declining state and a rising but still relatively 
weak challenger. Fear, on the part of the dominant power, is a key aspect of this dyad, and the 
literature suggests it may take several forms.
2
 There may be a fear that military conflict, while 
not imminent, is highly likely or inevitable in the end. Alternatively, the fear may be of a less 
critical sort, perhaps a more vague perception that the status quo will get worse if no action is 
taken. There may also be the concern that an adversary may cross some precarious threshold of 
military or technological capability—such as attaining weapons of mass destruction. Much of the 
literature suggests that any one or a combination of these fears will spark a preventive war 




This dissertation questions the inevitability of war given the international situation in 
which one state is rising vis-à-vis another state over time. I will explore whether the dominant 
state will react militarily to the challenger. In contrast to much of the established literature, my 
perspective is that, given such circumstances, dominant states do not necessarily initiate military 
action. Instead, I suggest that over time, dominant but declining states have choices regarding 
                                                 
2
 The other side of this equation is that of the aspirations of the rising power, which may also result in war. 
However, the focus of this dissertation is on the dominant power, and the actions it may take to stop the rise of a 
challenger. 
3
 It should be noted that prevention is very different from preemption. Prevention occurs over a relatively large 
expanse of time in which conflict is not seen as imminent. Prevention anticipates that sometime in the future—
perhaps even somewhat distant future—a rival will gain some capability that will put one’s state at risk. Preventive 
action is a strategic response to a long-term threat that may even be years in the making. It is designed to preclude 
the development of new military assets or other strategic capabilities, or prevent the possible use of existing, but not 
yet mobilized, capabilities. Preemption, on the other hand, is a tactical response to a threat of an attack that is 
perceived to be imminent. Any action to lessen an imminent attack’s impact would be preemptive. Such an action is 
designed to thwart an enemy who is mobilizing or otherwise clearly preparing to use an existing military force. See 
chapter 2.  
 3 
how they respond to rising challengers. They may react in a variety of ways, manifested by 
different policy strategies. These responses take alternative forms of what I will call “preventive 
action.”
4
 At the benign end of the spectrum, dominant states may choose not to respond or be 
unable to respond in any substantial way to a rising challenger. They may also acquiesce to the 
demands of the challenger. Alternatively, a dominant state may choose to confront or contain the 
rising challenger using carrots and sticks, hoping to achieve the best possible outcome for itself 
without provoking the challenger. Moving to the more coercive end of the preventive action 
spectrum, a dominant state may engage in sustained coercive or militant diplomacy with the 
challenger. Finally, the dominant state may initiate the most severe form of preventive action, 
preventive war, against the challenger. 
In this project, I will try to explain why a state chooses a particular type of preventive 
action. Much of the literature on preventive war has focused on systemic and structural 
components in determining whether the dominant state will initiate preventive war. This project 
focuses more closely on decision makers’ perceptions, choices, and interactions at the domestic 
level. I suggest there is an element of choice that plays a key role in determining the policy of a 
state. In essence, I focus more than others have on the domestic dimension of preventive action 
initiation. 
Inherent in the idea of preventive action is a relationship that evolves between states over 
time—not simply the immediate origins of war. This insight shapes the empirical part of my 
dissertation. In order to capture this relationship, my case studies are rather extensive and 
                                                 
4
 I use the term “preventive action” in this project to encompass the entire range of responses a dominant state may 
undertake regarding a rising challenger. The term, as used here, should be understood in a different context than 
some other uses of the same term. For example, some authors have used “preventive action” to mean economic and 
diplomatic policies aimed at preventing war from occurring. Examples of such work include Michael S. Lund, 
Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1996). and Barnett R. Rubin, ed., Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action (New York: The Century 
Foundation Press, 1998). My use of the term is quite different from these authors. As used in this dissertation, 
“preventive action” refers to an attempt on the part of the dominant state to stop the further rise of the challenger. 
 4 
encompass broad historical time frames. In the empirical sections of my dissertation, I will 
examine three major historical episodes in which dominant states dealt with rising challengers. 
These three cases are as follows: 
1) How the United Kingdom coped with relative decline from 1816 to 1914. 
 
2) How Russia coped with relative decline from 1816 to 1997. 
 
3) How the United States dealt with relative decline from 1816 to 1996. 
 
 Regarding the cases, my goal is not to present a narrative, but instead to isolate key 
policies that states employed over decades if not centuries. In order to capture, in a systematic 
way, how the dominant state sought to respond to the rise of the challenger, I utilize the method 
of focused, structured comparison and its various components as proposed by Alexander George 
and Andrew Bennett.
5
 Process tracing and the development of a typological theory, two 
components of structured, focused comparison, assist in the explanation of why dominant states 
react to rising challengers the way they do. This methodology teases out relevant material and 
key theoretical elements that illuminate individual and domestic level decision making regarding 
preventive action. 
When examining our case studies, several things must be kept in mind. First, it is 
essential to determine objectively if there is a declining dominant power and a rising challenger, 
and which state is which. This is not easy, but using the National Materials Capabilities data set 
from the Correlates of War project simplifies this matter.
6
 Fortunately, this data is available 
                                                 
5
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, BCSIA 
Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005). 
6
 In order to make the data comparable across cases, I use the Composite Index of National Capability data from the 
National Material Capabilities v. 3.02 data set. This data can be found at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
 5 
starting in 1816, which meshes nicely with our focus on modern states. Using this dataset, I am 
able to determine objectively when a state is in relative decline vis-à-vis other states.
7
 
Second, we must determine the policy strategies of the declining dominant power, and 
determine whether these policies were targeted at a rising challenger. To do this we can look at 
the level of fear shared by policy makers in the declining dominant state regarding the rising 
challenger. We must also ask ourselves the question, “What do these policy makers fear?” For 
example, if policy makers in our declining dominant power (state A) are concerned that our 
rising challenger (state B) is developing a military capability that will render A’s military 
obsolete, and then launches a war against B, we can with some confidence suggest that this was 
preventive action. In our analysis then, we must bring these elements together to determine the 
validity of our model. 
In looking at the cases in this study, I am essentially trying to fill a gap in deterministic 
structural theories such as neorealism, hegemonic stability theory, and power transition theory. 
One way to do this is to examine the political leaders who are actually making the decisions and 
determining policy. Through process tracing, I accomplish this goal, and provide a better 
explanation of why states experiencing relative decline have pursued the policies they have.
8
 
The cases in this study reveal complex and varied responses to relative decline by 
dominant powers. What the cases show is that declining states tend to prefer non-militarized 
preventive action when facing a rising challenger. Only on rare occasions did the declining 
                                                 
7
 See Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895 - 1905 (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988). One important question I am trying to answer here is to what extent 
political leaders are successful in gauging their own states relative decline vis-à-vis other nations. The Material 
Capabilities Index I use presents an objective way to gage this, but do political leaders at the time perceive this 
relative decline? I hope to discover this by looking at individual leaders and groups in the domestic sphere. See 
Friedberg 4-17 for a discussion regarding the ability of political leaders to gage this decline, and different models 
that address this issue. On the issue of perception of decline by political leaders, Friedberg seems to disagree with 
Kupchan’s argument that the political elite are quite perceptive and willing to accept and react to these changes.  
8
 Ibid., 18. 
 6 
dominant state engage in behavior that was likely to result in militarized conflict. For example, 
the United States after the Second World War enjoyed military superiority over the rest of the 
world’s nations. By the end of 1947 or 1948 it was clear to American decision makers that the 
Soviet Union was going to constitute a serious challenge to American global leadership in the 
years and perhaps decades to come. Nonetheless, President Harry S Truman and his successors 
did not engage in preventive war, but instead chose a form of non-militarized preventive action 
to contain the communist bloc. In another example, facing relative decline vis-à-vis Japan in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, Britain chose to ally itself with the Japanese, and not 
confront them in any way.  
 It is clear from the cases presented in this dissertation that dominant states have a choice 
when it comes to dealing with rising challengers. It is not simply a decision of war or no war, but 
instead we find that decision makers within the dominant state have at their disposal a range of 
options. By focusing more than others have on the perceptions of decision makers and the 
workings of domestic politics in determining how dominant states respond to rising challengers, 
this study builds on the work of other scholars to develop a model of preventive action that better 




 I define a preventive action
1
 as one in which a dominant but relatively declining state 
takes some action against a rising but still inferior challenger
2
 with the primary goal of 
forestalling the continued ascendance of the challenger.
3
 Given these general circumstances, two 
things may be viewed by the dominant state as likely or inevitable: 1) its continued relative 
decline, and 2) the possibility of eventual conflict, whether militarized or otherwise, with the 
challenger. In such an instance, the dominant state will see action taken now as providing an 
advantage over waiting for the situation to deteriorate further. “Preventive motivation” is the 
term Jack Levy has given this “perception that one’s military power and potential are declining 
relative to that of a rising adversary, and…the fear of the consequences of that decline.” 
4
 The 
presence of this preventive motivation is essential in defining any action as preventive in nature. 
Before discussing the manner in which the concept of prevention has evolved, it is 
prudent to differentiate between prevention and preemption. The two can be separated primarily 
in terms of urgency and the time frame in which the conflict occurs.
5
 The element of immediacy, 
or more importantly, the absence thereof, is essential when discussing preventive action. 
Prevention anticipates that sometime in the future—perhaps even somewhat distant future—a 
rival will gain some capability that will put one’s state at risk. Preventive action is a strategic 
                                                 
1
 From this point on, I use the terms “preventive action” and “prevention” synonymously. 
2
 For the purpose of readability, I will use the terms “dominant” and “dominant state” to refer to a dominant but 
relatively declining state and the term “challenger” to refer to a relatively weak but rising challenger. It is important 
to recognize that dominant states experiencing relative decline might not be declining in absolute terms. The key 
here is looking at differential rates of growth between states. If the dominant state is growing, though at a slower 
rate than a rising challenger, it is still experiencing relative decline. 
3
 Some scholars suggest that prevention can also be seen in the form of a declining state that might not be superior, 
if that declining state believes that militarized conflict with the dominant state is inevitable, and that a war fought 
now would be fought under better conditions than a war fought later. This latter part is the common thread in all 
preventive action, and I do not deny the possibility of initiation by a declining non-superior state, but my focus is on 
a dominant state’s initiation of preventive action. 
4
 Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987). 
5
 Levy suggests that the two can be differentiated along several dimensions. I do not find this more helpful than the 
simpler element of time advanced here. Ibid. 
 8 
response to a long-term threat that may even be years in the making. It is designed to preclude 
the development of new military assets or other strategic capabilities, or prevent the possible use 
of existing, but not yet mobilized, capabilities.
6
 For the preventive scenario, failure to act 
immediately risks future geo-political, economic, or military uncertainty, and perhaps a higher 
risk of a more costly conflict or an increasingly deteriorating status quo. While, in the case of a 
militarized threat, attack is not imminent, it is believed that conflict with the challenger is 
ultimately likely and perhaps inevitable. In contrast, if conflict were imminent or perceived as 
imminent, any action would be tactical and not strategic in nature. Such a response falls under 
the rubric of preemption. Stephen Van Evera suggests that a preemptive attack is designed to 
thwart an enemy who is mobilizing or otherwise clearly preparing to use an existing military 
force. In the instance of a preemptive situation, failure to act right away risks immediate attack 
by an aggressor. A preemptive attack is “mounted to seize the initiative, in the belief that the first 
mover gains an important advantage…”
7
 
While militarized threats have been the focus of much of the literature, non-militarized 
threats, usually in the form of economic competition, can also lead to insecurity on the part of the 
                                                 
6
 Ibid. 
7 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), fn. 18, 40. A word should be said about the relationship between preventive action and 
deterrence/compellance. The connection between the two concepts is a complex one. Deterrence and compellance 
both involve the threat to use force either in order to prevent an adversary from taking some action, to stop an 
adversary from continuing an action it is already taking, or to get an opponent to initiate some action it is not 
currently taking. See Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
especially 1-25. The key with both deterrence and compellance is that these are threats that force may follow. If 
these threats are issued by a dominant state against a rising challenger, with the hope that such threats will stop the 
development of strategic capabilities, this may in fact be a form of preventive action according to the guidelines I 
have outlined above. This is not to say, however, that all deterrence falls within the purview of preventive action. 
During the Cold War when both the United States and the Soviet Union exercised Mutually Assured Destruction, 
they were using deterrence but not preventive action. There was no attempt to prevent the rise of a challenger, only 
the threat that any use of already available assets would result in annihilation.  However, if the Soviet Union during 
the 1980s had issued a threat to the United States that if the U.S. went forward with the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) it would automatically result in a Soviet invasion of Europe, and this threat had been issued with the hopes 
that such a threat would stop the U.S. from developing SDI, then such a threat would be both deterrence and 
preventive action. I would like to thank Dr. Robert Duval for bringing this to my attention. 
 9 
leadership and populace of the dominant state. Instances of these non-militarized threats are just 
as important as militarized threats, and are an essential element in this study. One hypothesis of 
this study is that dominant states will react differently to a non-militarized threat than they would 
to a militarized threat. We might ask, for example, “How did the United States react to a 
militarized threat (the Soviet Union) in contrast to a non-militarized threat (Japan) after World 
War II?” We might also ask, “Was the nature of the threat the key element in the foreign policy 
outcomes of the United Sates in these cases?” This study answers these questions. 
 
International Systems Theory and Preventive War 
Now that we have highlighted the distinction between prevention and preemption, we can 
explore the evolution of preventive action itself. The origin of prevention lies in antiquity and 
can be traced back to at least Thucydides and his study of the sources of the Peloponnesian War. 
He notes, “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made 
war inevitable.”
8
 Later, he suggests, “Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a 
superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made.”
9
 Though he never uses 
the term, the conflict between Athens and Sparta as portrayed by Thucydides can be described as 
a preventive war. The actual term “preventive war” was first used by Thomas Fuller in 1639, in 
his book The History of the Holy War, while explaining the legality of the Crusades. He 
suggests, “A preventive war, grounded on a just fear of an invasion…is warranted by reason and 
the practice of all wise nations…It is the most advised way not to wait for the enemy, but to seek 
him out in his own country.”
10
 The concept of prevention was further articulated by Otto von 
                                                 
8
 Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New 
York: Touchstone, 1996), 16. 
9
 Ibid., 372. 
10
 Thomas Fuller, The History of the Holy War (London: William Pickering, 1639/1840), 15-16. For the etymology 
of the term see the Oxford English Dictionary (Online Version) (Second) (Oxford University Press,  1989); available 
 10 
Bismarck who suggested that “No government, if it regards war as inevitable even when it does 
not want it, would be so foolish as to leave to the enemy the choice of time and occasion and to 
wait for the moment which is most convenient for the enemy.”
11
 The concept has been used 
contemporaneously by the Bush administration in “The National Security Strategy of the United 
States” in which President Bush, discussing terrorism, stated, “America will act against such 
emerging threats before they are fully formed.”
12
 The idea of prevention, in an international 
relations context, is thus a well-established concept. 
 
Balance of Power Theory and War 
Prevention as a general theory of international relations is a much more recent 
phenomenon and is a product of some of the most important research in the field over the past 
fifty years. This research has yielded a rich theoretical literature dealing primarily with systemic 
and structural variables. The theory of preventive war in the post World War II era has been a 
topic of interest for many scholars including Hans Morgenthau (1948, 1967), A.F.K. Organski 
(1958, 1968), and Robert Gilpin (1981). Morgenthau, Organski, and Gilpin address the issue of 
prevention as part of a larger framework designed to explore international politics or causes of 
war in general and not specifically preventive war. Furthermore, Morgenthau and Organski are 
primarily concerned with power; whether in the former’s case of a balance of power or in the 
latter’s case of a hierarchy of power. 





 Bismarck was ambivalent about his feelings regarding preventive war for he also stated, “Preventive war is like 
suicide from fear of death.” 
12
 Introductory letter, signed by President George W. Bush. "The National Security Strategy of the United States,"  
(2002). 
 11 
Morgenthau, in Politics Among Nations, discusses prevention only in passing in the 
development of his theory of international relations, but he suggests preventive war is a 
necessary means of maintaining equilibrium in the international system: 
Since in a balance of power system all nations live in constant fear lest their rivals 
deprive them, at the first opportune moment, of their power position, all nations have a 
vital interest in anticipating such a development and doing unto the others what they do 
not want the others to do unto them…. Preventive war, however abhorred in diplomatic 





 Morgenthau suggests in his balance of power theory, that war is least likely in an 
international system in which multiple states have roughly equal amounts of power. According to 
this theory, if states are able to balance against an aggressor, either through their own power or 
with the combined power of allies, no state is likely to initiate war since it would be able to see 
that the balance of power would shift against it. In such a system, aggression is futile because 
such action would result in a counterbalance that would defeat any aggressor and restore balance 




More recently, Paul Kennedy and John Mearsheimer have added an element of 
dynamism to balance of power theory. Kennedy, in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 
views the international system through an economic lens and suggests that states grow at 
different rates. He argues that the international system is essentially one of shifting power, based 
largely on economic forces. According to Kennedy, economic power shifts from the most 
powerful states to rising challengers. He suggests that the nation most likely to gain military 
power is that nation that is most able to gain economic power. Essentially, he argues that large 
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and powerful militaries require massive amounts of financial capital. He also suggests that as 
powers grow, they tend to overreach their natural abilities. It is this overreach that strains a 
countries military and economic capacities and eventually forces great powers to pull back from 
their goals of global dominance.
15
 
John Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, focuses much more on 
military power. While he does not directly address the issue of preventive war, his theory of 
offensive realism implies that preventive war, or at least some form of preventive action, should 
be a normal tool of statecraft. He suggests that domestic politics and governmental structure play 
a negligible role in determining whether a state will initiate war against another state. Instead, he 
argues it is the structure of the international system that determines the level of war proneness. 
He argues that major variations of balance in the international system can affect a nation’s 
calculations regarding the efficacy of war. He suggests that multipolar systems with a potential 
hegemon are the most war prone, with multipolar systems of roughly equal states as second most 
war prone, and bipolar systems as the least war prone. According to offensive realism, a potential 
hegemon in a multipolar system will likely initiate war to become a true hegemon. Implicit in 
this argument is that the potential hegemon, or a true hegemon if it reaches that status, would 
also initiate preventive war against any challengers. Like Kennedy, Mearsheimer suggests that 




Power Transition Theory and the Hierarchy of the International System 
Not all international relations scholars, however, agree with the balance of power 
theorists’ portrayal of the international system, nor their conclusions regarding preventive war. In 
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particular, Organski, in World Politics, criticizes Morgenthau on the basis that he does not take 
into account the fundamental problem of differential rates of growth. In response, Organski 
develops his own theory of international relations—power transition theory.
17
 Organski 
examines preventive war in more depth than Morgenthau does; but it is still a tangent in a larger 
theoretical framework. Power transition theorists see an international system that is hierarchical 
in nature with a “dominant power” at the top of the hierarchy.
18
 They suggest that a powerful 
state—once it ascends to the dominant position—configures the international system to serve its 
own long-term interests. Kugler and Organski (1980, 1989) argue that the maximization of net 
gains is the goal of the dominant power.
19
 Beneath this dominant power are other “great” or 
“major” powers that have a significant proportion of the power of the dominant state. The great 
powers “share in the allocation of resources and…help maintain the international system.”
20
 
Below the great powers are “middle powers” and “small” or “minor” powers that, though they 
might be dissatisfied with the status quo, do not play an important role in the international 
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system. However, they may play a supporting role in any struggle between the dominant power 
and a dissatisfied major power.
21
 
In contrast to balance of power theory, power transition theory suggests that 
confrontation is most likely when the dominant power and an unsatisfied state are roughly equal 
in power. Such a rough equilibrium of power comes to pass because the dominant state, which 
has already gone through industrialization with the accompanying growth spurt in such 
determinants of power as population, political efficiency, and economic development, has since 
slowed in its overall growth. The rapidly rising challenger, however, is going through its own 
power transition, which brings it closer to the power of the dominant state and may catapult it 
ahead of the dominant. This view of dynamic change within the state that results in a new 
distribution of power is in contrast to balance of power theorists who suggest that the main 
mechanism for a state to increase its power is through increasing armaments, conquering new 
territory, or winning new allies.
22
 
It is also this element of dynamic change and power differentials within the state that 
places power transition at the heart of the preventive war literature. Though power transition 
theory predicts that in most cases it is the challenger who starts wars in an attempt to change the 
status quo, the theory does contribute to the development of preventive war theory by suggesting 
that there have been instances in which the dominant state attempts to halt a challenger’s rise 
using preventive war. Organski addresses this issue by attempting to answer the broader question 
of why power differentials sometimes result in war, and at other times do not. He suggests that 
war is likely if the following conditions are present:  
1) If the challenger is of such a size that at its peak it will roughly equal the dominant 
nation in power 
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2) If the rise of the challenger is rapid 
 
3) If the dominant nation is inflexible in its policies  
 
4) If there is no tradition of friendship between the dominant nation and the challenger  
 
5) If the challenger sets out to replace the existing international order with a competitive 




Power transition theory predicts that if the dominant power is going to initiate a preventive war, 
it is likely to do so in the beginning stages of the power transition when its military power is at 
its zenith vis-à-vis the challenger. It will do so because the leadership of the dominant state will 
realize that the longer it waits, the less its chances of winning a conflict. In fact, by the time the 
challenger enters the power transition, the dominant state may fear that it will lose its power to 
control its own foreign policy. Such fear may spark a preventive war against the challenger.
24
 
Power transition theory’s major contribution to a strong theory of preventive action lies mainly 
in its emphasis on the internal growth of states. It provides a mechanism by which power 
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Hegemonic Stability Theory and Prestige 
Robert Gilpin, in War & Change In World Politics, further develops the concept of 
prevention by using power transition theory’s hierarchy, but at the same time introducing the 
element of prestige. He suggests that a preventive war waged by a declining dominant power 
against a rising challenger may be the “most attractive response” available to the dominant 
state.
25
 Contrary to balance of power and power transition theories, however, Gilpin argues that 
prestige and not power may be the most important aspect of the international hierarchy. Gilpin 
segregates power and prestige as follows:  “Whereas power refers to the economic, military, and 
related capabilities of a state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with 
respect to a state’s capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power.”
26
 The prestige 
of a state rests on its ability and willingness to use military and non-military force to achieve its 
objectives. In other words, are the promises and threats of a state credible? A state that is 
powerful—and willing and able to use that power—will have more prestige than a state that is 
weak, or is powerful but unwilling to use its power. Gilpin goes so far as to argue that the 




Perception and Preventive War 
Jack Levy (1987) contributes to the evolution of preventive war theory by suggesting that 
perception is the key to understanding why preventive actions sometime occur and at other times 
do not. As I have noted above, Levy develops his concept of “preventive motivation,” which 
revolves around the dominant state’s perception that it is declining and the fear of the 
consequences of that decline. He was also the first scholar to pursue a research program that 
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isolated preventive war from more general theories of international relations or world politics. 
Levy suggests that the preventive motivation is best viewed as an intervening variable between a 
power shift and the decision to initiate war. He attempts to understand how preventive 
motivation fits in with other variables in determining whether a state in relative decline will 
initiate war against a rising challenger. He incorporates elements of prospect theory, suggesting 
that states become risk acceptant when faced with losses, and argues that this fact goes a long 
way in explaining why declining states are likely to initiate preventive war.
28
 
In an update of the 1987 article, Levy and Joseph Gochal (2004), suggest that preventive 
war initiated by a declining state has been a “fairly common” event in history. In their view, 
states in relative decline, who anticipate that a rising adversary will “either surpass it in military 
strength or cross a critical threshold of military capabilities,” have frequently launched 
preventive wars.
29
 Levy and Gochal argue that dominant powers may also be motivated to take 
preventive action if they think the status quo will get worse for them if the rising challenger is 
allowed to continue its ascendancy. This might reflect a general fear of a loss of bargaining 
power or fear of what the rising state might do once it gains a certain level of power, even if war 
is not necessarily seen as inevitable.
30
 For example, the globally dominant state, which is also the 
major power in a specific region, will not want to be replaced at the regional level by a new 
regional power. In such a scenario, if it is clear that the global dominant power will remain 
dominant on the world stage as a whole, but that it will be replaced within a particular region as 
the dominant power, the global dominant state might strike at the challenging regional state. The 
rising challenger does not necessarily need to have the potential of matching the dominant power 
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in every aspect to be threatening.
31
 Such a situation may be enough to spark a dominant initiated 
preventive action.
32
 Similarly, the threat that an adversary may cross some threshold of military 
technological capacity—such as attaining weapons of mass destruction—may be enough to 





A number of scholars have utilized preventive war theory to explain empirical cases. For 
example, Richard Ned Lebow, Stephen Van Evera, and Jack Snyder, among others, have used 
preventive war theory to explore the origins of World War I.
34
 In these cases, they have used the 
theory to examine whether challengers take advantage of opportunities that arise from power 
shifts, or whether dominant states take advantage of “windows of opportunity” to strike at 
challengers that have not yet reached their full potential.
35
 There have also been many 
quantitative tests for balance of power theory and power transition theory. Some of these tests 
shed light on the utility of a theory of preventive war.
36
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 Dale Copeland, in his important book The Origins of Major War, contributes to the 
development of preventive war theory by arguing that, in contrast to power transition and 
hegemonic stability theories, it is not the rising state but the dominant state that initiates war. He 
suggests that balance of power, power transition, and hegemonic stability theories are all 
inadequate in explaining under what conditions a declining state is likely to engage in preventive 
war. He argues that while many scholars recognize that preventive wars are a significant problem 
in history, they have failed to develop an adequate theoretical basis explaining the conditions 
under which preventive militarized action is initiated.
37
 He also argues that, contrary to power 
transition and hegemonic stability theory, most of the major wars in world history have been 
started by the declining dominant power. Furthermore, he notes, even if the dominant power did 
not start a war, it often engaged in risk acceptant behavior that brought about crises that raised 
the chances of war. His “dynamic differentials theory” integrates many of the concepts found in 
the other theories addressed above. Power differentials, polarity, and fear of decline are brought 
together under the umbrella of his theory. Furthermore, he takes into account the expected speed, 
depth, and type of decline being experienced by the dominant power. He grapples with the 
theoretical puzzle of preventive action by developing a rigorous theory that focuses mainly on 
structural aspects of the system, but also includes some elements of the domestic sphere. 
Nonetheless, he takes a much more deterministic approach to the subject than does Levy. In a 
sense, Copeland returns to the traditional approaches of Gilpin and Organski in that he focuses 
mainly on material and systemic determinants of power.
38
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 One of Copeland’s most significant contributions is his acknowledgement that preventive 
action need not necessarily result in armed conflict. He suggests that a declining state becomes 
risk acceptant and is willing to initiate a crisis if it believes that by doing so it might stem relative 
decline. A declining state is willing to do this because it does not fear war in the short term. In 
Copeland’s view, if a state believes war is likely or inevitable in the future, and that such a war 
will be fought under increasingly worsening conditions, it has nothing to lose by initiating a 
crisis in the short term. According to this logic, if the crisis is managed successfully, relative 
decline will be slowed or reversed. If the crisis spirals out of control, then a war will be fought 
under the best possible conditions. Doing nothing will result in further deterioration of the 
declining state’s power position. Copeland, however, does not go into detail about what types of 
preventive action a declining state might initiate. Other than initiating crises in order to forestall 




State Level Theories and Preventive War 
As is evident, most of the literature dealing with preventive war does not take more than 
a cursory look beyond systemic factors. However, in recent years a number of scholars have 
begun to examine the topic of prevention in terms of domestic factors. These scholars have 
focused on such wide-ranging topics as the effect of ruling groups, the internal structure of 
states, and what role belief systems play in preventive war decisions. Perspectives that focus on 
the state level allow us to move beyond systemic explanations that quite often fail to explain why 
a state sometimes does not choose to engage in preventive war. 
Randall Schweller was one of the first scholars to examine some of these domestic 
factors. He is interested in the domestic political structure of states and asks the question, “Do 




democracies fight preventive wars?” He also wonders why “some power shifts result in 
preventive war while others do not.” Schweller argues that it is the internal domestic structure—
whether democratic or not—that determines how a declining dominant power responds to a 
rising challenger. He concludes that when faced with a democratic rising challenger, 
democracies do not initiate preventive war, but instead accommodate the challenger. When it 
comes to non-democratic challengers, however, democratic states attempt to form defensive 
alliance systems. Also of interest, though, is that he leaves open the possibility that a democracy 
may initiate preventive war against a non-democratic challenger if the dominant democratic state 
believes that such a war would not be long or costly. Meanwhile, non-democratic states, when 
faced with a challenger (whether democratic or not), will either form a defensive alliance or will 
initiate preventive war. Accommodation is not in their nature. In all, Schweller suggests that 
there are four possible responses by a dominant state facing a challenger: 1) accommodation, 2) 
internal balancing—which is difficult for democracies because of the costs involved in building 
up military power, 3) alliance formation, and 4) preventive war.
40
 In sum, Schweller’s article is 
important both because he examines the internal structure of states, and because he suggests a 
range of responses by the dominant state. 
Jack Snyder, in The Myths of Empire, contributes to the literature on domestic factors of 
preventive war by examining the internal political dynamics of rising powers, as well as material 
components of power. The essence of Snyder’s arguments is that the origin of a state’s foreign 
policy is not the external environment, but the domestic one and the structures that develop 
within the domestic realm. This is not to say that events and structures in the international system 
do not play a part in shaping a nation’s foreign policy, but he suggests that the key ingredient in 
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understanding the foreign policy is domestic affairs and structures. Snyder also suggests that 
within the domestic sphere, myths of bandwagoning and the paper tiger can arise. These myths, 
if not counterbalanced by a more rational system of conceptualizations of the international 
system, can lead a state to overreach. This imperial overreach, in turn, can lead to war and the 
eventual contraction or destruction of the state. 
Though he is largely interested in rising powers, he reiterates the argument that a state is 
tempted to engage in preventive action if its chances of winning victory in a later war are less 
than its chances of winning a war now. Other considerations that must be examined, according to 
Snyder, include the domestic political costs and operational disadvantages of being the 
aggressor. Furthermore, the stronger state must look at the alternative of the costs of appeasing 
the rising power. Snyder also points out that leaders calculate both short and long-term shifts in 
power and resources. If the stronger state perceives the rising state as a future threat that has not 




Snyder is also interested in how states develop and the role of elites in that development. 
For example, he examines development in Germany and Japan prior to the Second World War. 
In both of these cases, Snyder suggests that their late industrial development allowed a narrow 
number of powerful elite groups to set the strategic agenda for the countries. These elite groups 
were tied closely with the military and the military had a strong influence on the foreign policy 
of both countries. The power elites and the military had no real checks on their power. Instead, 
they would work together, in what he terms “logrolling,” which allowed each interest group to 
achieve their main goals, but inevitably pushed their states into empire and overextension. 
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Furthermore, he suggests that because of their late industrial development and the concentration 
of power within a limited number of elite groups, democracy never had a chance to develop. 
Snyder compares this lack of democracy to Britain, which developed earlier and along more 
democratic lines. He demonstrates how democratic institutions prevented strong military elites 
from hijacking British foreign policy.
42
 
Charles Kupchan is perhaps the leading scholar on internal elements dealing with 
preventive war. In his The Vulnerability of Empire, he examines elite beliefs and the rise of 
hardliners, domestic politics, and options of the declining state. Kupchan suggests that both 
military and civilian leaders have an incentive to take hard-line stances. However, as the ill 
effects of hard-line policies mount, elites begin to realize that their policies are coming to 
jeopardize the security of their state. After a certain time lag, they come to appreciate that their 
beliefs are inconsistent with incoming information. Elite beliefs are fairly sensitive to incoming 
and disconfirming information, and decision makers eventually become aware of the need to 
adjust grand strategy. Unfortunately, elite beliefs, which are relatively malleable, run into public 
opinion, or what Kupchan calls “strategic culture,” which is more resistant to incoming 
information and to change.
43
 Kupchan demonstrates how hard-liners can become entrapped by 
the strategic culture which they, at least in part, helped manufacture. He suggests that even 
though strategic images may be created primarily for public consumption, they gradually spread 
through the elite community. Over time, individual members of the elite community come to 
believe in the strategic images that they repeatedly articulate before the public. This is especially 
true when decision makers pursue policies consistent with the images they are propagating. In 
essence, they come to believe their own rhetoric, and internalize the images they are producing. 




 Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 89-90. 
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New members of the elite community, and those not in the inner circle, unaware that prevailing 
strategic conceptions were originally crafted for propaganda purposes, become indoctrinated in 
the strategic culture. Over the longer term, elites may find it costly in political terms to refute 
precisely those images that they had previously been championing. Because strategic culture can 
infuse the elite community and its institutions with powerful images that override strategic logic, 
elites may not even accept that they must reverse course despite incoming information pointing 
to the need to do so. Furthermore, because elite beliefs adapt faster to new information than 
strategic culture, the same images that once shaped public opinion and empowered decision 
makers eventually can come to constrain them.
44
 All of these factors have important implications 
when it comes to the decision of whether to initiate preventive action. 
Kupchan’s emphasis on “vulnerability” is also of importance when discussing the 
probability of preventive war. Kupchan suggests, “Should elites believe that conflict with the 
rising state is unavoidable, they may even resort to preventive war in order to defeat the 
adversary while they still have the capability to do so.”
45
 In Kupchan’s view, high vulnerability 
means, “elites operate under conditions of strategic deficiency. They calculate that their own 
resources and those of their allies are insufficient to enable them to prevail against the likely 
adversary or adversarial coalition.” Because of this, declining states will attempt to avoid war, if 
possible. They will do so, even if it means making concessions to the rising challenger. He 
suggests, “It might be possible to avoid conflict altogether by meeting the demands of the 
adversary. At a minimum, accommodation will postpone conflict and buy time for the defender 
to seek added resources and improve the military balance.”
46
 Kupchan thus runs counter to the 
rest of the preventive war literature by suggesting that time is on the side of the declining state. 
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He suggests that adding allies or military resources over the long term will benefit the decliner. 
On the other hand, he suggests time is not on the challenger’s side and thus provides an incentive 
for an attack against the dominant state. Despite these controversial hypotheses regarding which 
side is favored by the passage of time, Kupchan’s insight into the domestic sphere is extremely 
valuable. 
 
Conclusion – Expanding the Concept and Examining Domestic Factors 
In sum, much of the past fifty years of international relations literature has dealt with 
preventive war directly or indirectly. However, there has been much discussion of whether the 
dominant or challenger state in a given dyad is most likely to initiate war. There are also serious 
deficiencies in much of the literature, though some scholars have begun to address some of these 
issues. Of particular importance are the issues of degrees of preventive action and the 
determinants of that action.  
On the first front, most scholars have treated the issue of prevention as an either-or 
proposition: either states initiate war, or they do not. I suggest that this is an overly simplistic 
view of a complex subject. Like Schweller, and to a lesser extent Copeland, I suggest that there 
is a range of possible responses by the declining power. By looking at a variety of forms 
prevention may take, we can better understand the utility of the concept and build a more refined 
theory of preventive action. On the second front, by examining more closely domestic factors 
such as elite belief systems, domestic political constraints, and the choices elites make; we can 
better understand the dynamics of the preventive motivation. We may then be in a position to 
explain better why power shifts sometimes lead to war and other times do not.  
 26 
All scholars stand on the shoulders of those who have come before us, and I am no 
different. On the one hand, this research fits in with that of scholars such as Levy and Copeland 
who suggest that it is the dominant state that is likely to initiate preventive action. On the other 
hand, I join scholars like Schweller, Snyder, and Kupchan by emphasizing domestic level 
factors. I also agree with Gilpin that prestige plays a part in explaining why states act the way 
they do, and I explore this element in my case studies. I also explore Levy’s ideas of decision 
makers’ perceptions regarding the domestic atmosphere, the international system, and the 
adversary. I use Snyder’s insights about domestic politics and the literature on belief systems, as 
well as Kupchan’s concept of strategic culture, to shed light on preventive action initiated by 
dominant powers. This study, then, contributes to the literature by recognizing a wider range of 
preventive actions and by focusing more closely than others on domestic factors.
47
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Chapter Three 
The Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 
As mentioned above, I am arguing that preventive action can take different forms, from 
diplomatic actions, to sanctions and embargoes, to one-time military strikes, to general war. I 
suggest that our traditional instruments for detecting preventive action have not been sensitive 
enough. By looking only for preventive war, most scholars have failed to see other forms of 
preventive action. Even those scholars who have acknowledged different types of preventive 
action have not sufficiently developed a typological theory of the phenomenon. The theoretical 
puzzle that has not been addressed in the literature is why a particular preventive action takes the 
form it does. Why in one case is an economic and military embargo levied, while in another case 
an invasion initiated? 
My answer is that the form preventive action takes is largely determined by domestic 
factors. Despite the contributions of hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory, the 
preventive war literature has essentially disregarded non-structural aspects and, with the 
exception of scholars such as Copeland and Schweller, has largely ignored variation in the scope 
of preventive action. My Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP), as outlined below, 
addresses the shortcomings of systemic structural theories by suggesting that domestic factors 
are largely responsible for determining when a state will initiate a preventive war, and when it 
will initiate less extreme forms of preventive action. In developing hypotheses that posit answers 
to this question, and testing those hypotheses, I develop a rigorous first cut at a typological 
theory of preventive action that explains the form preventive action ultimately takes. I create a 
model of preventive action, which demonstrates the utility of a broader conceptualization. This 
project contributes to the intellectual discussion by developing a model of preventive action 
grounded in domestic level factors. In so doing, I utilize some basic assumptions and findings of 
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prospect theory. More fundamentally, I use the method of structured, focused comparison to 
examine the interaction of domestic elements as well as systemic phenomena, and how that 
interaction shapes the form preventive action takes. However, by using a limited number of 
historical case studies I do not anticipate finding definitive proof of my hypotheses. Instead, I 
suggest that if I find evidence to support my concepts, it will provide an incentive for continued 
research in an area that has been underdeveloped by scholars. 
 
Assumptions of the DPMP: Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory provides a basis for understanding how states in relative decline might 
respond to rising challengers. Prospect theory suggests that actors are more fearful of losing what 
they have—what is termed loss aversion—than they are hopeful of gains.
1
 Actors will take risks 
to preserve what they have, whereas they will not take a similar risk to gain a similar objective. 
Prospect theory demonstrates that actors tend to overvalue what they have, and tend to favor the 
status quo. In other words, states will fight to protect what they have, whereas they may be less 
willing to fight to achieve conquest.
2
 Accordingly, if there is a possibility that taking preventive 
action will result in a loss, a state should not engage in such activity. However, if it is probable 
that a loss will be suffered if nothing is done, the state will take preventive action. Similarly, if it 
is likely that a state’s situation vis-à-vis another state will only worsen if no action is taken, it 
will likely take preventive action to slow or stop the deterioration.
3
 In short, declining states are 
security maximizers while rising challengers are “cautious” power maximizers. These aspects of 
prospect theory are integrated into the model as outlined below. 
                                                 
1
 Prospect theory is quite complex, and not all elements apply to preventive action. Only the relevant aspects are 
included here. 
2





Components of the DPMP  
Having briefly examined prospect theory above, it is now possible to develop a model of 
preventive action focused on domestic factors and the actions of domestic elements—by which I 
mean elites, decision makers, leaders, ruling coalitions, political opposition, and influential 
interest groups. I test this model against two other models—one composed of systemic structural 
causal mechanisms and one composed of domestic structural causal mechanisms. I do this in 
order to test whether preventive action occurs as suggested by structural theories, or whether a 
model based on other factors might perform better. I argue that the form preventive action takes 
is primarily determined by the three causal mechanisms in my model, and that the DPMP will 




Causal Mechanism 1: Internal Power Constraints 
The first causal mechanism in the DPMP is the level of internal power constraints, 
measured by whether the state has an offensive or defensive military doctrine. If a state has not 
prepared for offensive warfare, it cannot initiate militarized preventive action, or at least it would 
be foolhardy to do so. Defensive military postures, then, act as an internal power constraint on 
the leadership’s ability to exercise this form of preventive action.
5
 However, non-militarized 
preventive action is still a viable option for a state with a defensive military doctrine. 
                                                 
4
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Robert J. Art, and Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1984). 
 30 
 Jack Snyder’s study of the role of military doctrine in the outbreak of war in 1914, 
demonstrates how offensive doctrines are propagated among domestic elites, and the military in 
particular.
6
 He suggests that France, Germany, and Russia all had offensive strategies that 
prompted them to initiate war, even though there was real reason to believe that defensive 
strategies were more prudent. Snyder suggests that organizational biases and doctrinal 
oversimplification on the part of military planners were the primary sources of offensive 
doctrines. Snyder finds that institutional bias was greatest when the core values of the 
organization were threatened. These organizations developed overly offensive doctrines in order 
to ensure that the institutions were indispensable.
7
 
In essence, military planners create offensive doctrines because those doctrines ensure 
that the military has a mission. This is even more effective when they are able to make the 
argument that the best defense is a strong offense, meaning that if war becomes inevitable, it is 
better to be in a position to strike first and win a quick victory than to wait to be attacked and get 
bogged down in a long defensive struggle. Snyder argues that such simplifications of a complex 




 These biases can manifest themselves in the military doctrines of states. Snyder suggests, 
“As a rule, the weaker power is usually the defender and the stronger is the attacker. This rule 
tacitly recognizes the advantages of the defense…”
9
 When the balance of power is more equal, 
however, states tend to forget the advantages of defensive strategies. Instead, states look for 




 Ibid., 16. 
8
 Ibid., 16-19. Snyder is quite concerned with motivational bias in determining whether offensive strategies are 
proper given reality. I am much less concerned with the presence of bias. I am not interested in whether a particular 
policy or doctrine was correct, but whether it led to a particular type of preventive action. Nor am I concerned with 
the normative issue of how historical actors should have acted, but instead in how they did act. 
9
 Ibid., 22. 
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trends of power shifts and “windows of opportunity” through which they might be able to initiate 
preventive action. One problem, as noted by Snyder, is that strategists tend to see windows when 
none exist or overrate their importance. Furthermore, Snyder suggests that a rational calculus can 
yield an offensive strategy when some or all of the following conditions are met: “(1) the state is 
expansionist, (2) technology either favors the attacker or at least does not strongly favor the 
defender, (3) geography does not strongly favor the defender, (4) the military balance is 
favorable, (5) the anticipated trend of the balance is unfavorable.”
10
  
The current project is primarily concerned with Snyder’s fourth and fifth conditions. 
First, I am interested in the actions of the militarily dominant state in a given dyad. Second, if the 
status quo is seen as getting worse if nothing is done, preventive action is a rational response. In 
this sense, then, internal power constraints in the form of offensive-defensive military strategies 
are linked to domestic elements’ perceptions about the future. This is an example of the 
interdependence of the causal mechanisms, and leads one to the conclusion that equifinality is 
likely in this study.
11
 
The real issue regarding internal power constraints for this project is to what extent 
military doctrines hinder those domestic elements who favor preventive action. I suggest that 
defensive military doctrines constrain the initiation of militarized preventive action, while such 
doctrines probably have little or no effect on non-militarized preventive action. I would add just 
one caveat to this statement. If domestic elements fear a downward spiral from non-militarized 
preventive action to militarized preventive action, and they recognize that they are particularly 
weak militarily, they may be constrained even non-militarily. However, this should be a 
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relatively rare phenomenon since I am assuming that the dominant state is superior militarily and 
in a position to at least defend itself against the rising challenger. 
 
Causal Mechanism 2: Domestic Political Constraints 
The second causal mechanism I examine is the level of domestic political constraints, 
measured by the level of domestic opposition and regime fragmentation. It should be noted that 
my theory shares certain aspects with Hagan’s concepts of domestic political oppositions.
12
 This 
issue is important in understanding to what extent a given regime is able to pursue its preferred 
foreign policy.
13
 For the purposes of this study, domestic political constraints play an important 
role in determining whether domestic elements favoring preventive action will be successful in 
promoting their foreign policy agenda. As suggested in the opposition and war literature, and as 
emphasized by Hagan, “domestic political pressures [have been] very much the norm in foreign 
policy making.”
14
 The dialogue and political struggles between different domestic elements are 
analyzed in the case studies. We find both cooperation, in the form of logrolling between 
domestic elements that, though they may otherwise be contentious, share a particular common 
goal; and conflict, in the form of competition between domestic elements with opposing goals. 
Ultimately, this dialogue results in a foreign policy that, in part, determines the particular form of 
preventive action, if any, that is eventually initiated. 
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Domestic political opposition external to the regime can also affect foreign policy. Hagan 
suggests that of particular importance “is the strength and intensity of organized opposition 
immediate to the regime—i.e., dissenting actors within the ruling party, the legislature, the 
military, and regional governments. These are arenas for formal opposition to the regime, and the 
ability of the regime to retain power over the long term necessitates support of these 
institutions.”
15
 Special interests outside the government may also play an important role in 
opposing foreign policy initiatives of the ruling regime. 
Hagan also suggests that “regime fragmentation” is the primary regime property affecting 
a leader’s ability to initiate a preferred foreign policy. He notes, “This concerns the extent to 
which the central political leadership has persisting internal political divisions in the form of 
competing personalities, bureaucracies/institutions, faction, parties, or other kinds of autonomous 
political groups.”
16
 Hagan also suggests that there are five types of regimes, ranging from highly 
cohesive to highly fragmented. These can be broken down as follows: 1) single party regimes 
dominated by a single, individual leader; 2) regimes fragmented solely by the existence of 
established, autonomous political institutions/bureaucracies; 3) regimes controlled by a single 
party/group which is itself internally divided by established political factions; 4) regimes ruled 
by a coalition of autonomous political groups in which one actor has clear predominance; and 5) 
regimes ruled by a coalition in which there is no clear, single dominant actor.
17
 
The current study will examine how domestic political constraints shape or distort the 
foreign policy implementation of the ruling domestic elites in each of my cases. I argue that 
states characterized by severe domestic political constraints, either because of regime 
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fragmentation or political opposition, will be more acquiescent in the face of decline. States with 
minimal political constraints will be more likely to initiate militarized preventive action. 
 
Causal Mechanism 3:  Ruler Belief Systems 
The third causal mechanism I examine is the belief systems of decision makers. Belief 
systems manifest themselves by how rulers perceive threats. For this project, I am interested in 
the rise of hard-liners, and the extent to which they are able to affect national policy. In order to 
specify whether a regime is hard-line, I use Hagan’s typology of regime orientation. Hagan 
categorizes regimes as moderate, pragmatic, militant, or radical, with hard-liners falling into the 
last two categories. He suggests that these two political orientations are the most war prone and 
notes, “Leaders with a militant orientation perceive the international system as so hostile that 
interaction with adversaries is essentially zero-sum . . . Adversaries are viewed as having goals 
that directly threaten the security, well-being, and international status of one’s own nation . . . 
Confrontation . . . is meant to contain the threat and maintain the credibility of the nation’s 
deterrent.” The radical orientation, according to Hagan, is one in which “Leaders . . . consider 
adversaries to be evil actors who have a non-rational aggressiveness grounded in an expansionist 
ideology, unrestrained nationalism, and/or severe domestic crises.”
18
 
In understanding the importance of hard-liners, it is helpful to understand how they come 
to play an important role in the decision making process. Vasquez defines hard-liners as 
“…individuals who have a personal predisposition (due to their beliefs) to adopt a foreign policy 
that is adamant in not compromising its goals and who argue in favor of the efficacy and 
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legitimacy of threats and force.”
19
 Hard-liners are more willing to take risks than are 
accommodationists. They are also more nationalistic, hold a militaristic view of the world, are 
hostile toward and distrustful of other nations, and feel unable to control events.
20
 Vasquez 
suggests that hard-liners exaggerate the nature of threats in order to gain the support of other 
domestic elements and the public. He argues, “From the point of view of a decision maker facing 
a crisis, it is certain that strong actions will be supported domestically, while anything less will 
be criticized as being soft . . . In order to keep domestic support, leaders try to placate hard-
liners.”
 21
 Hagan adds to this discussion by suggesting that hard-liners may attempt to confront 
domestic opposition by amplifying foreign threats. They do this with the intent of diverting 
attention away from failing domestic policies, shoring up their political base, and mobilizing 
wider public support.
22
 Hagan further argues that the ruling leadership may employ a strategy of 
“political accommodation” by incorporating “the preferences expressed by the opposition…”
23
 If 
the opposition is hard-line, this may be another avenue through which they can gain influence. 
Either of the scenarios, diversionary theory or political accommodation, may help hard-liners 
come to play an important role in the decision-making process.
24
  
Hard-line policy is eventually codified into military doctrine and a set of war plans that 
can be used when needed. The connection between hard-line policies and the military is an often-
stated relationship in the literature. For example, Scott Sagan argues that military leadership is 
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 It should be noted that this project differs from the opposition and war literature in one significant aspect. 
Whereas the opposition and war literature is primarily concerned with how elites respond to domestic politics, this 
project is more concerned with how elites respond to shifts or perceived power shifts in the international system. 
How this perception is translated to the domestic sphere is the primary concern of this project. I am interested in 
domestic politics to the extent that those politics are shaped by the shift or perceived shift in the international sphere, 
and how those politics then shape foreign policy. 
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more predisposed, than is civilian leadership, to viewing militarized preventive action as a viable 
option. He argues that military leaders are socialized to see war as inevitable in the long run and 
therefore desirable in the short term if it will result in fewer casualties or more certain victory. 
They are, he suggests, less likely to seek nonmilitary solutions to international problems. In his 
view, military leaders prefer offensive strategies to defensive strategies, and would much rather 
be proactive on the battlefield than reactive. All of these factors, he suggests, should lead 
military leaders to be in favor of militarized preventive action.
25
 
Similarly, Alfred Vagts suggests that military officials are suspicious of an adversary’s 
military capability and have a propensity to see danger as increasing. These calculations tend to 
produce military solutions that favor the use of militarized preventive action. Civilian leadership, 
on the other hand, is inclined to view military danger as not necessarily increasing, and subject to 
neutralization through diplomacy. Vagts argues that civilian decision makers may be reluctant to 
take any action designed to counter-balance a perceived threat for fear of triggering a war 
initiated by the adversary.
26
 
For this reason, I examine the policy making role of the military in each of my cases, and 
in those cases where it is extreme, I look for evidence of hard-line policies. In this way, I search 
for a correlation between the two. Ultimately, I predict that domestic elements that exhibit either 
militant or radical orientations will advocate militarized preventive action, and the more militant 
or radical the orientation, the more drastic the recommended action. 
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I also suggest that as domestic elements within the dominant state evaluate a rising 
power, they go through several phases. These phases are not necessarily sequential and may 
occur simultaneously. In the first phase, domestic elements perceive some threat, in whatever 
form, from a rising challenger. I argue that a diligent declining power will monitor all other 
states to the best of its ability. Domestic elements may come to believe that the status quo will 
get worse for their state if the rising challenger is allowed to continue its ascendancy. This may 
be true even if the likelihood of conflict is low. They may perceive that their power and potential 
is in relative decline vis-à-vis a particular rising challenger. I suggest that a challenge to a state’s 
position in the international hierarchy can be enough to begin moving it down the road to 
preventive action. Because states are risk acceptant when it comes to possible losses, according 
to prospect theory—whether those losses are something tangible such as territory or whether 
they are less tangible such as international ranking or prestige—states will likely engage in 
preventive action. 
In the second phase, domestic elements evaluate the nature of the threat and determine 
their state’s level of vulnerability. By looking at the nature of the threat, domestic elements 
attempt to determine whether the threat is of a military nature. Kupchan suggests, “Should elites 
believe that conflict with the rising state is unavoidable, they may even resort to preventive war 
in order to defeat the adversary while they still have the capability to do so.”
27
 I suggest, 
however, that countering rising threats does not necessarily mean military action. If conflict is 
perceived as likely, though the challenger is unlikely to initiate militarized action, non-
militarized preventive action may be preferred by domestic elements in the dominant state. This 
is not to say that non-militarized preventive action may not be used against a military threat, or 
that militarized preventive action may not be used against a non-military threat. I am only 
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suggesting that in most cases, military threats will be met with military action while non-military 
threats will be dealt with in a non-military way. 
I suggest that in determining the vulnerability of the state, domestic elements not only 
look at the current power balance, but also the projected power balance. Even if the current 
balance is favorable, if the projected balance is unfavorable, there will be a feeling of high 
vulnerability.
28
 Domestic elements experience feelings of vulnerability if they perceive the future 
as worse than the present. I assume that the dominant state still has superior power, but is fearful 
that it will lose that superiority in the future. The level of vulnerability, therefore, refers to the 
extent of that fear. Feelings of vulnerability increase as the future looks increasingly dim. If 
domestic elements in the dominant state predict that the status quo will continue to worsen if 
nothing is done, they will likely push for some type of action. If a challenger state were 
perceived by the dominant state to be a threat, we would expect the dominant state to entertain 
the notion of initiating preventive action.
29
 In essence, for the purposes of this research project, 
the question that must be asked is whether the dominant state perceives a threat, and what form 
that threat is likely to take. 
For instances of non-militarized vulnerability, that is, instances of vulnerability that are 
deemed by the domestic elements in the dominant state to most likely not result in military 
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action, my predictions are similar to Kupchan’s predictions about low vulnerability. I argue that 
under such conditions, domestic elites will favor non-militarized preventive action. They will not 
feel the pressure to engage in military activity, and will not see the need for unnecessarily 
provocative behavior. Diplomatic and economic incentives will be seen as a first step in reducing 
threats. Kupchan suggests, 
At low levels of vulnerability, elites . . . focus on strategic and economic considerations 
in setting priorities; concern about reputation and resolve is far less prominent . . . Elites 
believe that they have at their disposal the resources necessary to deal with external 
threats. Strategic sufficiency enables them to respond relatively promptly to rising 
external dangers . . . Elites believe that they will be able to attain their international 
objectives. Even if war breaks out, elites believe that victory is likely; they are operating 
in the realm of gains. They will therefore [in accordance with prospect theory] behave in 





However, my disagreement with Kupchan’s interpretation of what constitutes high 
vulnerability (see footnote 28) leads to very different conclusions about what action domestic 
elements will favor. In Kupchan’s view, high vulnerability means that the military balance of 
power is perceived as having already shifted in favor of the challenger. Because of this, domestic 
elements in declining states will attempt to avoid war, if possible. They will do so, even if it 
means making concessions to the rising challenger. He suggests, “It might be possible to avoid 
conflict altogether by meeting the demands of the adversary. At a minimum, accommodation 




While Kupchan is focused on how domestic elements perceive the current military 
balance of power for explaining feelings of vulnerability, I suggest that feelings of military 
vulnerability have a more nebulous origin. In my view, domestic elements feelings of military 
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vulnerability stem not only from the current balance of military power as they perceive it, but 
also from the anticipated balance of military power at some point in the future. If domestic 
elements feel that they currently enjoy a favorable balance of military power, but that in the 
future that balance may tip in favor of the challenger, they are likely to experience feelings of 
high military vulnerability and are more likely to initiate militarized preventive action.    
There are several problems with Kupchan’s interpretation of high vulnerability. The most 
serious problem is that he views the balance of power as having already shifted and the 
challenger as militarily superior to the dominant state. He, however, fails to answer the question 
of why the dominant state would allow the challenger to gain superiority in the first place, even 
though he acknowledges that elites have a good understanding of the balance of power.
32
 If that 
were true, why would elites allow their state to be eclipsed by a threatening challenger? The 
answer is that they would not. They would take some kind of preventive action in an attempt to 
stop that from happening. Therefore, Kupchan’s premise that the challenger state is dominant is 
flawed. 
Another problem with Kupchan’s interpretation of high vulnerability is that he does not 
address what happens if domestic elements perceive the future as being worse militarily. A 
related issue is that he does not take into account the likelihood of conflict as perceived by 
domestic elements. If conflict and decline are seen as inevitable, waiting until one’s position is 
even weaker makes no sense. Kupchan tries to get around this by suggesting that in the time 
bought through concessions to the challenger, the dominant state might build up or strengthen its 
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alliance system. This is unconvincing since the possibility exists that any alliance formed by the 
declining state could be countered by alliance building on the part of the challenger.
33
 
Furthermore, I suggest that domestic elites can feel high vulnerability in either a military 
or non-military dimension. Domestic elements examine both the nature of the threat, whether 
military or non-military, and the anticipated balance of power. Level of vulnerability deals with 
the latter.
34
 In the third phase of evaluating the rising power, conflict (either non-militarized or 
militarized) may be seen increasingly as inevitable. Preventive action is particularly attractive to 
domestic elements if conflict with an adversary is seen as highly likely or inevitable. I suggest 
that the greater the likelihood of future conflict, as perceived by the dominant power, the greater 
the likelihood that preventive action will be initiated. However, because of the decline of the 
dominant state which serves as a crisis and the growing fear of inevitable conflict, the likelihood 
increases that hard-liners with a militant political orientation will become the primary decision 




As the ill effects of hard-line policies mount, elites may begin to realize that their policies 
are coming to jeopardize the security of their state. After a certain time lag, they may come to 
appreciate that their beliefs are inconsistent with incoming information. Elite beliefs are fairly 
sensitive to incoming and disconfirming information, and decision makers may eventually 
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become aware of the need to adjust grand strategy.
36
 Unfortunately, elite beliefs, which are 
relatively malleable, run into public opinion, or what Kupchan calls “strategic culture,” which is 
more resistant to incoming information and to change. In fact, Kupchan suggests, “Vivid events, 
such as war and crisis, can alter strategic culture relatively rapidly. Otherwise, shifts in collective 
self-image and identity take place much more slowly than shifts in elite beliefs.”
37
 These 
domestic elements then may become caught up in their own rhetoric, and may be unable to break 
free of their self-destructive policies. 
The concept of strategic culture is one of Kupchan’s more valuable ideas. He defines the 
concept as: 
The set of images that shapes a polity’s collective disposition toward the behavior of its 
state in the international arena. It refers to the realm of national identity and consists of 
the image and conceptions that determine how the polity understands . . . the nation’s 
position in the international hierarchy . . . The images that constitute strategic culture 
manifest themselves in and are propagated by numerous structures and mechanisms such 
as speeches, governmental institutions, popular literature, educational curricula, and local 





Kupchan demonstrates how hard-liners can become entrapped by the strategic culture 
which they, at least in part, helped manufacture. He suggests that even though strategic images 
may be created primarily for public consumption, they gradually spread through the elite 
community. Over time, individual members of the elite community come to believe in the 
strategic images that they repeatedly articulate before the public. This is especially true when 
decision makers pursue policies consistent with the images they are propagating. In essence, they 
come to believe their own rhetoric, and internalize the images they are producing. New members 
of the elite community, and those not in the inner circle, unaware that prevailing strategic 
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conceptions were originally crafted for propaganda purposes, become indoctrinated in the 
strategic culture. 
Over the longer term, elites may find it costly in political terms to refute precisely those 
images that they had previously been championing. Because strategic culture can infuse the elite 
community and its institutions with powerful images that override strategic logic, elites may not 
even accept that they must reverse course despite incoming information pointing to the need to 
do so. Furthermore, because elite beliefs adapt faster to new information than strategic culture, 
the same images that once shaped public opinion and empowered decision makers eventually can 
come to constrain them.
39
 In my case studies, I will examine the extent to which hard-liners are 
prevented from changing course because they cannot break away from the strategic culture. 
In the third phase, domestic elements, out of necessity, come to believe their own rhetoric 
that war would not be costly, that war now would be less costly than war later, or that the 
chances of winning a war now would be greater than the chances of winning a later war. The 
expected relative costs of action are essential to understanding what, if any, preventive action a 
state might initiate. Essentially, if preventive action is seen as not costly, it becomes more likely. 
If the expected costs of a particular action are high, that action is less probable. However, even if 
conflict now is seen as costly, but less so than conflict later, some sort of preventive action is 
preferable to doing nothing. Because of these calculations, the state becomes risk acceptant and 
advocates a strong offensive posture that can lead to militarized preventive action.
40
 This applies 
to both war and preventive actions short of war. Similarly, if war is perceived as inevitable, and 
war now is seen as inexpensive for the dominant state, it is likely to initiate preventive war in 
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order to forestall any future threat from the rising challenger. If a limited military action will 
reduce the future threat, such action might also be considered. A peripheral war will be an option 
if domestic elements in the dominant power see such a sign of resolve as deterring the 
challenger. General war against the challenger, on the other hand, may be seen as costly. 
Therefore, this form of preventive action may be the last option, other than doing nothing, which 
the dominant state will wish to take. 
The perceived chances of favorable outcomes are also essential to understanding what, if 
any, preventive action a state might initiate. Vasquez suggests, “All other factors being equal, the 
side that thinks it will win will tend to be the initiator. It makes sense that, once a war is likely, 
the side with the greater capability and commitment from allies will try to initiate the war, and 
the side with less capability and weaker commitment from allies will try to delay the start of 
war.”
41
 This would suggest that the dominant state should consider militarized preventive action 
as soon as it perceives a rising challenger and determines that war is likely. 
If military victory is likely, but less so in the future, some sort of militarized preventive 
action would be logical. The ultimate form this takes depends on some of the other factors 
discussed in this project. If military victory is uncertain at the present time, actions short of war 
may be a more desirable option. 
In essence, what is of importance for this project is to attempt to understand the extent to 
which hard-liners are able to influence foreign policy, determine to what extent domestic 
elements see threats as inevitable and/or military in nature, and to examine to what extent they 
are constrained by the strategic culture. Strategic culture becomes important if previously 
militant or radical hard-liners see evidence of a change, and try to move away from previous 
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hard-line positions, but are unable to do so because they are constrained by the strategic culture 
that they, in part, helped create. 
Finally, the strength of some of these factors determines the form of the likely preventive 
action. For example, the lower the costs of military action in the short term, the higher the 
probability of militarized preventive action in the short term. Similarly, the higher the perceived 
chances of success, the more likely the initiation of preventive action. The decision-making 
process as outlined above can be broken down as shown in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable: Form of Preventive Action 
As mentioned earlier, a real deficiency in the preventive literature is the lack of attention 
scholars have paid to preventive action short of war. By conceiving preventive action as a series 
of categories, it is possible to develop a model that questions why preventive action takes a 
particular form in a given case. The form of the preventive action then becomes the dependent 
variable in the DPMP. Below is a discussion outlining the possible responses by a dominant state 
to a rising challenger. 
 The first category, that of acquiescence (doing nothing), is not really a form of preventive 
action. In this case, the dominant state simply allows the power shift to occur. Nonetheless, it is 
included here because it is a possible outcome of a power shift, and one that occurs in my case 
studies. The United Kingdom’s response to the rise of the United States—removing the Royal 
Navy from the Western Hemisphere and turning over security of the hemisphere to the U.S.—is 
an example of this kind of behavior. The United State’s acquiescence to the rise of Japan in the 
1860s and 1870s also is a demonstration of this category. Both of these examples are explored in 
detail in later chapters. 
 46 
The second category, accommodation, is a mixed strategy of carrots and sticks on the part 
of the dominant state. The dominant state takes actions to stymie the rise of the challenger, but it 
is not willing to confront the challenger with overly coercive instruments. This category includes 
economic and diplomatic overtures, but of a relatively benign nature. An example of this type of 
action might be if a dominant state promoted the signing of treaties that prevent the spread of a 
particular type of military capability. The 1930 London naval disarmament agreement between 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan is an example of this. It can also include 
attempts to appease or negotiate a settlement between the dominant state and the challenger. For 
example, the Soviet Union negotiated a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany while Germany 
was rising but still inferior in terms of power.
42
  
The third category is that of sustained coercive/confrontational diplomacy. This can 
include the threat or actual use of embargoes and blockades to prevent a state from achieving 
some military capability. It also includes the formation of alliances against a particular 
challenger. The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for example, would fall 
within this category. It also includes the use of actual military resources to send a signal to the 
challenger that any continued unfriendly action will result in militarized conflict. When the 
United States sent three warships to Samoa in 1888 to respond to perceived German aggression 
there, the United States was sending a signal to Bismarck. 
The final category is that of militarized preventive action. This category entails several 
sub categories such as limited military action where military violence is used, but on a limited 
basis. The goal here is to prevent the challenger state from achieving a specific military 
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 A second sub category of preventive war is peripheral war. This type of war is 
similar to preventive diplomacy in that it is a signal, but in this case, it can be a signal to allies as 
well as the challenger. In this case, many military resources are utilized, but the target is not the 
challenger itself. Instead, a proxy target or third party country is used to demonstrate resolve. 
One goal, as seen by the dominant state, is to ensure that resources on the periphery are not 
accessible to the challenger. A second and perhaps even more important motive is that the 
demonstration of resolve will deter opponents and shore up allies. These peripheral areas often 
become significant not so much because of their actual military or economic importance, but 
because their “loss” to the challenger would represent a loss of prestige for the declining state 
that could open the possibility of defection of allies. Kupchan suggests, “Elites believe in the 
need to demonstrate resolve because they reason that they can offset insufficiency of material 
resources by bolstering reputation and prestige. Elites seek to rely on these intangible 
components of power to compensate for the relative loss of the material components of power.”
44
 
As a result, peripheral areas, and the wars fought over them, tend to become more important than 
their material worth would suggest. The U.S.’s involvement in Korea and Vietnam during the 
Cold War are examples of this classification of preventive action.
45
 
 The final sub category is that of general war. General wars are much less limited in scope 
than the other forms of war and are targeted directly at the challenger. General war is likely to be 
much more costly than other types of preventive action.
46
 It involves the targeting of multiple 
sites where research and development, production, and storage of a particular capability are 
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being conducted. It may involve a land invasion or substantial air and sea bombardment. General 
war often has as its goal broader implications than other types of war, possibly including the 
eradication and replacement of the rival government.
47
 
With the initial proposed typology in mind, the case studies are scored on a scale from 
acquiescence to general war, using the criteria outlined above. I then examine each case, using 
the method of process tracing, to determine to what extent each causal mechanism exists, or what 
form each causal mechanism takes. The validity of my hypotheses and model are then based on 




Testing the DPMP 
 In order to test my model, I have generated eleven hypotheses and eleven corresponding 
standardized questions to ask of each case.
49
 The last two hypotheses and the last two questions 
help compare the DPMP’s predictions against those of two other models. The first of these 
models tests the predictions of offensive realism, a systemic structural model. The second model 
tests the predictions of a democratic peace model focused on the domestic structure of both states 
in a dyad. I suggest that the DPMP outperforms both of these models. 
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In order to answer my research questions and test the DPMP, eleven hypotheses have 
been generated. These are as follows:  
H1. The greater the constraints on internal power, the less likely the initiation of militarized 
preventive action. 
 
H2. The stronger the domestic political constraints, the lower the likelihood of militarized 
preventive action. 
 
H3. The more militant or radical the ruler belief system, the higher the probability of militarized 
preventive action. States in which hard-liners emerge and gain dominance over the decision 
making process are more likely to engage in preventive action. 
 
 
The following six hypotheses evaluate different aspects of ruler belief systems, primarily 
in terms of perception. 
H4. Threats that are perceived as militarized in nature are more likely to result in militarized 
preventive action than are threats that are perceived to be non-military in nature.  
 
H5. The greater the perception that conflict is likely or inevitable, the greater the likelihood of 
preventive action. 
 
H6. States that believe that conflict will not be costly are most likely to initiate preventive action. 
  
H7. States that believe that militarized conflict now, while costly, will be less costly than 
militarized conflict later, are still motivated to initiate preventive action, though they may be 
more likely to choose non-militarized preventive action. 
 
H8. States that believe that the chances of winning a war now are greater than winning a war later 
are more likely to initiate preventive war than states that do not hold this belief. 
 







These last two hypotheses address the two models against which the DPMP is being 
tested. 
H10. Offensive realism predicts that unbalanced multipolar systems are more likely to generate 




H11. According to Schweller, democracies are unlikely to initiate militarized preventive action, 
but may choose accommodation or may form a defensive alliance against rising challengers. 





From these hypotheses, the following standardized questions have been generated and will be 
applied to the cases: 
1) To what extent is the internal power of the state constrained? 
2) To what extent are pro-preventive action elements constrained? 
3) What is the nature of the ruler belief system? 
4) What is the nature of the threat (military, non-military)? 
5) To what extent is conflict seen as likely or inevitable? 
6) To what extent do domestic elements believe that a war would not be costly? 
7) To what extent is there the belief that a war now would be less costly than a war later? 
8) To what extent is there the belief that the chances of winning a war now would be greater 
than the chances of winning a later war? 
 
9) To what extent do domestic elements think the status quo will get worse for their state if 
the rising challenger is allowed to continue its ascendancy? 
 
10) What is the nature (polarity) of the international system? I will use this question to 
determine what the offensive realist model predicts about the states’ behavior. 
 
11) What type of government exists in each state, i.e., are either or both democracies? I will 
use this question to determine what Schweller’s model predicts about the states’ 
behavior. 
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These eleven hypotheses and standardized questions allow me to test my cases in order to 
answer the basic research questions of this project. I am not suggesting that my hypotheses and 
questions are the only conceivably valid ones. I readily concede that many more hypotheses and 
questions are possible and perhaps desirable. I do hope, however, that the reader will approach 
this work with an open mind, recognizing that this is a first cut at forming a new understanding 
of the initiation of preventive action. If evidence supporting these hypotheses is found in the 
cases, it will suggest that the theory is credible. Furthermore, such findings would validate my 
conceptualization of preventive action as taking different forms. The research regarding the case 
studies will constitute the bulk of this project. 
It is also necessary to address whether alternative models make the same or different 
predictions on processes and outcomes in a given case. In general, the strongest possible 
supporting evidence for a model is a case that is least likely for that model but most likely for all 
alternative models, and one where at the same time the alternative models collectively predict an 
outcome very different from that of the least likely model. In such a case, if the least likely 
model turns out to be accurate, it deserves full credit for a prediction that cannot also be ascribed 
to other models (though it could still be spurious and due to an as-yet undiscovered theory). This 
might be called a toughest test case.
52 
The strongest possible evidence weakening a model is when a case is most likely for that 
model and for alternative models, and all these models make the same prediction. In such a case, 
if the prediction proves wrong, the failure of the model cannot be attributed to the countervailing 
influence of variables from other models (again, left-out variables can still weaken the strength 
of this inference). This might be called an easiest test case. If a model and all the alternatives fail 
in such a case, it should be considered a deviant case and might prove fruitful for looking for an 
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undiscovered causal path or variable that might be worthy of theoretical elaboration. Cases 
usually fall somewhere between being most and least likely for particular models.
53
 
I will test my Domestic Politics Model of Prevention against two other models derived 
from the literature. The first of these models is suggested by offensive realism.
54
 A real weakness 
of this model is that it only predicts preventive action in binomial terms: either war or no war. To 
supplement this model, I also utilize a second model derived from the democratic peace 
literature, particularly Schweller’s article “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are 
Democracies More Pacific?” In this seminal article, Schweller suggests a typology of when 
states are likely to engage in preventive war, and when they are likely to take actions short of 
war.
55
 I suggest that my model does a superior job at predicting when states are likely to engage 
in preventive action, and what form that action is likely to take. 
 
Alternative Model 1: Offensive Realism as a Structural Model of Preventive War 
In order to test the DPMP, I compare its predictive power to that of two other models. 
The first of these models examines the structure of the international system. The balance of 
power within the international system—whether it is bipolar, balanced multipolar, or unbalanced 
multipolar—has long been considered the primary factor in determining whether preventive war 
will occur. I test whether it is able to predict whether preventive action occurs, and if it is able to 
predict what form any preventive action takes. If it is able to do so, the importance of the DPMP 
will be weakened. On the other hand, if this model proves inadequate in its predictions, and the 
DPMP proves more accurate, my ideas are given more importance. 
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John Mearsheimer, with his theory of offensive realism, presents a refined picture of the 
international system. He suggests that major variations of balance in the international system can 
affect a nation’s calculations regarding the efficacy of war. Mearsheimer proposes a variety of 
systemic possibilities ranging from balanced bipolar systems to unbalanced multipolar systems.
56
 
He suggest that war is most likely to occur in a system in which a potential hegemon is 
emerging, what he calls an unbalanced multipolarity. On the other hand, war is least likely in a 
bipolar system in which two powers have roughly equal amounts of power. In between these two 
extremes is what he calls balanced multipolarity in which several states have roughly equal 
power, and there is no superior state. He suggests that in such a case, war is more likely than in a 
bipolar system, but less likely than in an unbalanced multipolar system.
57
 
I use Mearsheimer’s conceptualization of the polarity of the system in order to test my 
model. If preventive wars are initiated at a higher rate during periods of unbalanced 
multipolarity, less so during balanced multipolarity, and still less during bipolarity, the offensive 
realism model will be strengthened. Mearsheimer lists the polarity of the system as follows: 
1) Napoleonic era I, 1792-93 (1 year), balanced multipolarity 
2) Napoleonic era II, 1793-1815 (22 years), unbalanced multipolarity 
3) Nineteenth century, 1815-1902 (88 years), balanced multipolarity 
4) Kaiserreich era, 1903-18 (16 years), unbalanced multipolarity 
5) Interwar years, 1919-38 (20 years), balanced multipolarity 
6) Nazi era, 1939-45 (6 years), unbalanced multipolarity 
7)   Cold War, 1945-1990 (46 years), bipolarity
58
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I suggest that a model based on domestic factors will yield better predictions than one 
based on systemic mechanisms alone. One serious drawback of the offensive realism model is 
that it is not concerned with preventive action short of war. 
 
Alternative Model 2: Schweller’s Democratic Peace as a Model of Preventive War/Action 
The second alternative model I use to test the DPMP is based on Schweller’s predictions 
about the domestic structure of states and proclivity to initiate preventive war. Schweller argues 
that it is the internal domestic structure—whether democratic or not—that determines how a 
declining dominant power responds to a rising challenger. He concludes that when faced with a 
democratic rising challenger, democracies do not initiate preventive war, but instead 
accommodate the challenger. When it comes to non-democratic challengers, however, 
democratic states attempt to form defensive alliance systems. Also of interest, though, is that he 
leaves open the possibility that a democracy may initiate preventive war against a non-
democratic challenger if the dominant democratic state believes that such a war would not be 
long or costly. Meanwhile, non-democratic states, when faced with a challenger (whether 
democratic or not), will either form a defensive alliance or will initiate preventive war. 
Accommodation is not in their nature. In all, Schweller suggests that there are four possible 
responses by a dominant state facing a challenger: 1) accommodation, 2) internal balancing—
which is difficult for democracies because of the costs involved in building up military power, 3) 
alliance formation, and 4) preventive war.
59
 In sum, Schweller’s model is important both because 
he examines the internal structure of states, and because he suggests a range of responses by the 
dominant state. If Schweller’s model accurately predicts the behavior of states in my cases, the 
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importance of my model will be weakened. I predict, however, that my DPMP will outperform 
both Schweller’s model and the offensive realism model. 
 
Methodology 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett have devised a set of interrelated methods that 
are useful in dissecting the causal mechanisms of preventive action.
60
 The method of structured, 
focused comparison utilizes case studies, process tracing, and typological theory. These tools are 
examined in this section and explanation is given as to how they will be utilized in this project. I 
examine several cases of power shifts, both shifts that resulted in preventive action of different 
stripes, as well as cases that did not result in preventive action at all. These case studies are 
examined using the process tracing method within a structured-focused comparison framework, 
with a final goal of developing a typological theory of prevention that explains why preventive 
action sometimes occurs and other times does not, as well as explaining why preventive action 
takes the form it does in any given case. 
 
The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison 
 George and Bennett suggest that comparative case studies can use within-case analysis of 
individual cases as well as case comparisons to assess and refine existing theories, and more 
generally, to develop empirical theory. The method of doing so is “structured” in that the same 
standardized, general questions are asked of each case in order to guide data collection, thereby 
making possible systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings of the cases. The 
method is “focused” in that it deals with only certain aspects of the cases; that is, a selective 
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theoretical focus guides the analysis of the cases. Not all the theoretically interesting aspects of a 
case can be usefully addressed in a single study.
61
 In response to these methodological demands, 
I have developed a standardized set of questions that focus on the theoretically important aspects 
of my cases. 
 
 
The Case Study Method 
 
George and Bennett suggest that the case study method is particularly useful in 
specifying and measuring complex qualitative variables. Complex causal relations involve 
interacting causal variables that are not independent of each other. This method provides useful 
tools with which researchers can inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, and complex 
interaction effects. The case study method allows the researcher to develop contingent 
generalizations or typological theories. When done correctly, case studies allow the researcher to 
identify and test “causal mechanisms”—the social or political processes through which variables 
exert causal effects.
62
 I use this method because the causes of preventive action are complex, as 
will be demonstrated in this study. 
In examining preventive action, a power shift is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
63
 
Without a power shift, an action cannot be described as preventive. As Levy suggests, a power 
shift is an independent variable, but not all power shifts lead to war. I argue that not all power 
shifts even lead to preventive action. Some power shifts are met with inaction. For example, 
Russia and then the Soviet Union often chose to take no action against rising powers. The United 
States also allowed the United Kingdom and Japan to rise in relative power after World War II. 
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These are only two examples of several presented in this research where the dominant declining 
power took no action against a rising challenger. 
There are causal mechanisms that determine whether, in the presence of a power shift, 
preventive action will be initiated, and what form that preventive action will take. These causal 
mechanisms, and the resulting outcomes, are the subject of this study. Because of the complexity 
of these causal mechanisms, this study is necessarily concerned with the probability of a given 
form of preventive action. My model, therefore, is not deterministic in that if conditions A and B 
are present, outcome C will occur. Instead, I am suggesting that if A and B exist, there is a 
probability that C will occur, and that probability is higher than outcome D. 
 George and Bennett note that case study methods can address the issue of equifinality—
where the same outcome can arise through different causal paths in which there may be no single 
non-trivial necessary or sufficient condition. In other words, different mixes of causal variables 
can have the same effect. Case studies can also address the issue of multifinality—where 
contingent generalizations explicitly outline the differing background conditions under which the 
same value of a causal mechanism can have different effects.
64
 Both conditions occur in my case 
studies. For example equifinality is demonstrated by the fact that both the United Kingdom and 
Russia engaged in non-militarized preventive action when faced by militarized threats. The UK 
engaged in a naval buildup and then a redeployment of naval forces to contain the Russian threat 
at the turn of the twentieth century. The Russians, on the other hand, chose to develop closer ties 
with France in the 1890s to balance against a rising Germany. Both of these are examples of non-
militarized preventive action, but they come about along different causal pathways. To 
demonstrate multifinality, we can examine the American reaction to the militarized threats posed 
by the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s versus its reaction to the militarized threats from the 
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Soviet Union after the Second World War. In looking at the causal paths in the models in 
Appendix A, we can see that the causal paths are the same until we get to the question of status 
quo. At this point, the models diverge. Nonetheless, for the variables “nature of threat” and 
“likelihood of conflict” the values are the same but ultimately different policy prescriptions are 
reached.
65
      
 When choosing any method for research, the researcher must answer the question of why 
one method is chosen over another. One advantage of the case study method is that the 
likelihood that relevant variables will be left out is lower than for statistical methods. This is 
particularly important in the early stages of theory development, which I believe preventive 
action studies are in. Case study methods allow for the inductive identification of variables as 
well as their deductive specification. Indeed, one of the most visible and important contributions 
of case study methods has been to identify causal variables that have been left out or 
insufficiently examined by studies relying on purely deductive theories or statistical methods. 
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of the variables that play a part in the initiation 
of different forms of preventive action.
66
 I approach this research project from the standpoint that 
prior theories of preventive war/action have focused almost exclusively on systemic or structural 
variables, and have not taken an inductive approach. In this dissertation, I identify alternative 
causal mechanisms that will explain preventive action in a more comprehensive way. 
Having settled on the case study method, then, the next task is to select the case or cases 
which the researcher will examine. George and Bennett suggest that case selection is an 
opportunistic as well as a structured process. Researchers should look for whether the addition of 
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one or a few cases to a study might provide useful comparisons or allow inferences on additional 
types of cases. The primary criterion for case selection should be relevance to the research 
objective of the study, whether it includes theory testing and/or heuristic purposes. The research 
objective must be integrated into decisions on whether the research strategy should include one 
or a few case studies, case comparisons and/or within-case analysis, and so on. The cases must 
be selected to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem.
67
 
The case study method is sensitive to the manner in which cases are selected. A single 
crucial or nearly crucial case can strongly support or undermine a theory. A crucial case is one 
that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or conversely, 
must not fit equally well with any rule contrary to that proposed. In a crucial case it must be 
extremely difficult to dismiss any finding contrary to the theory as simply “deviant”—due to 
chance, or the operation of unconsidered factors. Studies of deviant cases are particularly useful 
for identifying new variables or causal mechanisms. By definition, deviant cases have outcomes 
that existing theories do not anticipate. George and Bennett note that truly crucial cases rarely 




 In a most likely case, the independent variable(s) posited by a theory are at values that 
strongly posit an outcome or posit an extreme outcome. In a least likely case, the independent 
variables in a theory are at values that only weakly predict an outcome or predict a low 
magnitude outcome. Most likely cases are tailored to cast strong doubt on theories if the theories 
do not fit, while least likely cases can help strengthen support for theories that fit even cases 
where they should be weak. One useful means determining whether a case is most likely or least 




 Ibid., Ch.1 and Ch. 4. 
 60 
likely is for case study researchers to include a typological table that shows the values of 
variables in the case(s) studied across competing hypotheses. It is important to consider not only 
whether a case is most or least likely for a given theory, but whether it is at the same time most 
or least likely for alternative theories, and a typological table helps identify which variables in a 
case may favor alternative theories.
69
 For this project, I suggest that the British response to a 
rising United States and the U.S. response to a rising Soviet Union after World War II are critical 
or most likely cases. These will be outlined further in the case studies of the dissertation. 
As noted throughout this dissertation, preventive action can refer to a full spectrum of 
responses to a rising challenger. In order to demonstrate the full range of preventive action, I 
have surveyed the historical record and chosen several cases that fit within my framework. 
Necessarily, I am unable to defend the cases presented here as a scientific sample. Instead, the 
cases I have chosen represent the range of preventive action in the Domestic Politics Model of 
Prevention. The three cases I have chosen, I would argue, also represent three of the most 
important episodes of the past two hundred years. The decline of great powers and super powers 
has shaped global politics during this period. I purposefully limited my cases to the modern era, 
and I limited the cases to the great powers.
70
 This necessarily means European states, with the 
addition of the United States and Japan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
One of the first questions that must be addressed about the case studies is “Why these 
particular cases?” One answer to that question lies in my desire for precision. I wanted to use 
objective data by which I could gage the rise and fall of states.
71
 I did not want to rely on the 
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 This is not to suggest that the theory I am laying out applies only to great powers. I would argue that these same 
dynamics will exist whenever the situation exists of a dominant declining state and a rising challenger, and should 
be an important area of further research. 
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 I use the Correlates of War project figures to determine relative decline of states. This data allows me to chart the 
rise and fall of states beginning in 1816. This data is available from http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
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observations of historians to make this determination. A second reason I decided to limit my 
cases to the “modern” great powers is because I believe, as Stephen Van Evera suggests, more is 
to be learned about the current state of affairs in the international system from the more recent 
past than from the ancient world. The study of modern times may provide a better understanding 
of how to prevent future clashes since the causes of modern conflict are more prone to recur.
72
 
The desire for objectivity and precision, and the belief that more applicable knowledge 
was to be gained from modern examples made me immediately rule out studying ancient 
civilizations such as ancient China, ancient India, the Ottoman Empire, the ancient Greeks, the 
Roman Empire, the Aztecs, or the Mayans. While rough estimates of power could be derived 
from historical accounts, my aim was to be as precise as possible when measuring the relative 
rise and decline of states. For similar reasons I chose not to use other eras that might have made 
logical sense. 
For example, 1648 may have been a natural choice with the ending of the Thirty Years’ 
War and the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia. The date 1519 might also seem an apt starting 
point. With the crowning of Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor over all Habsburg lands; one 
could argue this date would be a valid point of origin. Similarly, one could argue that the signing 
of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 might be a logical starting point. With the signing of the 
treaty, Spain retreated into the second tier of states, ending a push for hegemony by the 
combined Habsburg forces of Spain and Austria. Nonetheless, I chose to examine states since 
1816, because of the availability of objective measures of state power and the belief that more 
recent examples of preventive action would provide better predictors of future preventive action. 
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Since I am interested in great power preventive action, by definition any action in my 
case studies must include at least one of the great powers.
73
 Based on a survey of historical cases 
that fit my criteria, I have chosen three cases that I believe are both representative of preventive 
action in the modern era and are interesting examples. These constitute chapters 4 through 6 of 
the research project. Chapter 4 traces the decline of the United Kingdom and its response to 
challenges from Russia, the United States, Germany, and Japan. Chapter 5 examines the decline 
of Russia and the Soviet Union and its responses to rising challengers. Chapter 6 studies the 
decline of the United States vis-à-vis Russia, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom from 
1849 to 1996. 
I acknowledge that the historical periods under examination are complex, and that 
interpretations other than those offered in this study are possible. I do ask the reader, however, to 
suspend his or her preconceptions and to remain open to the evidence and interpretations 
presented here. Furthermore, this project is primarily concerned with how states come to the 
decision to initiate a particular level of preventive action. Therefore, the case studies presented 
here focus mainly on decision-making conducted during peacetime, not on wartime planning. 
The reader will doubtlessly notice that I spend very little time discussing the causes of 
rising states and declining power. These elements have been covered in detail in other studies—
particularly the literature on power transition theory. The purpose of this study is not to explore 
the underlying causes of decline or ascendance, but instead it is to understand what decision 
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 A word should be said about the limitations of this study. Because I am limiting my study to the modern era, and I 
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makers do with the knowledge that their state is in decline and that challengers are rising. I want 
to understand why decision makers in declining states react the way they do to rising challengers. 
A second issue facing researchers in the case study method, in addition to that of case 
selection, is the problem of reconciling conflicting interpretations of the same cases. As 
mentioned earlier, I have avoided one problem—that of interpreting state decline and 
ascendance—by using objective data obtained from the Correlates of War Project. Additionally, 
one remedy to this quandary includes identifying and addressing factual errors, disagreements, 
and misunderstandings.
74
 In order to overcome these issues, I rely on standard scholarly 
historical works, and where disagreements do emerge, I will acknowledge and attempt to 
reconcile them. 
I approach my cases in two ways. On the one hand, I compare cases with similar 
outcomes, i.e., cases that end in war, in order to identify the causal mechanisms associated with 
such outcomes. On the other hand, I compare dissimilar cases, i.e., cases that end in war and 
cases that end in action short of militarized conflict, in order to identify the conditions and causal 
mechanisms that served to account for this difference in outcome. Through these comparisons I 




As mentioned earlier, the presence of the preventive motivation is essential in being able 
to label any action as “preventive.” In order to systematically examine my cases and search for 
evidence of preventive motivation, I utilize the method of process tracing. This technique is 
valuable because it “link[s] theory and empirical work by using the observable implications of a 
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theory to suggest new observations that should be made to evaluate the theory.”
75
 The use of 
process tracing can strengthen the inferences that would otherwise have to be made on the basis 




Process tracing, according to George and Bennett, is the method of looking at the 
observable variables along a hypothesized causal process through which a causal mechanism 
exerts an observed causal effect. It is an attempt to trace empirically the temporal and possibly 
causal sequence of events within a case that intervene between independent variables and 
observed outcomes.
77
 Stephen Van Evera explains the method of process tracing as follows: 
“The investigator explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial 
case conditions are translated into case outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects 
independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the 
investigator looks for observable evidence of each step.” Furthermore, “Evidence that a given 
stimulus caused a given response can be sought in the sequence and structure of events and/or in 
the testimony of actors explaining why they acted as they did.”
78
 It is for this reason that I will 
examine the primary actors within the dominant state in each case. 
 Process tracing may help identify which interactions and potentially causal mechanisms 
in imperfectly matched cases can be ruled out as having causal significance. In other words, 
process tracing can test whether seemingly causal mechanisms are spurious and to uncover 
supposedly unrelated variables that may in fact be causal. George and Bennett have laid out the 
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criteria by which hypotheses can be tested. If all but one of the causal mechanisms that differ 
between the two cases can be ruled out via process tracing, a stronger (though still not definitive) 
basis exists for attributing causal significance to the remaining causal mechanism. If process 
tracing shows that a single step in the hypothesized causal chain in a case is not as predicted, 
then an unmodified version of the hypothesis cannot explain that case, even if it does explain 
most or even all other cases. Similarly, if there is only one intervening step in the hypothesized 
process, and this is observed to be untrue in the case, the hypothesis cannot explain that case. If a 
complex causal hypothesis involves several steps and even one of these is observed to be 
inoperative, the hypothesis cannot explain the case. If the hypothesized result does not 
materialize, even though a given causal mechanism was present, this would suggest that either 
the causal mechanism is not sufficient or there is a spurious relationship.
79
 These criteria will be 
used in my cases. 
 Process tracing tests whether a proposed explanation, or causal mechanism, is consistent 
with the evidence in a given case, and by extension whether the same causal process might apply 
to a category of cases with similar causal mechanisms. It can help identify a specific causal 
process that may explain an instance of a particular phenomenon. Process tracing can be 
especially useful in determining whether the phenomenon being investigated is characterized by 
equifinality. Process tracing can identify paths to an outcome, and can point out causal 
mechanisms that were left out in the initial comparison of cases.
80
 Furthermore, Van Evera 
suggests, “Process predictions are often unique—no other theories predict the same pattern of 
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events or the same actor testimony on their motives—hence process tracing often offers strong 
tests of a theory.”
81
 
 In sum, process tracing will assist me in determining to what extent each of my predicted 
causal mechanisms is effecting the foreign policy decisions of domestic elements. In addition, it 
will help me discard any causal mechanisms that might be spurious in relation to the type of 
preventive action policies that are eventually chosen. Process tracing will also allow me to 




 Case studies, through the use of process tracing, can be used inductively to develop and 
refine typological theories through a “building block” approach that maps out the alternative 
causal paths to the outcome of interest. A typological theory is a typology that is specified in 
terms of an underlying theory or set of theories that address not only how these causal 
mechanisms act singly but how they behave in specified conjunctive combinations. Each case 
potentially provides a new component in the construction of a comprehensive typological theory. 
Differentiated explanations of the outcomes of the cases that are all instances of the class of 
events being investigated become a part of a cumulative typological theory, or a “repertoire of 
causal mechanisms” of that phenomenon.
82
  
 The aim is to proceed incrementally toward the goal of developing a typological theory. 
George and Bennett suggest that by opting for this more flexible strategy, the investigator may 
gradually build a typology and a typological theory via empirical analysis of cases within a 
theoretical framework. Concern over the risk of a premature commitment to a well-defined, 
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comprehensive typology, one that may prove inadequate after much research on a set of cases 
selected for that typology, plays a role in encouraging a more gradual approach. For example, an 
empirical approach relying on historical explanations for different cases of preventive action 
enables the investigator to discover more general types of preventive action, some of which may 
encompass several cases, and to identify generic explanations for each type of preventive action. 
The different causal patterns of preventive action become part of a typological theory. Such a 
differentiated theory of prevention is significantly different from, and should be more useful 
than, a theory that attempts to provide a single explanation for all preventive action. It should 
also prove more valuable than systemic and structural theories that examine only preventive war. 
Typological theories contribute to the development of a rich, differentiated theory on the 
phenomenon in question, rather than a very general theory.
83
 
Typological theories are useful in showing that different combinations of causal 
mechanisms may interact to produce similar outcomes on the dependent variable. The most 
appropriate form for modeling the complexity of equifinality and multifinality is often that of 
typological theories. The resulting theories usually focus on interactions among combinations of 
causal mechanisms, rather than causal mechanisms considered alone or isolated through means 
of statistical control. Typological theorizing, as opposed to the simple use of typologies, pushes 
theorists to try to anticipate and explain interaction effects, although there is no guarantee that 
they will do so adequately. Typological theories address the problem of equifinality directly, 
acknowledging and even taking advantage of the fact that there may be alternative causal paths 
that lead to the same or similar outcomes. The development and refinement of typological 
theories, as opposed to typologies, is a key goal of theorizing on social phenomena characterized 
by complex interactions among numerous causal mechanisms that may be causal even though 




they are not necessary or sufficient conditions. They may explain how the same level of a 
particular causal mechanism can lead to different outcomes depending on the values of other 
causal mechanisms, if the goal is to explain the causal powers of a single causal mechanism.
84
 
Typological theories identify generalized pathways, whether the path in question has 
occurred only once, a thousand times, or is merely hypothesized as a potential path that has not 
yet occurred at all. Specific pathways can be explained by known causal mechanisms. According 
to George and Bennett, examples of causal mechanisms include: evolutionary selection, 
socialization, emulation, collective action problems, principle-agent problems, problems of 
credible commitments, two-level games and learning, and functional forms (such as linearity, 




Typological theories contribute to specific case study research designs and the selection 
of cases in the following ways. If two cases are to be regarded as typologically similar, or are 
common in the values of all the causal mechanisms and thus occupy the same cell in the 
typology, then they should have similar outcomes. This offers the most basic test of the validity 
of the specification of the type. If the outcomes of typologically similar cases differ, then the 
researcher should check for measurement error and for the presence of probabilistic causal 
processes. To the extent that these can be ruled out, a new causal mechanism (or several) in 
which the cases differ may need to be added to the typology and linked to a causal theory that 
can then be generalized. For example, if two states in my cases show similar values on the causal 






mechanisms, they should initiate similar preventive actions. If the outcomes are not similar, I 
may need to examine other factors that might be present.
86
 
 A second research design involves two cases that occupy adjacent cells in the typology 
and thus differ only in the outcome and in one causal mechanism. If exogenous causal 
mechanism can be ruled out as a source of variation in the outcome (admittedly not a simple 
matter), then differences in the outcome can be attributed to the one causal mechanism in the 
typology on which the cases differ. This method uses a typological theory to establish a 
controlled comparison of similar cases.
87
 
For each case, I will determine which domestic elements are the most powerful inside the 
dominant state and their ability to shape foreign policy, particularly if they have preventive 
action leanings. I will also examine the extent to which hard-liners dominate the decision making 
process of the dominant state. Furthermore, I will assess the threat or perceived threat as seen by 
the leadership of the dominant state. I will also examine the domestic elements’ perceptions 
regarding the timing of conflict. From this discussion, I have developed a preliminary typology 
(see Appendix B) that will guide the elements I examine in my process tracing of the case 
studies. 
 In this chapter, I have detailed the components of the Domestic Politics Model of 
Prevention. I have also explored several different theoretical models, which I will use to test the 
validity of my own model. In the next four chapters, I explore my cases using the theoretical 
framework and methods developed in this chapter. 








The Decline of the United Kingdom 
 
This chapter examines the decline of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis several rising powers 
from 1816 to 1914, with a focus on the period 1895-1905.
1
 The first section of this chapter is 
meant to serve as a general overview of British decline. The rest of the chapter will delve into 
particular aspects of Britain‘s relative decline and the specific threats to its dominance of the 
international system. 
In 1870, only England and Belgium could be described as ―highly industrialized.‖
2
 By 
1900, this was no longer the case, with Germany, the United States, Russia, and Japan all 
embarking on the path of industrialization. In the cases of Germany and the United States, 
Britain had been surpassed in many measures of industrial power. Even in the area of world 
trade, in which Britain had long dominated, there was a measure of relative decline.
3
 This is 
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United Kingdom vis-à-vis the United States 
From 1816 until 1892, the United Kingdom was dominant over the United States. 
Friedberg notes, ―In the early 1870s Britain was averaging £230 million in exports per year, 
greater than the combined total of the United States and Germany.‖
5
 Despite its dominant 
position, the UK was declining in terms of relative power vis-à-vis the United States during this 
period. The only significant exception to this was between 1865 and 1867 when the Unites States 
was in the wake of its civil war. By 1868, the UK‘s downward slide was once again apparent. In 
1892, the United States‘ CINC score reached parity with the United Kingdom for the first time. 
From 1893 to 1896, the United Kingdom regained its position as the dominant power between 
the two, but just barely. In 1897, the United States reemerged as the dominant state, and has held 
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United Kingdom vis-à-vis Prussia/Germany 
Closer to the home island, Germany had emerged as the biggest threat to the Empire by 
the early 1900s.  Germany‘s CINC score first overtook Britain in 1905, and Germany held the 
lead from 1905 to 1915. From 1916 to 1918, the two countries oscillated between dominant and 
challenger, but it was clear that Germany was becoming a powerhouse on the Continent. 
Germany‘s economy overtook that of Britain and Germany‘s population, which had been 39 
million in 1870, had ballooned to 65 million in 1913. During the same period, Britain‘s 
population had only increased from 31 million to 46 million. In 1870, Britain‘s GDP had been 40 
percent higher than Germany‘s. By 1913, Germany‘s was 6 percent higher than Britain‘s. In 
1880, Britain‘s share of world manufacturing production was 23 percent while Germany‘s was 8 
percent. In 1913, the figures were 14 and 15 percent respectively.
 6
 In the wake of the First 
World War, however, Britain retook the lead from Germany until 1934, at which time Germany 
again gained dominance until the end of World War II. Germany was divided at the end of the 
war, and it was not until 1990 that a unified Germany reemerged on the international scene. 
When Germany did resurface, it was dominant over Britain. It has maintained its superiority 
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 Britain‘s decline was apparent to the British press, and thus to British decision makers 
and the British public. Friedberg notes, ―In 1896 Ernest Williams, a journalist for the New 
Review, tapped a deep wellspring of anxiety over this new situation with articles and, later, a 
best-selling book. Britain was pictured as being inundated with German machines, tools, 
household goods, and even children‘s toys.‖ Several years later another book entitled The 
American Invaders reemphasized the concern about British decline.
7
 
 In August 1896, the Board of Trade, under the leadership of Charles Ritchie, undertook a 
detailed study comparing Britain with its principal competitors. This report, which focused on 
France, Germany, and the United States, concluded that Britain was still ahead of the United 
States and Germany in its ―power for manufacture of export,‖ but the two competitors were 
gaining ground and were experiencing faster growth. Even more troubling, was the finding that, 
barring the outbreak of war, Britain‘s competitors were likely to continue to continue their 
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ascendance and Britain‘s relative position would continue to come under increasing pressure. It 
was foreseeable that a structural change in the international system was in the offing. 
Nonetheless, what was called for, according to the report, was a redoubling of British effort, and 




United Kingdom vis-à-vis Japan 
Between 1860 and the early 1930s, Britain also declined vis-à-vis Japan. The relative 
decline of British power leveled off during the Second World War, and even climbed towards the 
end of the war and the defeat of Japan. However, after the war, British relative power once again 
began to decline as Japan recovered from the war. By 1962, Japan was in a dominant position 
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United Kingdom vis-à-vis Russia/the Soviet Union 
Russia also posed a challenge to Britain, particularly in the area of Indian security. 
Russia‘s CINC score first matched or exceeded that of Britain in 1905 and 1906. Britain and 
Russia continued to trade places as the dominant power between 1907 and 1926. At times, 
Britain would be dominant, at other times Russia would be in the superior position. By 1927, 






This chapter examines the following instances in which the United Kingdom was in a 
dominant but relatively declining position in relation to the challenger: 
UK/German relations: 1816-1914 
UK/Japan relations: 1860-1914 
UK/Russia relations: 1816-1914 


















































































































Nature of the Threat 
British decision makers often viewed the threat to Britain on two general planes: 
economic and military, with the latter focusing on naval power. In this chapter, I examine the 
extent to which these threats weighed on British decision makers, and the impact these perceived 





As early as the 1840s, some segments of the British government and the general public 
became concerned that the future did not look as bright as the past, and that Prussia in particular 
posed an economic threat. A select parliamentary committee on ―Import Duties and the 
Exportation of Machinery‖ was concerned about Prussian efforts to imitate British machines. 
Later, in 1856, a pamphlet titled The Darkening Cloud called attention to Britain‘s growing 
dependence on foreign sources of food and its tendency to import more than it exported.
10
 For 
the most part, these initial warnings of decline were dismissed. 
Despite these early forebodings, the message from the government was often ambivalent. 
For example, an 1885 report by a royal commission on the ―Depression of Trade and Industry‖ 
provided a mixed picture of the future. On the one hand, the commissioners seemed resigned to a 
measure of inevitable relative decline: 
We cannot, perhaps, hope to maintain, to the same extent as heretofore, the lead 
which we formerly held among the manufacturing nations of the world. Various 
causes contributed to give us a position far in advance of other countries, which 
we were able to hold for many years; but those causes could not have been 
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On the other hand, there was continued official optimism about trade and economic 
conditions despite the ongoing battle in the press and Parliament between those who favored free 
trade and those who proclaimed the necessity of fair trade. The 1885 report suggested that 
Britain was getting wealthier despite the fact that profits and agricultural prices were falling. 
Britain‘s export trade was increasing, even if not as rapidly as that of some of its rivals. Despite 
the fact that Britain would inevitably decline relative to other countries, it could still be expected 
to improve absolutely. The committee suggested, ―We have still the same physical and 
intellectual qualities which gave us so commanding a lead; and we see no reason why, with care, 
intelligence, enterprise and thoroughness, we should not be able to continue to advance.‖
12
 
While there was no consensus that the status quo would continue to worsen, the debate of 
whether the status quo was deteriorating centered on two primary groups of leaders. One group 
favored free trade, even if trading partners sometimes cheated, while the other group wanted fair 
trade. For the latter group, free trade that drove Britain into debt was no bargain. These 
advocates of fair trade argued that laissez faire policies were hurting the trade balance of Britain; 
and they worried that very large powers like the United States and Russia would eventually 
eclipse Britain. In August 1877, the Bradford Chronicle and Mail lamented ―our trade with 
America has fallen…and with Germany the fall is, if anything, greater…. Unless the nations of 
Europe and the United States can be induced to treat with us on fair terms…our foreign trade, as 
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regards Bradford, is doomed to decay.‖
13
 Similarly, an 1888 report by the Board of Trade 
claimed that, between 1875-1877 and 1884-1885, British exports had increased 8 percent while 
those of Germany had risen 16 percent and those of the United States had risen 35 percent.
14
 
Herbert Asquith, the Liberal MP and future prime minister, argued that the U.S., 
Germany, and other industrializing nations would inevitably develop their resources and supply 
their own domestic needs with their own manufactures. This was, in his opinion, only natural.
15
 
He even went so far as to reassure other nations that Britain was a benign power by stating, ―We 
do not covet any people‘s territory, we have no desire to impose our rule upon alien populations. 
The British Empire is enough for us.‖
16
 Meanwhile, Lord Roseberry scoffed at those who warned 
that Great Britain was not rising as fast as Germany and the United States.  He argued, ―Well, 
they began with very little. You could not expect to keep the monopoly of the trade of the world, 
because their populations swelled, and as their energy developed they naturally demanded a 
share of the trade of the world, as you ought to be pleased and proud that you have kept your 
position as well as you have.‖
17
 
The most ardent of the fair traders, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, saw in the 
available evidence clear signs that Britain was declining, but he questioned the inevitability of 
the rise of the superstates. Chamberlain argued, ―When we…talk of the prosperity of America 
and Germany, [our opponents] say, ‗yes, that is natural. Are they not greater than us, are they not 
more numerous?‘ Then, in a sort of despairing fatalism they seem to say, ‗What can our little 
England do but fall a victim to the inexorable decrees of fate?‘‖ Chamberlain argued that this 
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was fatalistic and false logic. He did not see Britain‘s decline in crucial sectors as either 
inevitable or natural. He argued, ―When I see these industries not leaving us because we are no 
longer capable of attending to them, but filched from us, stolen by unfair means, then I ask 
you…How long are you going to take it lying down?‖
18
 He suggested that Britain could 
strengthen its ties with its empire and could escape the decaying situation.
19
 He advocated free 
trade within the empire, but argued that there should be protection from outside states. He also 
suggested that close cooperation with Germany might be possible, but negotiations along these 
lines eventually broke down.
20
  
Not surprisingly, the free traders disagreed with Chamberlain‘s assessment and remedies. 
They believed that protection in any form was bad. Where Chamberlain saw indications of 
decline, the free traders in the cabinet and the various bureaucracies of the government searched 
for signs of hope or at least indications that decline was the result of natural forces beyond the 
reach of governmental policy. Instead of protectionism, they proposed the same solutions that 




Other free traders disagreed with Chamberlain‘s overall assessment. The Duke of 
Devonshire, for example, warned against, ―making a new departure, uncalled for by any existing 
evils, but based solely on abstract arguments as to evils which may possibly come into existence 
in the future.‖ Nor did Robert Giffen, the chief of the Board of Trade‘s statistical department, 
accept the evidence used by the advocates of fair trade or their conclusions. Giffen claimed, 
―There is no weakening in the hold of the United Kingdom (in comparison with its chief 
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competitors) upon either the import or the export trade of the world.‖ While he acknowledged 
that the costs of ruling Britain and the empire increased in the years before 1900, he argued that 
the gross national product of Great Britain also grew substantially during this time. It appeared to 
him that the rate of overall economic growth was close to the rate at which spending increased. 
The cost of ruling the empire was not, in his opinion, overly burdensome. As a result, he viewed 
any possible move toward protection as potentially harmful to British interests.
22
 
Additionally, the free traders at the Treasury Department manipulated the price indexes 
in such a way that they were able to argue that Britain was in a more advantageous position than 
might otherwise appear. For example, by comparing trade figures from 1882 with those of 1902, 
and measuring them in constant 1882 prices, imports rose by 56.6 percent, but exports were also 
up by 39.4 percent. This presented only a slightly negative picture, certainly nothing to cause 
national panic. The Treasury Department‘s analysts also saw significant improvement in almost 
every other economic sector including individual savings and overall coal consumption.
23
 
In addition to concerns about trade, some British official were also troubled about 
government spending. Michael Hicks Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his fourth 
budget speech in the spring of 1899, complained about the growth of spending in civil and social 
services. However, he was forced to admit that the largest increases had come in the area of 
defense, which he blamed on the ―increased and increasing armaments of other nations.‖
24
 
While Hicks Beach claimed that Britain was reaching its limits in terms of national 
financial power, Joseph Chamberlain argued that the limits had not yet been approached. He 
argued that spending was relatively light compared to the darkest days of the struggle against 
Napoleon. Furthermore, Britain‘s burdens were also relatively light compared to its competitors. 
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―I confess that you alarm me,‖ Chamberlain wrote in response to Hicks Beach. ―No doubt the 
normal expenditure on the Army and Navy has been enormous, but has it been more than is 
necessary—having regard to what other nations are doing?‖ The colonial secretary argued that 
the navy must remain inviolable and the army should only be cut once revised decisions about 
imperial defense requirements had been reached. Chamberlain argued that tax burdens were not 
as heavy as was commonly assumed, and that the public would be willing to sacrifice further to 
ensure the security of the empire. He felt that public opinion and competition from other 
countries would require some increases in defense spending in the short term. His predictions 
proved correct as the ministers prepared their budgets for the coming fiscal year.
25
 
Hicks Beach was not convinced by Chamberlain‘s analysis. Hicks Beach believed that 
the populace would not tolerate any more taxes. He argued, ―It is true that our present burthens 
are light, considering the increase of population and wealth, compared with those borne by our 
ancestors one hundred years ago. But they were engaged in a life-and-death struggle with 
France; we, on my assumption, will not be at war at all: the cases do not admit of comparison.‖ 
In his view, financial ruin and political unrest was inevitable unless the rate of growth of 
spending could be cut. He suggested that the rate of growth in naval spending had been excessive 
and could ―be lessened with perfect safety.‖ He also argued in favor of inducing the colonies to 
―take their share in the Naval Defense of the Empire.‖ Furthermore, he believed that army 
efficiency could be increased and thus the size of the army could be reduced without losing any 
effectiveness. This in turn, would result in a cheaper standing army. In his final analysis, Hicks 
Beach proposed cutting defense spending once the Boer War was over.
26
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Charles Ritchie, Chancellor of the Exchequer after July 1902, largely agreed with Hicks 
Beach‘s assessment. For Ritchie and his fellow free traders, long-term industrial decline was not 
as much of a danger as protectionism. In his view, reducing taxes was the best way to return to 
sound financial practices. In order to do this, and not run up additional deficits, he acknowledged 
that existing spending programs would need to be cut. However, Ritchie argued that Britain 
could not safely cut its own naval fleet while other countries were busy adding to their fleets.
27
 It 
became clear that the ax would fall first on the army. 
As has been alluded to earlier, in addition to the battles over trade policy and 
governmental spending, the Boer War was seen by some as driving Britain into dire fiscal straits. 
Yearly budgets were showing massive deficits instead of the usual surpluses. A feeling of fiscal 
constraint was particularly pressing for the Conservative Unionist government that held power 
from 1900 to 1905. The specter of excessive governmental spending loomed over decisions 
about alliances and the organization and deployment of the army and the navy.
28
 
Tax rates were raised between 1899 and 1902 in response to emergency spending. There 
were also warnings by Michael Hicks Beach and others that the finances of Britain were in crisis. 
They argued that the nation‘s financial difficulties predated the beginning of the Boer War and 
would persist even once hostilities were concluded. In their view, the existing tax system could 
not fund steadily expanding peacetime expenditures. Joseph Chamberlain and a few others who 
continued to defend further increases in spending were now decisively outnumbered. A new 
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Eventually, key British political leaders like Arthur James Balfour and Joseph 
Chamberlain‘s son Austen, who became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1903, came to believe 
that larger budgets, accompanied by higher taxes, would inevitably harm the economy. A 
weakened economy would ultimately reduce Britain‘s ability to raise large sums of money in an 
emergency. Political opposition from either the rich or the poor and perhaps from both was also 
seen as a possibility. Despite this logic, taxes were increased but still failed to match 
expenditures. Increased defense spending and expanding social spending were simply too much 
for a balanced budget.
 30
 
By the turn of the century, the debate had moved on to tariff reform. From 1860 to 1932, 
American tariffs were at extremely high levels. Thanks to Britain‘s willingness to allow 
American goods reasonably free access to its market without reciprocity, the United States 
enjoyed a free ride in terms of international trade. This finally ended when Britain responded to 
the American Smoot-Hawley Tariff by raising reciprocal tariffs against American goods.
31
 
From 1903 to 1905, the Conservative party and the country as a whole became embroiled 
in an increasingly bitter debate over tariff reform. In July 1903, the economist Percy Ashley 
wrote that Britain‘s exports were ―almost stationary.‖ He claimed that the commerce of Britain 
had suffered because of foreign tariffs and the industrial development of other countries. Still, 
Ashley concluded, ―Taking such indices as we have, the capital of the country is not declining.‖ 
He believed that the nation was growing more dependent on banking than on manufacturing, but 
―if scientific and industrial ability remains [in] the country, new industries will develop.‖
32
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In August 1903, Prime Minister Balfour declared that foreign protectionism was to blame 
for the declining British economy. He argued that the nation‘s economy might be holding steady 
at present, but he suggested that there was little reason to think that it would continue to do so. 




Alfred Marshall, one of Balfour‘s consultants, agreed with Balfour‘s conclusions that 
tariffs by foreign nations were hurting Britain‘s trade. He also suggested that the expansion of 
exports had slowed in recent years. He argued that in the future, Britain could not be ―the leader 
but she may be a leader.‖ Marshall viewed as inevitable the loss of some of Britain‘s earlier 
advantage. He believed that the best way to keep Britain in the top tier of nations was to promote 
free trade with Germany and the U.S.
34
 
Joseph Chamberlain‘s son, Austen, took over the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer 
in 1903. In Chamberlain‘s view, the financial resources of the United Kingdom were inadequate 
to provide for imperial defense. Civil spending would need to be frozen and defense budgets 
would need to be cut. He insisted that both the army and the navy share in the cuts that were now 
seen as unavoidable. ―It is with great reluctance,‖ he wrote, ―that I suggest any curtailment of 
expenditure on the navy; but it would seem clear that we cannot obtain from the army alone all 
the relief that we require.‖ By December 1903, Austen Chamberlain and Lord Selborne agreed 
that naval spending would go up by only ₤2 million in 1904. However, this compromise was 
abandoned by the end of the year when the Admiralty made a sudden request for two additional 
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Balfour and his fellow Conservatives chose a time-honored method of dealing with 
financial distress—spending cuts designed to bring budgets back into balance. Defense spending 
was still seen as abnormally and unnecessarily high two and three years after the close of the 
Boer War. Conservatives were also concerned about the new social and political forces that were 
increasingly determining the shape of domestic politics. They preferred the danger of military 
disaster overseas to certain electoral defeat at home.
36
 
The drive for economy had a significant influence over the empire‘s defensive posture. 
Between 1904 and 1906, the spending on the army was reduced from ₤31.6 million to ₤29.1 
million. Chamberlain‘s luck with the army was somewhat better. As hostilities in South Africa 
drew to a close, the budget for ground forces was reduced. In 1901-1902 total expenditure on the 
army stood at ₤94.2 million. By the next year, the figure was ₤70.2 million. It fell to ₤39.6 




One of the problems that confronted both free traders and fair traders in determining 
relative decline was that, as Friedberg argues, there was ―no reliable way of estimating growth 
rates or comparing overall economic capabilities across national boundaries.‖ This made judging 
relative decline difficult. Had decision makers been able to use an index that estimated spending 
as a share of gross domestic product, such estimates would have indicated that while outlays had 
increased dramatically, the economy of Britain had also grown substantially.  By the turn of the 
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century the burden of government spending had grown heavier, but the picture was not nearly as 
bleak as absolute expenditure figures seemed to suggest. Armed with this type of information, 
Giffen and Chamberlain might have been more successful in easing their contemporaries‘ 
anxieties. Without this type of index, it was probably inevitable that absolute spending figures 




Because of the optimistic reports and despite a growing feeling of unease about Britain‘s 
relative economic decline, no responsible politician was willing to challenge openly the 
country‘s faith in free trade. The Government‘s free traders in the cabinet and the various 
bureaucracies looked for signs of hope or at least for evidence that what was happening was the 
inevitable result of the operation of natural forces. Therefore, even though there was evidence 
showing that Britain‘s opponents were growing faster than it was, Britain reacted in a 
fragmented and only partially coordinated way. There was not enough evidence to convince the 
vast majority of politicians to move away from the ideal of free trade, and no real change in 
governmental policy was forthcoming.
39
 
Since there was no decisive evidence of relative decline, neither side was able to win the 
intellectual or policy debate regarding Britain‘s future. The participants of the debate were 
largely able to revert to their preexisting beliefs about what was best for Britain and for 
themselves, and to interpret what evidence there was through the prism of those beliefs. Since 
the free traders had dominated the political landscape before the debate, an intellectual stalemate 
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Perhaps even more troubling than the long-term possibility of economic decline was the 
threat of the loss in the short term of outright naval supremacy. In the mid-nineteenth century, 
the Royal navy consisted of over 240 ships, crewed by more than 40,000 sailors. It was the 
largest navy in the world by far. Niall Ferguson argues, ―At no other time in history has one 




The doctrine of the navy held that its principal mission was control of the seas. In time of 
war, this would require the prompt engagement and destruction of all enemy forces. As a 
consequence of this doctrine, the key to naval success rested upon the concentration and rapid 
mobility of British naval forces. Any unnecessary dispersion of the navy, such as to sooth 




At the end of the nineteenth century, maintaining parity with the French and Russian 
navies was becoming an increasingly costly undertaking. The emergence of a strong German 
fleet raised the possibility that the traditional two-power standard, in which Britain maintained 
naval forces equal to its next two competitors, might not be enough to ensure British control of 
European waters. Finally, the growing capabilities of the American and Japanese navies meant 
that even a firm grip on European waters was no longer a guarantee of worldwide command of 
the seas. As a result, some of Britain‘s outlying interests and possessions could not be considered 
as secure as they once had been.
43
 
                                                 
41
 Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power, 138-41. 
42
 Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895 - 1905, 117. 
43
 Ibid., 168. 
88 
 
A member of the British parliament suggested at the time of the First Hague Conference 
in May 1899, ―The United States, Great Britain and possibly Japan should make their combined 
naval power so absolutely supreme that they could order the other naval Powers to sell out their 
ships. Should they refuse, their vessels would be captured on leaving port. That would settle the 
peace of the world.‖ At the same time, at least one British service journal also advocated the idea 
of a preventive war to check naval competition. Within British naval circles, there was a fair 
amount of unguarded talk about preventive war. Alfred Vagts quotes one member as telling the 
German naval attaché that at present Germany possessed only a few ships, which the British 
Navy could easily dispose of, ―but in a few years you might be strong and we would lose too 
many of our ships….‖
44
 Britain would eventually find itself faced with naval opposition both 
from Europe and further abroad. 
 
**Continental Powers** 
In 1817, Foreign Minister Castlereagh articulated the policy that would govern British 
Naval policy for the next nine decades. He suggested that Britain‘s goal should be ―to keep up a 
navy equal to the navies of any two Powers that can be brought against us.‖ By the 1830s, there 
were already concerns that France and Russia would sign a treaty and effectively combine their 
two fleets in opposition to Britain. Worries about a possible Franco-Russian alliance became 
more intense in the wake of the Crimean War. An Admiralty minute of early 1858 warned, 
―When determining upon the number of ships which England should have, it should be borne in 
mind that the navies of France and Russia may very probably be combined against her.‖ To 
make matters worse, by the end of the 1870s, the French began a shipbuilding program that 
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equaled Britain‘s in cost. Italy, Germany, and Russia also all increased their naval expenditures 
at about the same time.
45
 
The two expanding empires of Russia and Britain met in the nineteenth century in Central 
Asia. Beginning in 1879, when the British, for the second time, attempted to invade and control 
Afghanistan, Britain and Russia conducted the world‘s first cold war along the North-West 
Frontier. This continued until 1919.
46
 Despite these increased tensions, both powers came to fear 
Germany more than they feared each other. As a result, they signed the Triple Entente, an 
essentially defensive treaty, with France in 1907.
47
 
France, Russia, and Germany were seen as probable challengers to British naval 
supremacy throughout the 1880s. The fear was that France and Germany would sign a treaty and 
effectively fuse their fleets in opposition to Britain. By 1884, France had nearly as many ships as 
Britain. If Britain were to face a combined Franco-German fleet, the Royal Navy would face a 
superior force of battleships and an almost equal number of cruisers. In 1887 and 1888, British 
naval activity decreased while that of the nation‘s competitors continued unabated. To 
complicate matters further, at the beginning of 1888 renewed rumors began to circulate that 




In the spring of 1889, the first lord of the Admiralty, George Hamilton, restated the two-
power standard. In a flashback to the ideas of 1817, he recommended to Parliament a five-year 
program of construction to build ten battleships, forty-two cruisers, and eighteen torpedo boats. 
The total price tag was ₤23 million. Hamilton concluded, ―Our establishment should be on such 
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a scale that it should be equal to the naval strength of any two other countries.‖ In particular, 
Hamilton was referring to ―the newest type and most approved design‖ of battleships.
49
 
Though it never stated so publicly, from the beginning the Admiralty had its eye on a 
possible Franco-Russian alliance. Fortunately for Britain, geography prevented the French and 
Russian fleets from combining with ease. The hopes of the British navy were pinned on a 
strategy of destroying its opponents as they moved out of ports on the Baltic and Atlantic coasts 
and attempted to come together at sea. Furthermore, as long as a Franco-Russian alliance was the 
worst thing Britain had to fear, it was reasonable to expect that it could maintain control of the 
waters surrounding Europe. In essence, no hostile forces would be able to fight Britain on the 
high seas and would not be able to attack its colonies.
50
 
Another threat to Britain would come if more than two European powers combined 
against Britain. There was a fear that a larger ―Continental Coalition‖ possibly including 
Germany, could form. These fears were further heightened by the ―Kruger telegram‖ incident in 
which the Kaiser publicly attempted to mobilize European opposition to British policy in South 
Africa while threatening privately that England would face a ―Continental League‖ if it did not 
sign a treaty with Germany. At the turn of the century, Germany did in fact emerge as Britain‘s 
single most dangerous naval threat.
51
 
Beginning in the mid 1880s, Britain became more concerned about the Franco-Russian 
threat and had to work harder just to keep up. There was a fear that Britain could be eclipsed by 
the combined naval forces of France and Russia. The British were also concerned that the French 
and Russians would interfere in British naval operations in the Mediterranean. In the late 1880s 
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and early 1890s, there were signs that both the Russians and French were increasing the size and 
improving the quality of their fleets. In August 1891, France and Russia entered into a formal 
entente. Though this stopped short of outright military alliance, it was still disconcerting to 
British naval observers.  Then, in October 1893, Franco-Russian solidarity peaked when a 
Russian squadron arrived at the French port of Toulon.
52
 
In December 1893 the Conservative opposition in Parliament, including Joseph 
Chamberlain, accused the Government of doing nothing about an increasingly unfavorable naval 
balance in vital strategic areas. Chamberlain, arguing that the two-power standard might be 
antiquated suggested, ―It may be that a better formula would be…that for any three battleships 
built by any naval combination against this country we should build five, and that for every 
cruiser built by the same combination we should build two.‖
53
 
The Liberal leadership, however, stuck to the two-power standard. At the time of the 
Toulon visit, naval intelligence warned that if there were no change in the pace of naval building, 
Britain would lose its two-battleship advantage over France and Russia within two years and 
would instead stand at a three-ship disadvantage. By 1896-1897, the disadvantage could grow to 
as wide as eight capital ships. In early 1896, Salisbury‘s advisers warned him of increasing 
Russian naval activity in the Pacific.
54
 
In the face of these concerns, First Lord of the Admiralty Spencer proposed a substantial 
increase in planned construction. Prime Minister William Gladstone resisted this plan, but after 
the Prime Minister‘s hasty and forced retirement, a smaller version of Spencer‘s plan was 
adopted. This new building program ultimately included nine new first-class battleships. This 
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building spurt ensured that Britain would maintain a slight numerical edge over the combined 
forces of France and Russia.
55
 
Other decision makers saw trouble elsewhere. Sir Charles Dilke, a navalist in Parliament, 
cautioned that existing plans did not adequately address the new threat posed by a rising 
Germany. He argued that the Government had two options: it could either enter into an alliance 
with some other state (a measure that he opposed), or it could follow ―the only true policy of this 
country…keeping up such a fleet as would make us safe against any probable combination.‖ 
Over the next two years, Dilke continued to criticize the government‘s building plans. He argued 
that a three-power coalition was always possible. He also warned that there was growing 
evidence that increasingly effective French and Russian mobilization procedures were increasing 
the danger of surprise attack.
56
 
Other British policy makers did not agree with Dilke‘s assessment. First Lord Goschen 
criticized Dilke‘s position on the grounds that it was a proposal that suggested Britain ―must 
have a Navy as large as all the navies of the world combined.‖ Goschen dismissed this idea as 
―preposterous.‖ He answered Dilke‘s warnings by arguing that the nature of a coalition with its 
ships of varying design and capabilities could never defeat the navy of a single nation, even if the 
opposing fleets were equal in size. Any advantage gained by superiority in numbers would be 
nullified by the problems of coordination. Arthur Balfour also dismissed Dilke‘s scenario as ―the 
extreme case‖ and argued that while the combined French-Russian fleet looked formidable on 
paper, most of their battleships were not capable of operating very far from their homeports. He 
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informed the House that by 1898, Britain would enjoy a five-ship advantage in first-class craft 
over Russia and France.
57
 
In May 1898, figures published in Parliament showed that Britain had fifty-two 
battleships, France had twenty-seven, and Russia had twelve. The Franco-Russian alliance also 
had eighteen battleships under construction. Britain only had twelve battleships under 
construction. This meant that the gap between the two sides would decrease from thirteen to 
seven. Germany clearly held the balance with seventeen battleships built and five in the process 




During the summer of 1898, it was announced that the Russians were building six 
additional capital ships. In response, four battleships and four cruisers were added to the Royal 
Navy‘s construction schedule. At the end of 1898, a report from the Director of Naval 
Intelligence forecast that within six years Britain would have fifty-seven battleships, compared 
with twenty-five for Russia and thirty-four for France.
59
 
The Fashoda crisis, in which Britain successfully faced down France, boosted confidence 
in the fleet and highlighted the continued importance of sea superiority. Some optimists believed 
that Britain‘s rivals would back away from their plans against the country now that it had shown 
that it was still superior at sea. Other observers saw only a narrow margin between the nation and 
potentially unfriendly states, an increasingly costly effort to preserve that advantage, and the 
possibility that German collaboration would upset the delicate balance.
60
 
                                                 
57
 Ibid., 157-58. 
58
 Ibid., 158. 
59
 Ibid., 158-59. 
60
 Ibid., 159. 
94 
 
The Boer War only aggravated these fears. During the first months of the war in South 
Africa, there were persistent reports that the Russians were attempting to draw France and 
Germany into an alliance against Great Britain. There was also concern that France would take 
advantage of the relative weakness of the Channel fleet which was supporting operations in 
South Africa to carry off a surprise invasion of the home islands.
61
 Furthermore, from the British 
point of view, thanks to the naval law of 1898 and Admiral Tirpitz‘s plan to build a German 




The concern about Britain‘s ability to maintain its naval supremacy during this time 
seems to have penetrated to the highest levels of government. Goschen, in 1900, stated, ―This 
great development of naval power which is being made, not only in France, Russia and Germany 




Lord Selborne assumed control of the Admiralty toward the end of 1900. First Sea Lord 
Walter Kerr advised Selborne on 22 October 1900 that estimates showing Britain with a slight 
lead over its two closest competitors was flawed. These estimates included some vessels armed 
with obsolete muzzle loading guns. The French were already modernizing their navy with 
superior breechloaders. Kerr concluded that by 1905 France and Russia would have fifty-seven 
battleships opposed to fifty-six for Great Britain. Even this estimate included some newer 
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muzzleloaders in the British front line. Selborne therefore recommended a minimal building 
program of six additional battleships (the two-power standard plus two additional ships), to be 
completed by the end of 1905.
64
 
Sir Reginald Custance, the director of Naval Intelligence, worried that even this might 
not be enough. He calculated that by 1907 Germany would have the same number of battleships 
as Russia. To make matters worse, the German fleet would be concentrated in the North Sea 
rather than divided between the Black Sea and the Pacific. Custance deduced that ―if we are 
involved in difficulties with any other Nation, and Germany adopts a menacing attitude, it will 
be necessary to maintain a force in the North Sea sufficient to mask the German fleet. As the 
German Navy will be at that date a much greater danger to this country than the Fleet of Russia it 




Selborne was also concerned about the potential strength and importance of the German 
navy. He was becoming increasingly aware of an intensified German political hostility toward 
Britain. By the end of 1902, Selborne was becoming quite anxious about the German threat. He 
wanted an additional six battleships over and above simple parity with France and Russia. 
Selborne was convinced that ―the great new German navy [was] being carefully built up from the 
point of view of a war with‖ Great Britain.
66
 
By 1905, the German navy had come to be perceived as a potent and threatening 
challenger for control of the waters around Europe. The only real alternative to the redistribution 
of naval forces was therefore an even greater expansion in the Royal Navy‘s overall size. More 
battleships and cruisers could conceivably have permitted a buildup close to home while 
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allowing a larger continued presence in Asia and the Western Hemisphere. However, this was 
dismissed as economically infeasible. Since prevailing financial assumptions were so strong, the 




In the wake of the divisive Boer War, the Liberals‘ enjoyed an electoral victory in 
January 1906 with one of the biggest election landslides in British history. As they took power, 
however, the security threat of Germany was looming. In 1907 the Foreign Office official Eyre 
Crowe, drafted a ‗Memorandum on the present state of British relations with France and 
Germany‘. Its bleak message was that Germany‘s desire to play ―on the world‘s stage a much 
larger and more dominant part than she finds allotted to herself under the present distribution of 
material power‖ might lead it ―to diminish the power of any rivals, to enhance her own [power] 
by extending her dominion, to hinder the co-operation of other states, and ultimately to break up 
and supplant the British Empire.‖
68
 
During this period of intense naval competition, preventive action was also proposed in 
addition to or in substitution of a British naval buildup. Whether the threats to British naval 
supremacy were real or merely perceived, the fear that it caused led to the restatement and 
advocacy of the idea of preventive action by British Navy and Army officers. For example, the 
British military attaché in Berlin in the 1890s, James Grierson, was convinced that ―we must go 
for the Germans, and right soon, or they will go for us later.  A pretext for war would not be 
difficult to find, and I don‘t believe that even Russia would stand by them.‖
 69
 In 1895, R.P. 
Hobson recommended that the British take preventive action against the French to avert the loss 
of naval supremacy. 
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At the time, such proposals found only a small amount of approval in British admiralty 
circles. Nonetheless, some naval writers adopted the idea and suggested that if ―European 
Powers do not stop the building of warships, an ultimatum should be sent to them by some 




First Sea Lord Fisher was also an advocate of preventive war against Germany. For 
example, he contemplated destroying the German fleet inside the Kiel harbor during the first 
Moroccan crisis. The ministers of Parliament, both Conservatives and Liberals, allowed Fisher, 
who was widely respected for his reorganization of the navy, to openly promote his preventive 
war ideas. The Germans concluded that Fisher meant what he said and that his Government did 




Fisher was not alone among British defense officials in his concepts of preventive war. 
His and King Edward‘s close friend, Lord Esher of the Committee of Imperial Defence, also 
supported preventive war. In November 1908, Esher told the French that in case of a Continental 
war, the British Government ―would be led, by the force of things, to intervene.... Germany will 
be our competitor and rival and, sooner or later, the opposition of our interests will lead us into 
conflict.  Much better that it should come about today while we remain faithful to our policy [of 
the entente with France] rather than postpone the day it is falling due and thus alienate France 
and possibly prepare for ourselves terrible reprisals. This would as well be for our fleet an 
exceptional occasion to annihilate the German fleet before it can become a real menace to us.‖
 72
 









German concerns were heightened in May 1905 when a British admiral was quoted as 
saying that much as he regarded an Anglo-German war a great calamity, he ―would sooner see 
such a war break out tomorrow than see it (if it really must come) postponed for a series of years 
when Germany will be stronger by sea and it may be possible for her to obtain an advantage over 
us.‖ The ongoing Anglo-German naval competition, increasingly burdensome and hence 
irritating, produced on the British side both proposals for a halt in the race and proposals for 
preventive action against Germany before it was too late.
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Despite these proclamations by some government and military officials, even with 
considerable backing from the press, there was no broad popular sentiment for preventive war 
against Germany in 1914 or before.
74
 Government approval for such preventive action was never 
obtained. There were threats on the far horizon that also required attention. 
The Admiralty was also concerned with the possibility of another threat emerging in the 
form of non-European countries developing significant naval capabilities. It was feared that the 
development of this latter threat would spread thin the British fleet and would likely require a 
substantial enlargement of the fleet. Combining this threat with countering a Franco-Russian 
(and possibly German) alliance would be extremely difficult. At the end of the 19
th
 century and 
beginning of the 20
th





For Great Britain, a rising United States represented a new front on which Britain would 
have to fight even before the close of the eighteenth century. As the wars of 1779-1783 and 
1812-1814 showed, this could be a problematic distraction if British forces were engaged in a 











 This would be a theme that would play out over the next century 
and a half.
77
 Robert Kagan argues, ―Except for the need to protect Canada, an increasingly 
difficult assignment, British policy aimed at appeasing the United States, not challenging it.‖
78
 
The United States had allowed its fleet to decay after the Civil War; and as late as the mid 
1880s the American fleet was still an insignificant entity, smaller even than the Swedish fleet. 
However, beginning in the late 1880s, it began the slow process of rebuilding by embarking on a 
navy-building program more ambitious than even Germany‘s. The achievement was incredible, 
and by 1907 the American fleet was second only to the Royal Navy. By the early 1900s Great 




As late as 1889, War Office and Admiralty officials concluded that existing garrisons in 
North America provided sufficient protection to Britain‘s imperial possessions in the Western 
Hemisphere as long as the United States did not increase the size of its navy. The army‘s 
planners concluded that no immediate reinforcements were needed at places like Bermuda and 
Halifax as long as the U.S. navy remained weak. However, the report from the joint conference 
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By 1890, the United States had three battleships capable of conducting operations along 
its coasts, and in 1892 a fourth battleship was added to the fleet. The British navy, with its 
overwhelming naval power, had nothing directly to fear from these developments. The real 
problem for the British was that there was now the possibility of yet another hostile collaborator 
against British imperial interests.
81
 
In late 1895 and early 1896, Britain and the United States were involved in a dispute over 
the determination of boundaries in Venezuela. Partly because this crisis coincided with the 
Kruger telegram incident, the cabinet decided to give way before American pressure, and in so 
doing, they ceded dominance of the hemisphere to the United States.
 82
 Arthur Balfour, the Tory 
leader in the Commons, declared in January 1896 that Britain had no ―forward policy‖ in 
South America and that it had ―never desired‖ and did not ―now desire, either to interfere in 
the domestic concerns of any South American State or to acquire for ourselves any territory that 
belongs to them.‖ He also pleaded for permanent Anglo-Saxon friendship and unity. Fears of 
Germany and Russia and to perceived vulnerabilities across the expanse of the British Empire 
helped pave the way from British acquiescence in the Western Hemisphere.
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On the first day of 1896, after the worst had passed, Lord Dufferin, former governor of 
Canada, wrote to Queen Victoria: ―Even if peace is assured for the present, America is sure now 
to set about strengthening her navy; and, when she has a powerful fleet she will be tempted to 
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Calls for a three-power standard did not, as has been noted, make much headway, 
whether the presumed third party was Germany or the United States. Nevertheless, in the wake 
of the Venezuelan scare there was a renewed interest in the defense of the North American 
portions of the empire. In April the Joint Naval Military Committee agreed that ―in the case of 
war with the United States the safety of Canada could be best ensured…by landing a British 
force on American territory and making a vigorous offensive movement.‖
85
 
Increasingly, however, an invasion of the United States was seen as less and less 
desirable. There were already high-ranking officials in London who doubted both the wisdom 
and the feasibility of entering into an open and explicit naval competition with the United States. 
By the end of 1896, some navy officers were warning that they had already lost superiority on 
the western half of the American continent. On 8 January 1897, Lord Lansdowne, secretary of 
state for war and future head of the Foreign Office, argued that if Britain tried to keep pace with 
the United States in the Western Hemisphere, financial ruin would inevitably result.
86
 
At the end of 1897, the first sea lord warned that the American government was making 
―a supreme effort‖ to strengthen its coastal defenses ―as well as to increase the Navy.‖ The 
Admiralty was rapidly losing whatever stomach it might once have had for a wartime effort to 
land forces along America‘s eastern seaboard. The Admiralty for its part was becoming less and 
less willing to contemplate the possibility of a naval clash with the United States.
87
 
The British view of the American navy came into focus in the last couple of years of the 
19
th
 century and the first couple of years of the 20
th
 century. During the Spanish-American War, 
the United States demonstrated the fighting power of its new navy and acquired bases from 
Spain in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In addition, three more battleships were added to the six 
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Great Britain now faced a serious dilemma. If it were to remain superior off the Atlantic 
coast of North America, it would need either to redistribute some of its forces in European and 
Asian waters or undertake an even larger buildup of its own. In February 1899, L.A. Beaumont, 
the outgoing Director of Naval Intelligence, warned, ―the United States mean to be the strongest 
Naval power [along their eastern coast] and it will be difficult to prevent it.‖ As Custance, 
Beaumont‘s successor as Director of Naval Intelligence, would shortly point out, ―with Cuba, 
Puerto Rico and St. Thomas in the hands of the Americans our position in Jamaica and the 




To make matters even worse for the British, the United States was also pressing for a 
canal across Central America that would link the eastern and western portions of its fleet and its 
new ―empire.‖ For almost two years, the U.S. and Britain had been involved in sporadic efforts 
to renegotiate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. This treaty did not allow either country to 
build and exert exclusive control over a Central American sea canal.
 90
 The treaty reflected the 
disparity of power between the British Empire and the United States in 1950, but by the end of 
the nineteenth century, the U.S. government felt it was in a much stronger position.
 91
 The United 
States government wanted the ability to quickly move its growing navy, in order to protect its 
new possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The British, on the other hand, were dragging 
their feet in the negotiations precisely to prevent this enhanced American flexibility. The British 
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were happy with the status quo. However, with the outbreak of the Boer War and their troubles 
in Europe and the Far East, Lord Landsdowne, the new head of the Foreign Office was much 
more willing to reach some sort of agreement with the U.S., even if it meant giving in to a 
number of American demands.
92
 
On 5 January 1900, the Admiralty produced a report that suggested that the United States 
would soon have ―a fleet sufficiently powerful to insure to her command of the Caribbean Sea 
and of American waters on the Pacific Coast. It is difficult to see how Great Britain can prevent 
this if the latent resources of the U.S. are considered.‖ The report noted that under existing 
conditions Britain could still deploy sufficient forces to gain local superiority.  Doing so, 
however, would seriously weaken its position in other areas. The situation was likely to worsen 
as the United States further utilized its latent power. It was therefore extremely unlikely that the 
Royal Navy could safely match the Americans on either side of the proposed isthmian canal. The 
development of a canal would make the task of overwhelming the U.S. fleet even more difficult. 
A canal would virtually ensure American supremacy off U.S. coasts in wartime. Given the 
relatively small British deployments there, this condition already prevailed during peacetime. 
Lord Landsdowne argued that with or without the canal, the American navy would become 
dominant in the Western Hemisphere. There was little complaint from the admiralty, which had 
already come to the same conclusion.
93
 
The army, on the other hand, since there was no formal treaty with the U.S., continued to 
hold itself ultimately responsible for the defense of Canada and the manning of the various 
imperial outposts scattered off the U.S. coast. Canada, with its extended land border, was of 
special concern to the army. The British army had hoped to deal with the danger of an American 
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invasion by planning an amphibious counterattack against the eastern seaboard of the United 
States. This plan was clearly no longer viable after 1901. As the Admiralty reduced the circle 
within which most of its forces would operate, it inevitably left the army dangerously exposed in 




On 24 February 1903, the Admiralty spelled out some of the conclusions to which it had 
come two years before. It predicted that by the end of 1905 the U.S. fleet would consist of 
twenty battleships and eight armored cruisers. Only a small number would be deployed in the 
Pacific. This fact, along with the increasing strength of the European Continental Powers, did not 
bode well for the probability that Britain would be able to blockade the Atlantic portion of the 
United States‘ fleet in its own ports. Admiral ―Jackie‖ Fisher went so far as to suggest that the 
defense of western Canada was ―absolutely hopeless [and] that it would be equally hopeless 
elsewhere….‖ Fisher‘s conclusion was that given the weakness of its position, the policy of the 
British government ought to be to ―use all possible means to avoid‖ a war with the U.S. In any 
case, ―it seems an utter waste of time to prepare for it.‖ In his view, there was little Britain could 
do to defend Canada if the U.S. was determined to invade.
95
 
The decision to acquiesce to an American-built-and-controlled canal committed Great 
Britain to naval inferiority in American waters and therefore to friendship with the United States. 
On 6 January 1905, the Admiralty made a formal statement: ―The view of the Admiralty is that 
Canada must primarily rely upon her own resources for defence against invasion by the United 
States.‖ The Admiralty also warned the Canadian government that it should do nothing by way 
of preparation that might antagonize the Americans. Appeasement was to be pursued by both 
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Ottawa and London. For all practical purposes, the British presence in the Western Hemisphere 





British acquiescence to the United States opened the door to similar actions regarding 
Japan. A rising Japan was signaled when that island nation defeated China in the spring of 1895, 
but Japan had been on the move well before then. During the late 1880s, the Japanese began 
taking the first steps toward acquiring a modern navy.
97
  While the emergence of the United 
States as a naval power seemed an obvious threat to British interests, the materialization of a 
strong Japan was a more ambiguous occurrence. 
After the defeat of the Chinese, the European powers coerced Japan into surrendering 
much of what it had gained through combat. In the wake of this humiliation, the Tokyo 
government vowed to never again be at the mercy of the Europeans and began a substantial naval 
buildup with plans to construct six battleships and six modern cruisers. In 1896, Brassey‘s 
authoritative Naval Annual pointed out that ―the Japanese are already building two powerful 
battleships in England and have drawn up an extensive programme of shipbuilding, which 
includes four battleships of 15,000 tons. It is clear that with this new competitor in the field, we 




In the closing quarter of the nineteenth century, the European powers were competing for 
influence in the Far East. By 1898, Japan was at least theoretically capable of tipping the naval 
balance in a war between the European powers. Britain therefore had good strategic reasons to 
                                                 
96
 Ibid., 172-99. 
97
 Ibid., 161. 
98
 Ibid., 165-66. 
106 
 
seek amiable diplomatic relations with Japan and perhaps to encourage the growth of the 
Japanese armed forces. If Britain regarded Japan as a potential enemy, it would need to either 
accommodate one or more of the other powers in the region, or increase its forces there 
unilaterally. If, however, Japan became an ally, the combined fleets of the two ―island empires‖ 
might be able to take on those of even the largest Continental coalition. Beginning in the early 
1870s, English officers acted as instructors to their Japanese counterparts. Furthermore, most of 
the major ships in Japan‘s navy were actually built in England until 1900.
99
 
At the end of the summer of 1901, the Government was preparing to enter into serious 
treaty talks with Japan. Britain was concerned with defending its interests in the Far East while at 
the same time more than matching its likely opponents in European waters. Of primary concern 
was the fact that Russia‘s naval strength in Asia had been steadily increasing.
100
 
Selborne argued that if Britain entered into a naval alliance with Japan, the combined 
battleship strength of the two nations in Asian waters would be eleven, two ahead of France and 
Russia. They would also be assured of a ―preponderance of cruisers.‖ Selborne‘s arguments 
played an important part in the cabinet‘s decision to negotiate an agreement with Japan. If 
Britain wished to remain superior in the Pacific to France and Russia, or even Japan, let alone a 
coalition of all three, it would need to either weaken itself dangerously in European waters or 
make substantial increases in overall fleet size.
101
 
The Anglo-Japanese treaty was signed on 29 January 1902. It was published several 
weeks later and committed each country to come to the assistance of the other if it was attacked 
by two or more hostile powers. A secret clause also called for substantial naval cooperation in 
times of peace. Britain was thus forced in the opening years of the twentieth century to abandon 
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its traditional diplomatic policy of ―splendid isolation.‖ This was a direct result of the 
deterioration in its relative naval power.
102
 
In February 1904, Japan and Russia came to blows. Britain and France had no desire to 
be sucked into the war by their respective allies. In an effort to avoid such a scenario, Britain and 
France came to an agreement regarding spheres of influence in North Africa. The agreement 
ushered in a major improvement in relations between the two old rivals and would eventually 
lead to a virtual diplomatic and military alliance.
103
 
The opening battles of the Russo-Japanese War proved the Japanese to be more than a 
match for their Russian opponent. Initial naval engagements off Port Arthur left the Russian 
Pacific fleet badly damaged. By the end of the war, Russia was reduced to the rank of a minor 
naval power and forced to sue for peace. With the demise of the Russian fleet and more cordial 
relations with France, Germany was increasingly seen as the principal threat to Britain‘s control 
of European waters. For this reason, the concentration of British forces would have to continue.  
The new organization was made easier by the weakening of Russia‘s presence in the Far East 
and by the virtual disappearance of the czar‘s fleet.
104
 
Russia‘s defeat was a boon for Britain. Before the Japanese victory, England would have 
been no match numerically for a coalition of France, Russia, and Germany.  In the aftermath of 
the Russo-Japanese War, the Royal Navy could deploy, in the words of Fisher, ―a force of 
battleships considerably superior to the combined battleship strength of those three Powers. 
Remember, it is the battleship that determines victory.‖
105
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By the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Britain had an alliance with Japan and more 
cordial relations with France. Russia was no longer a naval threat. Britain had also resolved the 
puzzle of what to do in the Western Hemisphere by conceding the region to the United States. 
Germany was still a serious concern, but many Britons were secure in the fact that at least Britain 
would not be facing a coalition of powerful states should conflict come. 
 
Analysis 
In this section, I assess the performance of my Domestic Politics Model of Prevention in 
predicting the outcome of British policy during the periods under consideration. Following the 
method of structured, focused comparison, each of the eleven questions posed in chapter three 
are answered, and then an overview of the model‘s performance is outlined for each question. 
The typology for this model appears in table 4.1 while the flowcharts for the individual cases 
appear in Appendix A.  
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1) To what extent is the internal power of the state constrained? 
The internal power of Britain was highly constrained between 1900 and 1905 in 
the wake of the Boer War. Free trade policies also had an impact on government 
revenue since an absence of tariffs meant no income from imports. Furthermore, 
deficits during this period limited decision makers‘ options regarding preventive 
action toward challengers. This is brought into stark contrast with Hicks Beach‘s 
recommendations to cut defense spending. His view that Britain was reaching the 
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to continue its military buildup. The expenses of the Boer War put further pressure on 
the finances of the empire. These financial constraints eventually resulted in military 
constraints. 
Using the typology of preventive action, I have developed (see figure 4.1) the 
UK‘s internal power constraints and military posture during this period can be 
classified either as a ―Severe/Defensive Strategy‖ or ―Moderate/Defensive-Offensive 
Strategy‖. This would suggest that the UK would acquiesce to or accommodate rising 
powers. This is what we have seen during this period. Particularly when it came to 
European powers, Britain was much more inclined to a containment policy. In regards 
to the U.S. and Japan, acquiescence and accommodation were the order of the day. 
 
2) To what extent are pro-preventive action elements constrained? 
As we have seen, though there was talk of possible preventive war against 
Germany, France, and Russia (particularly in terms of naval matters), this ―loose talk‖ 
was never transformed into governmental policy. In fact, these discussions were never 
given serious consideration by most decision makers. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that pro-preventive action elements were fairly constrained. 
 
3) What is the nature of the ruler belief system? 
The leadership of Britain during this time can only be labeled as moderate or 
pragmatic. The latter label seems the most appropriate. This is particularly true when 
looking at British policymakers decisions regarding naval forces. In this case, British 
political leaders recognized that British naval power was not sufficient to maintain 
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preponderance around the globe; and so they ceded some of that responsibility to the 
Americans and the Japanese. Since European waters were the priority for British 
policymakers, this was a very pragmatic decision. 
Looking again at the typology in figure 4.1, ―Moderate-Acquiescent‖ and 
―Moderate-Pragmatic‖ best describe the ruler belief systems during this period. This 
would suggest outcomes that square very well with reality. Acquiescence and 
accommodation are predicted by the DPMP, and that is what in fact occurred. 
 
4) What is the nature of the threat (military, non-military)? 
As early as the 1840s, Prussia was seen as an economic threat. In the 1870s and 
1880s, the United States and Germany were both seen as economic threats. There was, 
as has been noted above, a contentious debate about fair versus free trade. There was 
also talk about retaliatory tariffs (a form of preventive action), but no real action was 
taken during the period under investigation. 
Furthermore, Russia, Germany, and France were all seen as naval competitors. 
The primary British response to this was a continued naval buildup in an attempt to 
maintain a favorable balance of power. Over time, however, fleet consolidation in 
European waters became necessary. 
The U.S also posed a threat to the supremacy of the Royal Navy in the Western 
Hemisphere, but not to the British naval supremacy in the waters surrounding Europe. 
It became increasingly clear that if Britain maintained parity in the Western 
Hemisphere it would risk losing supremacy in Continental waters. It was also evident 
that Canada and other British positions in the Western Hemisphere were becoming 
112 
 
indefensible. As a result, the British decided to pull back from the region and not 
attempt to forestall the rise of American regional power. British appeasement of 
American power, therefore, opened the door to further American expansion. 
Japan, like the United States, posed a naval threat on the periphery. Japan could 
clearly tilt the balance of power in the Far East. It was therefore in Britain‘s interest to 
make sure that Japan was on its side in any conflict. War with Japan would have meant 
sending some of the Royal Navy to the Far East, weakening the British position in 
some other part of the world. It seemed more expedient to make sure that such a 
conflict be avoided, and so Britain entered into an alliance with Japan. 
On this dimension, the DPMP performs less well. Though the British were not 
extremely concerned about the threat of Japan and the U.S. to the home islands, their 
navies still represented a militarized threat in their respective regions. In these two 
cases, the classification of the situation as ―Moderate-Militarized‖ would probably be 
most appropriate: suggesting ―coercive/confrontational diplomacy.‖ This, of course, 
did not happen. Britain instead acquiesced to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere and 
allied itself with Japan in the Far East. Regarding Continental powers, at least at some 
points during the period under study, there was a ―high-militarized‖ perception of 
threat. The typology suggests that under this condition, Britain should have initiated 
some kind of militarized preventive action. Instead, Britain moved more to contain the 
Continental powers—alliance with Japan, concentration of naval forces in European 





5) To what extent is conflict seen as likely or inevitable? 
Oddly enough, the belief in the inevitability of economic conflict does not seem to 
have played a major role in the decision making process during this time. The 
possibility of conflict was often framed in economic and trade terms, and even then it 
was treated as largely theoretical in nature. Even in terms of tariffs, there was no 
consensus to use retaliatory tariffs against other states. Prime Minister Balfour, 
however, did recommend the implementation of retaliatory tariffs. Asquith‘s statement 
about the benign nature of Britain exemplifies the belief or hope that conflict was 
unnecessary. 
In examining the naval relations between Russia, France, Germany, and Britain, it 
is difficult to determine the perception of the likelihood of conflict. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that conflict was seen as at least somewhat likely since there 
were crises such as Fashoda and the Crimean War. Unfortunately, the murkiness of 
this issue causes problems for my model. 
Conflict with the U.S. seems to have been thought possible, but less urgent than 
that of Continental powers. Probably the main reason for this fact is that the U.S. was 
not a threat to the British home islands themselves. Furthermore, control of the 
Continental waters was seen as the highest priority, and the U.S. was not perceived to 
threaten British supremacy there. Similarly, conflict with Japan was not seen as 
inevitable by British policy makers. It did not even seem likely. Therefore, the 
decision to enter into an alliance was a fairly easy one for the British. Additionally, the 
British-Japanese alliance can be seen as a form of preventive action against the 
Continental powers and perhaps even the United States. By ensuring a strong Japan, 
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the British reduced the probability that another power would be able to move into the 
Far East. 
In looking at the typology in figure 4.1, it seems that here again the DPMP falls 
short of accurately predicting British behavior. For the U.S. and Japan, there was a 
―moderate‖ threat of conflict and since this threat had a militarized component, Britain 
should have, according to the typology, initiated sustained coercive diplomacy with 
these two powers. On the other hand, regarding the Continental powers, there was a 
higher threat of conflict that should have at least resulted in confrontational diplomacy 
and perhaps militarized preventive action. Some of the former did occur, but the latter 
did not. Therefore, my model does not perform extremely well on this dimension. 
 
6) To what extent do domestic elements believe that a war would not be costly? 
Clearly, conflict between Britain, Russia, Germany, and France would be costly. 
Furthermore, British decision makers had to contend with the real possibility that any 
war with any one of these powers would result in a war with all three. Its two-power 
standard would in no way guarantee victory against these three powers. Therefore, 
militarized action would have been seen as very costly and possibly catastrophic. 
Conflict with the U.S. would have also been expensive. It was widely believed 
that the United States would be able to invade Canada and take that country regardless 
of what the British navy and army did. As the 19
th
 century came to a close and the 20
th
 
century dawned, it became increasingly clear that American power in the Western 
Hemisphere was outstripping that of Britain in the region. Conflict, therefore, would 
be prohibitively expensive. 
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Similarly, a war with Japan would have been costly because it would have created 
vulnerabilities in other parts of the empire. This cost would have increased if Japan 
joined a coalition of European powers—particularly France, Russia, or Germany—or 
any combination of the three. Alliance and accommodation seemed a much wiser 
course of action to many British decision makers. 
The DPMP (see flowcharts in Appendix A) predicts this dimension fairly well. In 
those instances when militarized preventive action is seen as costly it should be less 
likely. This was certainly the case with Britain. Even in those instances where it would 
have been less costly to initiate militarized preventive action sooner rather than later, 
there was still a great amount of apprehension. This occurred as predicted by my 
model. 
 
7) To what extent is there the belief that a war now would be less costly than a war 
later? 
 
There was clearly the belief by some decision makers, including Lord Esher, that 
if war were inevitable, it would be better to have it in the short term before Germany 
fully developed its naval potential. However, as has been noted, British policymakers 
were extremely cautious. It was clear that any conflict, especially militarized conflict, 
would present a heavy burden. 
Conflict on the periphery was also seen as problematic. War with the U.S. was 
already seen as prohibitively expensive. Canada would certainly be lost, as would 
other British positions. By the beginning of the 20
th
 century, war was seen in most 
corners of British policy making as simply too expensive to contemplate. Similarly, a 
war with Japan that could possibly involve Continental powers was seen as 
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exceedingly costly and dangerous. Acquiescence was a more logical choice from the 
standpoint of British decision makers. This would also have the added benefit of 
perhaps freezing other powers out of the Far East. 
This again is addressed by the flowcharts in Appendix A. The real problem here is 
that by the time British political leaders started to contemplate preventive action, the 
costs were already seen as too high. This was especially true when considering 
militarized preventive action. As a result, containment and other forms of non-
militarized preventive action were preferred. This is as expected by the DPMP. 
 
8) To what extent is there the belief that the chances of winning a war now would be 
greater than the chances of winning a later war? 
 
There was the belief that there was a better chance of a favorable outcome in the 
short term should there be conflict, than there would be further in the future. Time did 
not seem to be on Britain‘s side. However, this was tempered by the belief that Britain 
could maintain its position, especially economically, if Britons simply worked harder 
and returned to more traditional values. 
By the close of the 18
th
 century, war with the U.S. was seen as extremely 
dangerous because should such an event occur, British deployment of naval forces 
from Continental waters to the Western Hemisphere would leave the British home 
islands extremely vulnerable to invasion by Continental forces. In essence, then, war 
with the U.S. was simply too risky to contemplate, and a war could not be ―won‖ 
either at that time or later. 
As Japan rose, the danger of a Japanese-European coalition was the real danger. 
Once Britain had ensured that that was not going to happen, the real danger subsided. 
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For British policymakers an alliance with Japan was much less risky than a war with 
Japan that might eventually involve other European powers. 
This question is similar to the previous question. Again, the real problem is that 
even if a war was winnable, it was still seen as a Pyrrhic victory, especially in the 
wake of the Boer War. As a result, as predicted by the DPMP, non-militarized 
preventive action, if any action was to be taken at all, was preferred over militarized 
preventive action. 
 
9) To what extent do domestic elements think the status quo will get worse for their 
state if the rising challenger is allowed to continue its ascendancy? 
 
The August 1896 Board of Trade report suggested that Britain was likely to 
continue experiencing relative decline in the areas of manufacture and export vis-à-vis 
the United States and Germany. The report suggested that the only way this trend 
could be reversed was if a war would break out that would disrupt one or both of the 
competitors. Despite this gloomy outlook, there was no call for preventive action. 
Regarding the free trade versus fair trade debate, there was no consensus that the 
status quo would continue to get worse for Britain. There was also the belief that even 
if Britain continued to decline relatively, it was experiencing absolute improvement. 
Nonetheless, prominent political leaders such as Balfour were concerned about the 
future relative decline of Britain. Other public officials such as Marshall, however, 
believed that free trade with the U.S. and Germany would stave off future relative 
decline for Britain. 
In terms of military challenges, Germany was seen as the primary threat in terms 
of naval power. It was feared that the longer German naval power went unchecked, the 
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worse the future would be for Britain. As has been shown, British naval planners also 
feared a Russian-French-German alliance. These possibilities by themselves suggested 
a worsening status quo. 
Elsewhere in the world, it was clear that American naval power would continue to 
grow. The status quo for Britain in the Western Hemisphere would continue to worsen 
regardless of what Britain did. Any war with the U.S., the conventional wisdom ran, 
would only hasten the decline of British power in this part of the world. In essence, 
then, the rise of American naval power was seen as inevitable by most British 
policymakers.  
British policymakers were also cognizant that Japan‘s naval strength was 
growing. After Japan defeated the Chinese and then the Russians, it was clear that the 
status quo in the Far East was shifting. British political leaders seemed to be aware 
that British power in the region was in decline relative to that of Japan, but the British-
Japanese alliance seemed to assuage the larger fears of these policymakers. 
British policymakers and public officials almost universally came to see the status 
quo as worsening for the British people. However, many believed that with hard work 
and a return to traditional British values, the decline could be halted and even 
reversed. Then there were those who saw relative decline as inevitable as other 
countries grew and industrialized. British decision makers were also constrained in 
what they could do about the situation, even if they did acknowledge a worsening 
status quo. Therefore, while the answer to the question is ―Yes, most British 
policymaker believed the status quo was worsening,‖ there was relatively little 
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preventive action taken to stop it. This represents a failure of the DPMP, which 
predicts that under such conditions, some sort of preventive action becomes likely. 
 
10) What is the nature (polarity) of the international system? 
John Mearsheimer suggests that the period 1816-1902 was characterized by 
balanced multipolarity, while the period 1903-1918 was characterized by unbalanced 
multipolarity. According to his theory of offensive realism, war was therefore 
somewhat likely from 1816 to 1902 and most likely during the period 1903-1918.
 106
 
One question this theory does not answer is this: Why did war occur in 1914 and not, 
in say 1910 when the structure was the same? Mearsheimer‘s model comes up short in 
answering this puzzle. 
The typology of preventive action developed in this study also incorporates 
Mearsheimer‘s concepts of polarity. Within the typology, a ―Balanced multipolar‖ 
system suggests that Britain should have acquiesced, which is largely correct. 
However, in the later ―unbalanced multipolar‖ system, the typology predicts that 
Britain should have used coercive/confrontational diplomacy. On this point, the 
typology does not do a good job of accurately predicting the outcome. 
 




Between 1816 and 1879, the United Kingdom was an anocracy. During this 
period, Prussia/Germany and Russia are classified as autocracies and Japan as an 
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anocracy. The United States was a full democracy during this period. Therefore, 
according to Schweller‘s model, the United Kingdom should have either formed a 
defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against Germany/Prussia, Japan, Russia, 
and the U.S.
108
 Of course, what we have seen is that Britain was moving toward a 
defensive alliance with Japan and acquiesced to American demands in the Western 
Hemisphere. Schweller‘s model does not provide an adequate explanation for this. 
From 1880 to 1896, the UK was a full democracy. Germany and Russia were 
autocracies, Japan is classified as an anocracy, and the U.S. was a full democracy. 
Therefore, the UK should have formed a defensive alliance against Germany, Russia, 
and Japan and should have accommodated the rise of the United States. While the UK 
did accommodate the rise of the U.S., it did not form a defensive alliance against 
Japan, but instead moved still closer to accommodation with Japan. 
From 1897 to 1902, the UK was a full democracy. Germany and Russia, on the 
other hand, were autocracies during this period and Japan is classified as an 
anocracy.
109
 Therefore, the UK should have formed a defensive alliance against 
Germany, Russia, and Japan. In 1902, Britain and Japan formally signed a defensive 
alliance. This is not explained by Schweller‘s model. 
During 1903 and 1904, the United Kingdom was a full democracy. Germany and 
Japan were anocracies and Russia was an autocracy during this period. Schweller‘s 
model predicts that the United Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance 
against Germany, Russia, and Japan during this period. Instead, Britain and Japan 
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were allied. Germany and Russia, however, were still seen as adversaries by British 
political leaders. 
Between 1905 and 1913, the United Kingdom was a full democracy. Japan, on the 
other hand, was an anocracy during this period. Therefore, according to Schweller, the 
United Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance against Japan during this 
period. Finally, from 1914 to 1918, the United Kingdom was a full democracy while 
Russia and Japan were anocracies. Therefore, according to Schweller, the United 
Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance against Russia and Japan during this 
period. Of course, as has been seen above, this did not occur. Nonetheless, Schweller‘s 
model does work well for all of these periods if we consider the fact that Japan was an 
anocracy during all of these periods and not an outright autocracy. It does not, 
however, explain why Britain was willing to enter into a defensive alliance with Japan 
but not with the anocratic Germany (after 1903). Still, it is impossible to discount his 
model completely. All of these periods and predictions are summarized in table 4.2.
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Blank boxes indicate that the United Kingdom was no longer in relative decline vis-à-vis the other power or the other power had 
surpassed the UK. Either condition is outside the scope of this research. 
 









US Predicted Outcome 
1816-1879 Balanced Multipolar  
Anocracy 
Autocracy Autocracy Anocracy Democracy 
War Somewhat Likely Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
Defensive Alliance or 
Preventive War 
Defensive Alliance or 
Preventive War 
1880-1896 Balanced Multipolar Democracy Autocracy Autocracy Anocracy Democracy 
War Somewhat Likely* Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance Accommodation 
1897-1902 Balanced Multipolar Democracy Autocracy Autocracy Anocracy  
War Somewhat Likely Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance  
1903-1904 Unbalanced Multipolar Democracy Anocracy Autocracy Anocracy  
War most likely Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance  
1905-1913 Unbalanced Multipolar Democracy   Anocracy  
War most likely   Defensive Alliance  
1914-1918 Unbalanced Multipolar Democracy  Anocracy Anocracy  
War most likely  Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance  
Regime Type 




The most striking aspect of British foreign policy vis-à-vis rising states from 1816 to the 
second decade of the twentieth century is its acquiescence and accommodation. In essence, it 
allowed the United States, Germany, Japan, and Russia to rise relative to it, and in some cases to 
surpass it, with little or no effort to check their ascendance. The periphery was increasingly left 
to powerful, but for the moment at least, friendly nations. Whether the threat was economic or 
financial, as in the case of the United States and Germany, or primarily military—as in the case 
of Russia, Japan, and Germany—the United Kingdom did little to stop the rise of the threatening 
power. British public officials thus came to accept a geographically constrained form of naval 
superiority in which England could maintain its two-power standard only in European waters. 
This strategy implied coming to some accommodation with the peripheral powers and perhaps, 
as the European states increased their naval strength, with one or more of them as well. 
The typology and models developed for this research project perform about as well as 
Mearsheimer‘s polarity model and Schweller‘s democracy model. Despite the preventive action 
typology‘s failures, it still has some value in trying to predict, with more precision, the actions of 
Britain during this time. On some dimensions such as internal power constraints and ruler belief 
systems, the DPMP performed very well in this case study. On other dimensions such as system 
polarity and perceived likelihood of conflict, the model failed to predict accurately British 
behavior. This suggests that while the DPMP is far from perfect, with some modifications it may 




The Decline of Russia and the Soviet Union 
 
 
A Brief History to 1816 
This chapter examines the decline of Russia and the Soviet Union vis-à-vis several rising 
powers from 1816 to the mid 1940s. It is helpful, however, to outline a brief history of the 
emergence and rise to power of this pivotal nation. This section is meant to serve only as a very 
brief overview of the rise of Russia and the Soviet Union. In this project, of course, we are much 
more interested in its decline, the rise of challengers, and its reaction to those events. 
The rise of Russia really begins with Peter the Great‘s conquests of the early eighteenth 
century.
1
 Russia emerged on the international scene with its growth of military power and its 
defeat of the Swedes at Poltava in July 1709. Aided by numerous foreign advisers and willing to 
borrow widely from the military expertise of the West, Peter the Great built up a massive army 
and navy to protect his new possessions on the Baltic. Later in the eighteenth century, Russia‘s 
army was often larger than that of France. Russia‘s manufacturing base was also gaining strength 
and the country itself was difficult if not impossible to conquer, as Napoleon (and later Hitler) 
was to discover. Though it was still a backward country in many ways, it showed signs of 
modernizing on several fronts. By borrowing from other countries and thanks to its vast 
resources, it was able to catch up and then surpass other states.
2
 
By the time of the Seven Years‘ War (1756-1763), Russia could be considered a great 
power. The country‘s armies fought courageously and occupied Berlin in 1760.
3
 Russia retired 
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into profitable neutrality before the war ended, and at the end of the conflict, Russia emerged 
secure and dominant in the east and north.
4
 
By the end of the eighteenth century, Russia was among the most powerful nations in the 
world. By 1792, for example, Russia had made great advances at Turkey‘s expense. It had 
annexed the Crimea and it had secured the northern coast of the Black Sea. Furthermore, by 1796 
Catherine the Great had added 200,000 square miles to the already huge Russian Empire. 
Russia‘s raw numbers in terms of population also allowed it to occasionally field an effective 
offensive military force.
5
 With the Russian defeat of Napoleonic France, Alexander was ready to 







Russia/Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States 
For most of the years between 1816 and 1860, Russia was dominant but in relative 
decline vis-à-vis the United States. In 1861, the United States‘ CINC score surpassed that of 
Russia and the U.S. maintained its dominance with only short periodic breaks until the early 
1970s when Russia once again dominated the U.S. This condition lasted until just before the end 
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Russia/Soviet Union vis-à-vis Prussia/Germany 
Closer to the Fatherland, Prussia/Germany posed a more immediate threat than the 
United States for much of this period.  Between 1816 and 1878, Russia dominated 
Prussia/Germany, but Russia was in relative decline nearly the whole time. Germany dominated 
the bilateral relationship between 1879 and the end of the First World War. The 1920s once 
again brought Russia into the dominant position, but the first half of that decade presented a 
slowly declining Russia, and in 1923, 1924, and 1927 Russia declined more conspicuously 
relative to Germany. By the 1930s, Russia was in steady relative decline and was overtaken by 
Germany starting in 1939 and lasting until the end of the Second World War. Germany, of 
course, was divided after the end of World War II, and did not emerge again as a united political 
entity until 1990, at which time Russia dominated the newly united country. However, 







Russia/Soviet Union vis-à-vis Japan 
Russia‘s power relationship with Japan has been complex. Russia dominated Japan from 
1860 (the first year of data available for Japan) until 200 when Japan reached parity with Russia. 
Most of the fluctuations in relative power during the entire period 1860-1995 have more to do 
with the ups-and-downs of Russian/Soviet power than they do with an increase or decrease in 
Japanese power. However, the two periods, 1894-1945 and 1952-1973 were generally positive 
























































































































Russia/Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United Kingdom 
Britain lost its consistently dominant status vis-à-vis Russia shortly after the turn of the 
twentieth century. After 1905, Russia and then the Soviet Union was more often than not in a 
dominant position over Britain. By the 1920s, the Soviet Union was clearly dominant over the 
United Kingdom, and it never relinquished that dominance. Russia has maintained its dominance 
over Britain in the post Cold War period. Though the Soviet Union was dominant in the period 
1936-1946, it was in relative decline vis-à-vis the U.K. during most of that time. The period 
1972-1979 was another period of relative decline for the Soviet Union. 1984 to 1998 is the final 
period covered in this study in which the Soviet Union/Russia was dominant but in relative 












This chapter examines the following instances in which Russia/the Soviet Union was in a 















Russia/United Kingdom: 1936-1946, 1972-1979, 1984-1998
12
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 Much like the German case, preventive action against Japan after World War II was not a real possibility due to 




To simplify matters somewhat, the following time periods encapsulate the above scheme: 1816-
1888, 1892-1906, 1913-1918, 1932-1946 
 
 
Nature of the Threat 
Economic Challenges 
Russia‘s finances suffered heavily from the series of wars that occurred during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The government printed paper money at a fantastic 
rate, increasing the number of rubles in circulation from 200,000,000 in 1801 to nearly 
826,000,000 in 1816. As the number of rubles in circulation increased, their value decreased to 
the point that by 1816, the value of the paper ruble was only a quarter of a silver ruble (25 silver 
kopeks).
13
 Despite attempts by Finance Ministers Count D. A. Guryev and Egor Kankrin, who 
had succeeded in bringing inflation under control and had laid a solid foundation for economic 




The area of trade relations presented further challenges for the Russian state. Russia, like 
the rest of Europe, gravitated from free trade to protectionism in the second half of the 19
th
 
century. Tariffs rose from their lows of the late 1850s and early 1860s—first to a 10 percent 
tariff in 1881, then 20 percent in 1885, and finally to a prohibitive tariff of 33 percent in 1891.
15
 
Ministers of Finance Ivan Vyshnegradskii (1887-92) and Sergei Witte (1892-1903) imposed high 
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protective tariffs that were designed to improve Russia‘s balance of trade and promote domestic 
industries. 
Witte‘s domestic program was cautious and conservative. It postponed immediate 
gratification and saw economic development as the key to future increases of power. Witte‘s 
initial successes in the 1890s led to a rate of industrial growth for Russia never to recur until the 
1930s.
16
 Industrial production increased at an average of 8 percent per year, higher even than that 
of the United States. As Reginald Zelnik notes, ―Russia‘s presumptive but precarious position as 
a ‗great power‘ provided an underlying motivation for the pursuit of economic development, 
industrial strength, and financial independence.‖
17
 Unfortunately, Witte‘s policies became 
increasingly difficult to maintain as Russia became ensnared in Asian affairs. Tariffs 
implemented during this time were not designed to stunt the growth of potential challengers, at 
least not overtly, but they were created to help Russia maintain its great power status. Prestige 
was continuing to be an important factor for the Russians. 
By the early 1920s, years of warfare had once again ruined the national economy. In 
1921, for example, the country was facing total economic collapse. In that year, gross industrial 
output fell to less than one-fifth of the level before World War I, and production in the textiles 
industry was a mere one-tenth. Similarly, agricultural production was severely reduced during 
this period. Famine and epidemics claiming millions of lives ensued when the 1921 harvest 
produced significantly less than half the pre-war average. By 1922, hyperinflation was once 
again rampant and had driven prices for agricultural products to astronomical heights. The Soviet 
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government responded with a tight-money policy that caused difficulties in wage payments at 
many factories thereby triggering strikes and disorders.
18
 
Economics, not ideology, drove the Soviets to engage in economic agreements with the 
West in the aftermath of World War I. For example, the Russians signed a trade agreement with 
the British in March 1921. Germany and the Soviet Union also signed the German-Russian 
Agreement of 19 April 1922. One of the goals of the Treaty of Rapallo was to form closer 
economic ties between Germany and Russia.
 19
 Clearly, economic necessity trumped ideological 
orthodoxy during this period. 
Vladimir Lenin, recognizing the weakness of the Soviet economy, argued that military 
conflict between the capitalist and socialist camps was not necessarily inevitable. He suggested 
that they could both compete and cooperate with each other. According to his line of logic, 
socialist states could interact, especially economically, with the capitalist world because in any 
long-term competition socialism would ultimately prevail. This was a very pragmatic ideological 
shift given that the international proletarian revolution that was supposed to have occurred did 
not emerge, and therefore the Western assistance that was to have flowed to the new Soviet state 
did not materialize. Lenin and other Soviet leaders recognized that it was vital that the USSR end 
its diplomatic isolation and attract financial aid. This proved to be quite difficult, and as the 
decade opened not a single major industrial nation had yet given the revolutionaries diplomatic 
recognition. Nor were there any signs of significant foreign investment in the new state.
20
 
Despite these setbacks, by 1924 the national economy began to recover. Restarting 
factories closed during the civil war caused a sharp rise in manufacturing output. As a result, the 
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output of large-scale industry reached nearly half its pre-war scale in 1924 and 75 per cent a year 
later. Industrial exports rose to nine times what they had been at the beginning of the decade, 
even if still only a third of pre-war figures. By 1924, the cultivation of arable land approached 
1913 levels, and marketable output in agriculture increased 64 percent between 1922 and 1925.
21
 
This, of course, was only a recovery of the pre-war base, not an expansion. Industry soon 
reached a point of diminishing returns. There had been virtually no investment in industrial 
capacity since before the First World War. What the Russian civil war had not destroyed was, by 
the mid-1920s, badly worn or outmoded. Restarts of old factories could increase output, but 
without significant new investment, these factories could never reach the pre-war standard. 
Meanwhile, trade and foreign investment, which increased significantly after 1921, still fell far 
short of financing a renewed industrial base.
22
 
The Communists‘ answer to these shortcomings was the announcement of the ‗Five-Year 
Plan for Industrialization and Socialist Construction‘. Henceforth, the state would not only 
intervene in economic relations but would actually serve as the chief, even sole, manager of the 
economy. This ambitious plan aimed to dramatically increase investment, industrial production, 
electrical generation, and the size of the industrial labor force. Even with these grand goals, 
Stalin was unsatisfied and by the end of 1929 ‗Five in Four‘—that is, the fulfillment of the Plan 
in four years—became official policy. The result of the increased expectations was a constant 
state of emergency, ubiquitous shortage, and near total chaos of the Soviet economy that 
sometimes spilled over into the larger Soviet society itself.
23
 
                                                 
21




 Lewis Siegelbaum, "Building Stalinism 1929-1941," in Russia: A History, ed. Gregory L. Freeze (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 295-97. 
134 
 
The Five Year Plan‘s record was mixed, but by 1932 Stalin could claim some real 
achievements. Gross industrial production and producers‘ goods surpassed the ambitious goals 
laid out in the Five Year Plan. During this period, the value of machinery more than quadrupled. 
Total employment in construction, transportation, and industry also exceeded the benchmarks set 
by the Plan. On the other hand, the production of consumer goods was less impressive, and there 
were significant shortfalls in the output of coal, electricity, and steel.
24
 
Stalin recognized the shortcomings in the Soviet economy and remarked to a conference 
of economic officials during the First Five-Year Plan, ―Do you want our socialist fatherland to be 
beaten and to lose its independence?‖ He further stated, ―We are fifty or a hundred years behind 
the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we 
shall go under.‖ The Soviet government thus set out to quickly industrialize the country. It was 
largely because of this forced-pace industrialization that the Soviets were victorious in the Great 
Patriotic War of 1941-1945. However, because of increased military expenditure, investment in 
the collective and state farm system remained woefully inadequate. Agriculture still lagged and a 
major crop failure in 1936 strained the state‘s reserves and distribution network.
25
 
After the Second World War, the Fourth Five-Year Plan, which was adopted in March 
1946, set the target of exceeding pre-war levels of production by the end of 1950. In fact, the 
Soviet Union fulfilled this plan in most significant sectors. By 1950, for example, gross 
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The years from 1815 to 1914 marked a time of relative peace in Europe. During this 
period, there were no general wars between the great powers. The five Great Powers that had 
organized the Congress of Vienna continued to dominate Europe. The wars that did break out 
were short and limited in scope.
27
 For the forty years after Russia defeated Napoleon, Europeans 
regarded Russia as the most formidable power on the continent. However, Russia failed to 
progress at the same rate as competing nations in the areas of weapons development, logistical 
support, education, and industry. Russia, for example, was very late in developing a railroad 
system. This ultimately hindered its ability to supply troops in the Crimea. The sorry state of 
their military can be seen in the defeats they suffered at the hands of the Japanese (1904-1905), 
the Germans (1914-1918), and the Poles (1920).
28
 
Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth century was a complex picture that promised 
further Russian advances. By 1814, Russia was the greatest continental power and took an 
interest in all European problems. Alexander I, who reigned as emperor from 1801 to 1825, 
expected that Russia would play a leading part in all Continental affairs. He was in favor of 
establishing a new system of international order and peaceful cooperation with the other 
Continental powers. As a consequence of this newfound activism, Russia was involved in the 
settlement at the Congress of Vienna.
29
 
Alexander I also worked outside the bounds of the Congress of Vienna to enhance 
Russia‘s involvement with the rest of the Continent. In September 1815, he drafted the Holy 
Alliance in which he, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Prussia were ‗to take for their sole 
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guide the precepts of the Christian religion‘. The alliance became a symbol of the association of 
the three eastern monarchies.
30
 
Similarly, the Quadruple Alliance of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Britain, which had 
come into effect in 1814, opened the door for periodic meetings between the rulers of the four 
powers and their foreign ministers.
31
 The first of these meetings was held at Aachen from 
September to November 1818. Its main business was to arrange for the evacuation from France 
of the allied armies of occupation.
32
 
By the time of the outbreak of war over the Crimea, Nicholas‘ army looked strong on 
paper but it was no match for the allies. Russia‘s army was widely disbursed to protect against 
possible border attacks. The lack of industrialization and the lack of railroads proved to be a 
serious detriment to the forces sent to the Crimea. These forces actually had to be supplied by ox 
cart. Russian weapons, which had not been upgraded since earlier wars, had far shorter effective 
range than the enemy‘s weapons. To make matters worse, sanitary conditions for Russian troops 
were appalling, and disease claimed far more men than did battle. Not surprisingly, the troops 
were demoralized and ultimately defeated. At the same time, Nicholas became ill and died of 
pneumonia in early February 1855.
33
 
By 1856, in the wake of the war in the Crimea, Russia underwent numerous internal 
reforms including the gradual elimination of serfdom, education reform, judicial reform, and 
finally reform of the military. The Russian military adopted Western models and improved 
military technology, reorganized military administration, and improved the professionalism of 
military schools. The Universal Military Training Act of 1874 established universal conscription 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., 175. 
31
 Davies, Europe: A History, 762-63. 
32
 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917, 175. 
33
 Ransel, "Pre-Reform Russia 1801-1855," 167. 
137 
 
regardless of class standing, a significant change over the old system in which the nobility was 
exempt from military service. Under the 1874 Act, terms of service were determined by level of 
education, not by social origin or rank.
34
 
Forces drawing the Western Powers to Russia were also in play in the later 19
th
 century. 
When, in 1875, Bismarck threatened France with preventive war if it attempted to rearm, Russia 
and England saw this as overtly threatening and believed that the Germans were trying to start a 
war. In St. Petersburg and London, France found far more sympathy than Bismarck had 
expected. He had tried to turn European powers against France by presenting her as a state bent 
on domination through rearmament, but instead found that he was himself viewed as the rogue. 
This view was led by England and Russia, the two countries who were supposedly Germany‘s 
closest friends. Instead of criticizing France‘s rearmament or joining Germany‘s preventive war 
to stop the rearmament, Russia and England endorsed France‘s ―very natural‖ rearmament 
program while denying the legitimacy of preventive war.
35
 
Threats by Germany were not the only incentives driving the West into closer relations 
with Russia. In a poor state like Russia, which taxed its poorest citizens harshly, social and 
political revolution was seen as a real possibility. In reaction to this, and in the face of a rising 
Germany, the Western Powers worked to enhance their political ties with Russia. From 1890 to 
the outbreak of the First World War, France, Britain, and Belgium invested heavily in the giant 
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Russia‘s power was also enhanced by an increasing population that nearly doubled 
between 1863 and 1913. However, the country was economically backward when compared with 
its European counterparts. For example, the only rail line in Russia in 1855 ran between Moscow 
and St. Petersburg. As a result, it was difficult to move key resources around the country and key 
markets remained isolated. Russia still imported 70 percent of all machinery and did not have up-
to-date technology. All of this began to change in the final years of the 1870s, and by the mid 
1880s railway lines had increased from 1484 miles in 1861 to 18,720 miles in 1887. At the same 




Between the 1830s and the 1870s, Russia consolidated its power in the territories that 
bordered it. Poland was systematically dismantled as an independent state with the abolition of 
the Polish governmental councils in 1867, the reorganization of the area into ten Russian 
administrative provinces in 1868, the conversion of Warsaw University into a Russian institution 
in 1869, and the introduction of the Russian judicial system in 1876. Russia also used force in 
the Caucuses to put down a resistance movement there. The military campaign of 1857-62 
achieved a semblance of control, but Russian power remained tentative and vulnerable. The 
1860s and 1870s also marked the expansion of Russian rule into Central Asia. The motives for 
such a move came from two sources: an interest in its capacity for cotton production, and a 
desire to establish a firm and reliable border in the area. As a result, between 1864 and 1873 
Russia gradually reduced Central Asia to a protectorate status with unmistakable Russian 
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Late Imperial Russia seemed to contain within its borders inexhaustible stores of power 
and energy. It was the largest consolidated state in the world, it had the largest population in 
Europe, and it had the world‘s largest army. It produced more agricultural products than any 
other state in Europe and was the chief recipient of external investment thanks to its massive 
mineral resources.
 40
   
The leaders of Russia during this time wanted to prolong the European peace to provide 
continued stability in which Russia could continue its development. Russia was a leading 
proponent of peace conferences in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. Peace conferences at The 
Hague in 1899 and 1907 were largely held at the Tsar‘s urging. Disarmament, the arbitration of 
international disputes, and the rules of land warfare were the topics of discussion at these 
conferences. Out of these meetings emerged the International Court of Justice in 1900 and the 
Hague Convention in 1907.
41
 Alas, peace was not meant to last indefinitely. The outbreak of the 
First World War and then internal revolution would immerse Russia into turbulence for years. 
As the world slipped toward the First World War, alliances began to play a key role in 
European politics. The agreements between Russia and France obliged them to assist each other 
if attacked, but the third member of the Triple Entente, Great Britain, was not formally 
committed to come to their defense. In addition, there was no treaty in force between Russia and 
Serbia. Even the treaty of 1839, which committed Britain to uphold Belgian independence, 
predated the Triple Entente. Despite appearances, then, these countries were not locked into 
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automatic responses to aggression. They actually had quite a bit of room to maneuver. The fact is 
that in 1914, they all chose war. 
In St. Petersburg, Tsar Nicholas II had ordered full mobilization on 30 July. It seems that 
he did not consult the Minister of War before making his decision. News of Germany‘s 
declaration of war, which had occurred on 1 August, quickly reached St. Petersburg and on 2 
August, Russia declared war on Germany. The Russians hoped that they would be able to 
mobilize fully their army in eighteen days and that they would ‗be in Berlin before the Germans 
were in Paris.‘
42
    
February 1917 ushered in a revolution in which the tsar agreed to abdicate his throne. 
Amidst the crisis of war and social upheaval, the provisional government tried to rule and 
reform. Poland, which was under the occupation of the Central Powers, was granted virtual 
independence by the provisional government. Autonomy was also granted to Finland. In the 
wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Allies tried to intervene in the emerging Soviet Union, but 
their intervention had little military effect.
43
 
The new Soviet state tried to further its rise to power through the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) of the 1920s. It was hoped that NEP would ignite revolution in Europe thus creating 
Soviet friendly governments and improving the standing of the Soviet Union in Europe. None of 
this came to pass. While Lenin had pursued ‗peaceful coexistence‘ with the capitalist world, 
Stalin emphasized what he saw as the link between foreign threats and the internal mobilization 
of the Soviet populace and resources. For Stalin, it looked as if the capitalist powers wished to 
encircle the Soviet state. Soviet behavior, based on this belief of encirclement by hostile powers 
bent on the destruction of the USSR, only served further to estrange the USSR from the rest of 
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the international system. As a result of this behavior, the Soviet Union was widely distrusted by 
the end of the 1920s, and it did not have any reliable allies. The situation for the Soviet Union at 
the end of the decade was little better than it had been at the beginning of the decade.
44
 
Despite its militaristic overtones, the Soviet government realized during the period of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) that the country needed time to heal its wounds and strengthen 
itself militarily. Daniel Orlovsky suggests, ―The army not only represented a military force but 
also provided the formative experience for the first generation of Bolsheviks.‖ It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the Soviet Union developed as a military-administrative state. Military 
ideology and military thinking permeated government, economy, and society.
45
 
During this period, the immediate focus of Soviet foreign policy was survival and state 
interest.
46
 In pursuit of this goal, commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) called for total 
disarmament. This call, not surprisingly, evoked nothing but skepticism in European capitals. 
Nonetheless, the Soviet Union did succeed in normalizing relations with neighboring countries 
and establishing full diplomatic relations with the United States in 1933.
47
 
By the late 1930s, the Soviet Union had largely accomplished its goal of recovering from 
the trauma of its birth and was a thoroughly militarized state. Soviet defense outlays in 1941 
amounted to over 43 percent of the country‘s GNP. This massive amount of defense spending, 
however, could not compensate for the loss of experienced military leaders purged by Stalin 
during the 1930s.
48
 Because of this perception of weakness and vulnerability at the highest levels 
of Soviet leadership and despite an ideological view that included the inevitability of war 
between the capitalist world and the communist world, the government remained on the 
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defensive, and continued to postpone the actual outbreak of the coming conflict until the Soviet 
Union was in a more advantageous position.
49
 
With the triumph of the Nazis in Germany and the consolidation of a Japanese puppet 
state on the Soviet Union‘s eastern borders, the Communist International (Comintern) developed 
and implemented a strategy of Popular Fronts and an intensification of Soviet efforts to achieve 
collective security with the European democracies. These policies bore fruit in the form of 
mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, and the election of a Popular 
Front government in France in 1936.
 50
 
There was a limit, however, to the extent to which the European democracies were 
willing to cooperate with the Soviets. This limit was reached during the Spanish Civil War. 
Despite Soviet assistance to republican forces in Spain—or perhaps because the European 
democracies feared a communist Spain more than one ruled by Franco, the European 
democracies failed to prevent fascists from coming to power in Spain. The betrayal of 
Czechoslovakia at Munich in September 1938 confirmed Soviet suspicions that neither Britain 






Between 1881 and 1887, Russia joined Germany and Austria in the Dreikaiserbund, and 
between 1887 and 1890, it signed two ‗reinsurance‘ treaties with Russia. After Bismarck‘s 
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dismissal, however, relations cooled between Russia and Germany. The Tsar then turned to 
France and Britain for diplomatic partners.
52
 
By the time Vyshnegradskii left office and Witte took over, the Russian military—despite 
the misgivings of political conservatives and enemies of republicanism—had begun to see 
France as the most reliable ally for Russia and the best chance to balance against the rising 
power of Germany. By 1892, even a cautious Foreign Ministry, which was loathe to raise the ire 
of Germany, concluded its first, quite limited entente with Paris. By the end of the 1890s, both 
Russian economic and foreign policy were more oriented towards France than ever. This meant 




In 1908, Vienna, at Russia‘s expense, unilaterally annexed the disputed Balkan provinces 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and then reneged on a promised quid pro quo. This was embarrassing 
to Russia to say the least. Infighting between the army and the navy was depleting the budget and 
demoralizing the military. Plans for Russian domination of Mongolia and Manchuria no longer 
seemed plausible and were scaled back. There was also disagreement between key Russian 
decision makers regarding the issue of where to draw the line in terms of defending Russia 
against Germany and Austria. How far west should the line be drawn?
54
 
Russian military planners, watching the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, committed to a 
―Western‖-oriented strategy and planned for full rather than partial mobilization in the event of a 
major international crisis.
55
 As war became more likely in 1914, the Russians wanted to avoid 
another humiliation in the Balkans. They also seemed to be losing their long quest to control the 
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Ottoman Empire and the Black Sea. Russia, as always, was also concerned with maintaining its 
great power status and did not want to be left behind. It also feared Germany‘s growing military 
and economic power. Its strategic and diplomatic ties to Britain and France further complicated 
matters and pulled Russia further into European politics and struggles. As Daniel Orlovsky puts 
it, ―Like the other powers, Russia was unduly deferential towards strategic planning and the 




In the wake of the First World War, the Treaty of Rapallo opened the way for secret 
German-Soviet military co-operation. Germany would be able to conduct training and weapons 
testing (forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles) on Soviet soil. In return, the Russians would be 
able to increase its military prowess by learning from German military expertise.
57
 
In the years leading up to the Second World War, the increasing likelihood of war in 
Europe prompted a radical shift in foreign policy away from seeking collective security with the 
Western democracies and towards an accommodation with Hitler. As mentioned earlier, after 
examining the democracies actions in Spain, the Soviets concluded that the West could not be 
relied upon to come to their assistance in the case of a Nazi attack. Therefore, Stalin signed the 
Soviet-German non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. Acting on a secret provision of that Pact, 
Soviet armed forces occupied eastern Poland, the three Baltic republics, and the Romanian 
province of Bessarabia. The Soviets also invaded Finland and eventually the Soviet army was 
victorious in the ‗Winter War‘ of 1939-40. In the wake of these military adventures, the Soviet 
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government fed its citizens a steady diet of Soviet patriotism accompanied by a massive build-up 
of the armed forces and defense industries.
58
 
Unfortunately, the Soviet leadership failed to understand the nature of Nazi war doctrine. 
For example, the Soviet leadership believed that a war with Germany would most likely start 
after an extended period of crisis, which would give the Soviet army time to mobilize.
59
 This 
failure to grasp the concept of blitzkrieg, and the aggressive nature of Hitler and Nazism, 
doomed the Soviet Union to a disastrous beginning once hostilities actually broke out.  
 
**United Kingdom (1936-1946)** 
 The Soviet Union‘s relationship with the United Kingdom during the 1930s was largely 
one of non-interaction. Though its industrial output had soared and probably overtaken that of 
Britain, the Soviet Union had turned inward and was trying to build ―socialism in one country.‖ 
The trend in the Soviet Union, as with many other countries at the time, was toward autarky. The 
Soviet Union was in diplomatic isolation and deeply suspicious of the western democracies. 
Furthermore, because of military weakness and the purges of the 1930s, Stalin felt that his 
country was passing through a ―danger zone‖ and therefore diplomacy designed to give the 
Soviet Union time to heal was the order of the day. The Soviet Union had joined the League of 
Nations in 1934 in hopes of getting some collective security benefits.
60
 
 From the British side, the psychological scarring that occurred after the First World War 
created a sense of isolation and a desire to stay out of Continental affairs. On the other hand, as 
suggested in the previous chapter, Russia was seen as a threat to India. During the 1930s, the 
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British were becoming conscious that their defensive resources were stretched very thinly, and 
that only through diplomacy could they hope to keep their empire intact and free from military 
attack. However, British policymakers could not get past their dislike of communism. They, 




**United States (1816-1860)** 
 Alexander I wanted to eliminate tensions between Russia and the United States. To this 
end, a treaty was signed between the two countries in 1824 that reduced Russia‘s claims to 




By 1857, Alaska was seen as more of a liability than an asset, and the Russians were 
willing to sell it to the United States. Its sale was put on hold during the American Civil War, in 
which the Russian government was ―markedly friendly‖ to the North.
63
 Russia decided to 





Japan, which was totally closed to the outside world until 1855, quickly learned European 
ways and established an empire of its own, first in Korea and then in China.
65
 When the Japanese 
emerged on the world stage, they felt no inhibitions with regard to aggressive war. On the eve of 
the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894, the Japanese shocked Secretary of State Gresham by telling 
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him, ―our situation at home is critical and war with China would improve it by arousing the 
patriotic sentiment of our people and more strongly attach them to the Government.‖  However, 
it did not surprise the German ambassador in London when his Japanese colleague Baron 
Hayashi informed him that there was a predominant view in Tokyo that war with Russia was 
inevitable. Hayashi added that many influential politicians were advocating preventive war 
against Russia and that a strike should come sooner rather than later. Japanese generals were 
confident that their armies could not be defeated during the next two years, and the admirals 
were certain that the Japanese fleet was superior to the Russian fleet.
66
  
Russia‘s Asian policy had become increasingly expansionist and aggressive since before 
the turn of the century. Russia, overall, was in a dominant position over the Japanese, but the 
Russians were unprepared when the island nation struck in February 1904. The Japanese felt 
compelled to action by the daily strengthening of Russia‘s military position in the Far East.
67
 The 
1904-1905 war resulted in national humiliation for Russia.
68
 However, even in the wake of this 
disastrous conflict, in which Japan gained southern Manchuria and Korea (which it fully annexed 
in 1910) Russia continued to strive for great power status. However, its military position was 
weaker than ever and the growth of an ever more troublesome deficit made the costs of 
rearmament difficult to overcome.
69
 
During their war for the control of China in the early and mid 1930s, the Japanese could 
never quite agree on who their next or ultimate enemy would be. For the army, Russia was 
originally the chosen enemy. The army plan was to fight the Soviets, when the timing was right, 
and with little or no assistance from the navy. If the Japanese military clique ―foresee an eventual 
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clash as inevitable,‖ Joseph Grew, American ambassador to Japan, reported in July 1933, ―it is 
quite possible that they may intend to strike before Soviet Russia gets stronger—and the time 
element is all in favor of the latter.‖ However, for 
 
reasons that are more imperialistic than 
strategic, Japanese aggression eventually settled on the United States.
70
 In the end, the Soviet 
Union concluded a neutrality pact with Japan in April 1941, and was not inclined to join the war 





In this section, I assess the performance of my Domestic Politics Model of Prevention in 
predicting the outcome of Russian/Soviet policy during the periods under consideration. 
Following the method of structured, focused comparison, each of the eleven questions posed in 
chapter three are answered, and then an overview of the model‘s performance is outlined for 
each question. The typology for this model appears in table 5.1 while the flowcharts for the 
individual cases appear in Appendix A.  
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1) To what extent is the internal power of the state constrained? 
For much of Russia‘s history, it has taken an isolationist viewpoint. From the time 
of Alexander III, who abandoned direct intervention in Europe, to the leaders of the 
Soviet Union who wanted to wait until the time was right, Russia and then the Soviet 
Union was much less aggressive in foreign affairs than is often portrayed.
72
 For the 
first seventy years, the United States (1816-1860), Prussia/Germany (1816-1878), and 
Japan (1860-1873, 1878-1888) were the primary challengers to Russia. Though 
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Russia was seen by other European powers as the most formidable power on the 
continent after the Napoleonic Wars, Russia seems to have always suffered from an 
inferiority complex. What we find throughout this period is a Russia that does not 
back down from an attack, but also does not go out of its way to get into trouble, 
particularly with the other great powers. Nonetheless, when Russia occupied 
territories of the Ottoman Empire in 1853, prompting Turkey to declare war on 
Russia, and then eventually forcing Britain and France to declare war on Russia, 
Russia fought for several years and then sought peace in 1856. This war showed some 
serious weaknesses of the Russian military.
73
 In the wake of the Crimean War, Russia 
underwent military and social reforms that prevented it from adopting an overtly 
offensive military doctrine. 
 From the 1890s, Russian leadership was bent on modernization. Heavy 
investment from the West helped increase industrialization dramatically. However, 
right up until the outbreak of the First World War, compared to other European 
powers, Russia continued to be economically backward. Russia‘s population also 
doubled between 1863 and 1913, but the economic backwardness of the country 
prevented many of these people from reaching their potential. The leadership in 
Russia, particularly after the Crimean War, seemed to be holding their breath hoping 
that the peace in Europe would last long enough for Russia to catch up with the other 
European powers. The war with Japan in 1904-1905, and Russia‘s humiliating defeat, 
did not help matters. Through all of this, then, we can conclude that the internal 
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In terms of the above typology, I would argue that Russian and then Soviet 
leadership was severely to moderately limited in terms of internal power constraints 
and had a defensive or defensive-offensive strategy for most of this period. The 
typology, therefore predicts that Russia/Soviet Union would follow a policy of 
acquiescence or accommodation during these periods. In this category, the typology 
does a good job predicting actual Russian/Soviet behavior. 
 
2) To what extent are pro-preventive action elements constrained? 
Since the overwhelming outlook of Russia‘s leaders from 1816 up until the 
outbreak of the First World War was to maintain the peace between the major 
powers, pro-preventive action advocates were largely silent. Even those who were 
advocating an offensive military ideology were much more focused on preemption 
instead of prevention. 
A similar mindset can be seen among the Soviet leadership after the First World 
War. Lenin and Stalin argued that what the Soviet Union needed was time to develop 
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its own resources and realize the potential of the vast country. Additionally, by 
putting off conflict with Western democracies, it would give the capitalist countries a 
chance to fight among themselves, thereby weakening themselves while the Soviet 
Union would be getting stronger. This would suggest that pro-prevention advocates 
would be largely silenced. This orientation toward avoiding conflict with the West 
should result in Russian and Soviet leadership that should be acquiescent and 
accommodating. Overall, again, the typology in figure 5.1 does a good job predicting 
Russian/Soviet behavior. 
 
3) What is the nature of the ruler belief system? 
From the time of Alexander I, Russian and then Soviet leaders tended to be 
pragmatists. Alexander helped create the European peace of 1816-1914, and his 
successors tended to follow suit. In the two major clashes Russia had with foreign 
powers between 1816 and 1913, Russia did not initiate military action. It did, 
however, take actions that prompted first Turkey and then Japan to declare war. Even 
these two moves: seizing the territory of a faltering Ottoman Empire in 1853 and 
reneging on its promise to withdraw troops from Manchuria in 1904—however can 
be seen as pragmatic moves given Russia‘s dominant power position. Of course, as 
we know, both moves ultimately turned out to be less than wise on the part of the 
Russian leadership. 
William Husband notes: 
In its foreign policy, a pragmatic internal logic governed Soviet behavior. 
Revolutionary Russia faced a hostile international community in 1921: the 
overthrow of tsarism by a mass movement had alarmed the ruling elites in the 
West, giving rise to the Red Scare. The Bolshevik state compounded such fears 
153 
 
when it nationalized industry, including foreign-owned enterprises, and 





The period 1932-1946 seems quite similar to the previous periods, and for similar 
reasons. Communist ideology suggested that war amongst the capitalist countries was 
inevitable, and that if the Soviet Union just waited and built ―socialism in one 
country,‖ it would be the beneficiary of those wars. Lenin and Stalin both suggested 
that war between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries was not inevitable, or 
at a minimum, should be put off as long as possible in order to build up the might of 
the Soviet state.  
Similarly, Stalin from 1932 up until the Second World War took a pragmatic view 
of the international environment. He first attempted to achieve collective security by 
reaching out to France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, and then when the European 
democracies failed them in Spain, the Soviets turned to accommodation with Hitler. 
Stalin‘s primary goal was to give the Soviet Union time to build up its defenses. 
Whether relying on European democracies or by accommodating Hitler, his goal was 
to buy time.  
Jack Snyder notes that the Soviets practiced what he calls ―moderate 
expansionism‖ that reflected a dichotomy in Soviet strategic thought. Stalin, and 
other Soviet leaders, believed that the security of the Soviet Union required expansion 
and that real security for the country would only come when socialism replaced 
capitalism in the more advanced countries. Therefore, Soviet policy should promote 
the spread of socialism. However, the Soviet Union‘s early leaders also believed that 
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if they exercised restraint in foreign policy, the capitalist countries would be more 
likely to focus their aggression on each other and leave the Soviet Union alone.
76
 
Snyder notes further that while Stalin may have had a hostile image of the 
capitalist nations; Stalin was a pragmatist who saw few opportunities to strike first. 
Stalin, therefore, tried to avoid provoking the capitalist countries or getting involved 
in their squabbles. Instead, he attempted to build a military deterrent. Stalin himself, 
in 1925, stated that if war comes ―we shall have to take action, but we shall be the last 
to do so in order to throw the decisive weight into the scales.‖
77
 Furthermore, Snyder 
argues, ―Stalin bent over backward to avoid provoking the Japanese and the Nazis.‖
78
 
For both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, then, the leadership was moderate-
pragmatic. This would suggest an accommodation strategy. If the conclusions reached 
here are accurate, the typology in figure 5.1 accurately predicts Russian/Soviet 
behavior. 
   
4) What is the nature of the threat (military, non-military)? 
 Since both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union were economically backwards 
and not reliant on global trade or distant colonies, most threats from other powers 
were seen as largely military in nature. Unlike Great Britain who had a widely spread 
empire and trading interests, Russia had relatively few economic ties to be threatened. 
For example, when Bismarck threatened France in 1875, Russia saw this as an 
attempt by Germany to start a war. Russia joined France and Britain in opposing the 
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German maneuver. This move by Russia, Britain, and France can be seen as a 
preventive action against Germany‘s attempts to start a preventive war. This is an 
interesting case of prevention to stymie prevention. Even the Russo-German tariff 
wars of the 1880s cannot really be classified as preventive in nature. They were more 
protective than preventive. 
 In this case, then, military threats were the primary concern of Russian and Soviet 
leadership. Still, even with these perceived military threats, primarily from 
Prussia/Germany, they were seen as secondary threats since Germany was likely to 
attack towards the west before turning east. Russian military planners therefore faced 
what can be classified as a moderate-militarized threat. This would suggest that they 
would engage in sustained coercive or confrontational diplomacy. On this level, it 
seems that the typology in figure 5.1 does not do a particularly good job of predicting 
Russian/Soviet behavior. On the whole, between 1816 and the outbreak of World War 
II, accommodation seemed to be more the order of the times from the Russians. 
 
5) To what extent is conflict seen as likely or inevitable? 
We have seen that Alexander I was very involved in preserving peace in Europe 
and helped to establish the Concert of Europe. It does not appear that Russian leaders 
between 1816 and the outbreak of the First World War viewed conflict with any 
particular power as inevitable. On the contrary, Russian leadership wanted to avoid 
military conflict with the major powers whenever possible in order to allow Russia to 
develop its massive potential. 
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The same can be said of the Soviet era up until the outbreak of World War II. 
Communist ideology dictated that eventually conflict would occur between the 
capitalist countries and the socialist countries, but Lenin thought that at least in the 
near future the two sides would be able to cohabitate. Stalin thought that by lying 
low, the Soviet Union might be able to sit out conflicts that were likely to occur 
among capitalist countries and that by doing so, the USSR would be in a powerful 
position should the day of reckoning come between the socialist and capitalist worlds. 
So, even in those quarters where conflict was seen as ultimately inevitable, it was 
thought to be advantageous to put it off as long as possible. The DPMP, therefore, 
would predict that preventive action would be unlikely and that if it did occur it 
would be non-militarized in nature.
79
 Under these conditions, our model predicts 
Russian/Soviet behavior fairly accurately. 
 
6) To what extent do domestic elements believe that a war would not be costly? 
The view that time was on their side prompted Russian military leaders to view 
war as more costly in the short term than it would be in the longer term when Russia 
would be in a stronger position. Russians in the imperial age and Soviets later 
respected Prussian/German military prowess and they went out of their way to avoid 
conflict with that nation.  The same can be said of the Soviet Union‘s relations with 
Japan prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. It seems clear that these 
periods, Russian/Soviet leadership believed that general conflict was not worth the 
price. For these cases, the DPMP accurately predicts Russian/Soviet behavior. 
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Russia was less cautious towards Japan in 1904. It did not withdraw from 
Manchuria as it had previously agreed, and does not seem to have been overly 
concerned about war with Japan. It seems that conflict with Japan was seen as likely, 
but the Russian leadership felt they would be able to defeat the island nation at 
relatively little cost. Of course, we now know that Russia would pay a heavy price for 
its bungling. For this case, the DPMP predicts that Russia would have engaged in 
militarized preventive action. This did not occur since Japan attacked Russia. Our 
model fails in this case. 
 
7) To what extent is there the belief that a war now would be less costly than a war 
later? 
 
As already mentioned, quite the opposite is true. The Russian/Soviet leadership 
felt that the future was brighter for their country than the present and that a war now 
would be more costly than a war later. In the view of the leadership, Russia/the Soviet 
Union had immense resources; it just needed time in which it could develop those 
resources into military and economic power. On this level, the DPMP somewhat 
predicts Russian/Soviet behavior. 
The DPMP predicts that the dominant power is likely to take non-militarized 
preventive action under these conditions. In some cases Russia/the Soviet Union 
engaged in this type of behavior, but more often than not it simply acquiesced or 
accommodated the challenger.
80
 For example, in regards to Germany during the 
1932-1938 period, the Soviets first tried to align themselves with the West against 
Germany, but failing that, they signed non-aggression pacts with both Germany and 
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Japan. Therefore, we must conclude that the DPMP does not accurately predict 
Russian/Soviet behavior under these conditions. 
 
8) To what extent is there the belief that the chances of winning a war now would 
be greater than the chances of winning a later war? 
Again, the leadership of Russia/the Soviet Union was confident that over time, 
their power would grow, and therefore the longer they could put off a war, the better 
their chances would be to win the conflict. Similar to the last condition, our Domestic 
Politics Model of Prevention again predicts that Russia/the Soviet Union was likely to 
engage in non-militarized preventive action. This once again holds true in some 
instances, but not in others. See Appendix A: Russia/Soviet Union-Prussia/Germany 
Threat. 
 
9) To what extent do domestic elements think the status quo will get worse for their 
state if the rising challenger is allowed to continue its ascendancy? 
In all of the cases with the exception of the United States, Russian leadership felt 
that in the end, Russia would emerge as more powerful than its challengers. They 
were hopeful that the future belonged to them. When it came to the U.S., however, 
they almost seemed resigned to a power sharing agreement. The Russian withdrawal 
from North America and consolidation of power in Asia and Europe suggests that 
from an early date, Russian leadership was seeing the world in terms of a Russian 
sphere of influence and an American sphere of influence. 
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I would argue, however, that though Russian leadership in the 1850s and 1860s 
did not see the future as particularly bright vis-à-vis the United States, this was of 
little concern to them. Their focus was on Asia and Europe, not on North America. In 
Appendix A: Russia-US Threat, therefore, I have answered ―no‖ to the question ―Will 
status quo continue to worsen if no action is taken?‖ From my research, there was not 
an overwhelming concern about the rise of the United States on the part of the 
Russian leadership. 
As long as the Russian/Soviet leadership did not feel that the status quo was 
getting worse (or in the case of the US—they did not care if it would get worse), the 
DPMP predicts that preventive action was unlikely or that should there by preventive 
action it was likely to be non-militarized in nature. My model seems to do a good job 
of predicting Russian/Soviet behavior under these conditions.  
 
 
10)  What is the nature (polarity) of the international system? 
John Mearsheimer suggests that the period 1816-1902 was characterized by 
balanced multipolarity (war somewhat likely), while the period 1903-1918 was 
characterized by unbalanced multipolarity (war most likely). 1919 to 1938 constituted 
a balanced multipolar system (war somewhat likely) while 1939 to 1945 was an 
unbalanced multipolar system (war most likely). According to his theory of offensive 
realism, war was therefore somewhat likely from 1816 to 1902 and again from 1919 
to 1938. War was most likely during the periods 1903-1918 and 1939 to 1945.
 81
 One 
question this theory does not answer is this: Why did war occur in 1914 and not, in 
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say 1910 when the structure was the same? Mearsheimer‘s model comes up short in 
answering this puzzle. 
The typology of preventive action developed in this study also incorporates 
Mearsheimer‘s concepts of polarity (see table 5.1 above). Within the typology, a 
―Balanced multipolar‖ system suggests that Russia should have acquiesced or have 
used a mixed strategy, which is at least partially correct. However, in the later 
―unbalanced multipolar‖ system, the typology predicts that Russia should have used 
coercive/confrontational diplomacy. On this point, the typology does not do a good 
job of accurately predicting the behavior of Russia/the Soviet Union. 
 




Between 1816 and 1879, Russia is classified as an autocracy as is 
Prussia/Germany. During this period, Japan is classified as an anocracy. The United 
States was a full democracy during this period. Therefore, according to Schweller‘s 
model, Russia should have either formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive 
war against Germany/Prussia, Japan, Russia, and the U.S.
83
 
Russia was a key player in the Concert of Europe and was active in European 
affairs, particularly under the rule of Alexander I and Nicholas. Many of the 
agreements reached during this period could be viewed as defensive alliances, so 
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Schweller‘s model seems to hold up during this time. However, Russia did not 
engage in preventive war, or preventive action of any kind during this entire period. 
From 1880 to 1896, Russia and Germany were classified as autocracies. The UK 
is classified as a full democracy and Japan is classified as an anocracy. Therefore, 
Russia should have formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against 
Germany, Japan, the UK and the United States. Russia continued to be involved in 
European affairs, but not in an overly aggressive way. Defensive agreements were 
made, but no real preventive action was taken. 
From 1897 to 1902, Russia and Germany were still autocracies. Japan was still 
classified as an anocracy while the United States and the United Kingdom are 
classified as full democracies.
84
 Therefore, Russia should have formed a defensive 
alliance or initiated preventive war against Germany, Japan, the UK and the United 
States. Again, Schweller‘s model somewhat predicts what Russia did during this time. 
Russia did not engage in preventive war, but its agreements at the Hague and 
elsewhere could be seen as entering into defensive alliances with other powers. 
During 1903 and 1904, Russia is classified as an autocracy while Japan is 
classified as an anocracy. Therefore, Russia should have formed a defensive alliance 
or initiated preventive war against Japan. In reality, Russia did neither. It attempted to 
continue its expansion in Asia, but Russia was humiliated when Japan launched a war 
against it in an attempt to put a halt to its expansionist dreams in Asia. 
Until 1906, Russia was still an autocracy and Russia‘s rulers refused to recognize 
any law that could not be subordinated to or reversed by the autocrat.
85
 In 1906, the 
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government of Russia underwent a significant change. On 23 April 1906, Russia 
formerly acquired a constitution, though it was flawed in several ways. Despite its 
shortcomings, it did have at least the potential to put some restrictions on the tsar‘s 
ability to increase military budgets. This now had to be approved by the Duma.
86
 
Between 1906 and 1918, Russia and Japan are classified as anocracies. Therefore, 
Russia should have formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against 
Japan. What we really see, though, is a turning inward and westward by Russia 
during this time. With the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea, there was less incentive 
for Russia to continue attempted expansion in Asia. In any case, the events in Europe 
began to demand more attention than events in Asia. 
Between 1932 and 1946, the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy. Germany 
is classified as an anocracy in 1932, but then is classified as an autocracy between 
1933 and 1944. Japan is classified as an anocracy between 1932 and 1944. The 
United Kingdom is classified as a democracy between 1932 and 1946. Therefore, 
Russia should have formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against all 
of these powers. Of course, this did not happen. The Soviet Union did not engage in 
preventive action during this period, and several of the agreements that it entered into 
were not defensive against these powers. The Soviet-German non-Aggression Pact of 
August 1939 was not a defensive alliance against Germany, as would be predicted by 
the Schweller model. Schweller‘s model seems to fail spectacularly in predicting 
Russian Soviet behavior. All of these periods and predictions are summarized in table 
5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Mearsheimer‘s and Schweller‘s Predicted Outcomes 
 
 











   Predicted Outcome 
1816-1879 Balanced Multipolar Autocracy  Autocracy Anocracy Democracy 
War Somewhat Likely  Defensive Alliance or 
Preventive War 
Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
1880-1896 Balanced Multipolar Autocracy   Anocracy  
War Somewhat Likely   Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
 
1897-1902 Balanced Multipolar Autocracy   Anocracy  
War Somewhat Likely   Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
 
1903-1904 Unbalanced Multipolar Autocracy   Anocracy  
War most likely   Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
 
1905-1913 Unbalanced Multipolar Anocracy*   Anocracy  
War most likely   Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
 
1914-1918 Unbalanced Multipolar Anocracy   Anocracy  
War most likely   Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
 
1932-1938 Balanced Multipolar Autocracy Democracy Autocracy** Anocracy  
War Somewhat Likely Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
Defensive Alliance or 
Preventive War 
Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
 
1939-1945 Unbalanced Multipolar Autocracy Democracy Autocracy Anocracy  
War most likely Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
Defensive Alliance or 
Preventive War 
Defensive Alliance 
or Preventive War 
 
* Russia was in turmoil in 1905 and therefore there is no Polity IV data for that year for Russia. Russia is classified as an anocracy starting in 1906. 
**For 1932, Germany is actually classified as an anocracy, but then in 1933 its classification reverts to autocracy. 
 
Blank boxes indicate that Russia/the Soviet Union was no longer in relative decline vis-à-vis the other power or the other power had surpassed Russia/the Soviet 
Union. Either condition is outside the scope of this research. 
Regime Type 




Russian and Soviet leadership had a largely optimistic view of the future for their state. 
Despite chronic economic and military weakness, both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union saw 
themselves as great powers at least equivalent to the most powerful states in Europe, Asia, and 
North America. Moreover, their belief that time was on their side and that they would only 
continue to get stronger led to a belief that conflict with other great powers should be avoided 
whenever possible. This was taken to an extreme in communist ideology, which suggested that 
the capitalist nations would fight amongst themselves, and a neutral Soviet Union would be the 
true beneficiary of such a conflict. 
This optimism about the future precluded a strong preventive school of thought from 
taking root in either Imperial Russia or the Soviet Union. Russia and the Soviet Union both 
largely accommodated rising powers, in much the same way that Britain had done, though for 
very different reasons. British leadership was largely resigned to a fate of declining power, while 
Russian and Soviet leadership were optimistic about their power potential. 
In the case of Russia and the Soviet Union, the typology and model developed for this 
research project perform about as well as Mearsheimer‘s polarity model and better than 
Schweller‘s democracy model. Where the DPMP does fail (nature of threat, expected cost of 
war, perceived chances of winning a war), it does not fail completely. Unfortunately, because it 
is correct some of the time while missing the mark at other times, we must conclude that on these 




The Decline of the United States 
 
 This chapter examines the decline of the United States vis-à-vis several rising powers 
from the middle of the nineteenth century to the close of the twentieth century. The first section 
of this chapter is meant to serve as a very brief overview of America‘s rise to power and its 
foreign policy. The rest of the chapter will delve into particular aspects of America‘s relative 
decline, the specific threats to its dominance of the Western Hemisphere and the international 
system, and its reaction to those challenges. 
 
A Brief Overview of American Power and Foreign Policy 
The story of the United States‘ rise to prominence begins in 1783, but even as early as 
1776; the rebellious colonies were showing signs of their future greatness. In that year, by some 
accounts, the Americans were producing more pig iron and bar iron than Great Britain.
1
 By the 
1770s, New Englanders may have been the wealthiest people in the world with per capita 
incomes that were at least equal to that in Great Britain. New Englanders also had bigger farms, 
bigger families, and better educations than their counterparts living in the old country did.
2
 
Furthermore, victory against Great Britain in the Revolutionary War (1775-83) ensured 




The march forward for the new nation would not be without its challenges and pitfalls, 
however. After the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, Britain and the major powers in Europe reacted 
                                                 
1
 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 93-94. 
2
 Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New 
York: Basic Books, 2002), 70. 
3
 Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763 - 1848, ed. Lord Bullock and William Deakin, 
Oxford History of Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1994), 11. 
166 
 
negatively to liberal revolutionary movements. In Europe, there was a movement back toward 
monarchism. The ―Holy Alliance‖—made up of Russia, Austria, and Prussia—vowed to deal 
with countries whose governments had been changed by revolution. Americans were obviously 
concerned about this wave of anti-liberalism, but they were also absorbed in their own domestic 
affairs and a looming civil war.
4
 
In the wake of its civil war, the United States emerged more powerful and influential than 
ever. By the end of the 1870s, the U.S. ranked among the richest countries in the world.
5
 The 
historian John Lewis Gaddis notes that by the 1860s, it was already becoming clear to the rest of 
the world that the United States‘ industrial strength and military might was becoming 
formidable. He argues, however, that Americans were never very comfortable with the power 
they accumulated and they were not always confident of their ability to wield power wisely. The 
foreign policy of the U.S. was, he asserts, ―curiously unassertive.‖
6
 
By the mid-1890s, despite greatly increased power, the U.S. continued to show 
apprehension in wielding its new power. For example, even though it created a colony in the 
Philippines, the U.S. government almost immediately saw this as a mistake and began to prepare 
the Filipino people for independence. Furthermore, the U.S. refused to turn Cuba into a colonial 
possession. Even after the First World War, the United States dismantled its military and then 
rejected Woodrow Wilson‘s primary vehicle, the League of Nations, for exercising American 
power.
7
 It would take another global conflagration to convince Americans that their leadership in 
world matters could be beneficial. 
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After the Second World War, the United States chose to be much more engaged in global 
affairs. In July 1944, at the Bretton Woods (New Hampshire) Conference, the United States took 
the lead in formulating a postwar monetary and economic system.
8
 It also oversaw the creation 
of the United Nations and other international mechanisms designed to prevent another global 
conflict. With the onset of the global struggle with the Soviet Union in the wake of the Second 
World War, American involvement on the world stage was entrenched. With the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the apparent triumph of democracy, the United States became the sole 
superpower and the undisputed leader of the international system. 
Despite its dramatic rise to power, the United States did not go unchallenged. The Soviet 
Union confronted the United States at various times during the twentieth century. Prussia and 
then Germany posed concerns for the United States from the late 1840s through the end of the 
1930s. Japan challenged the United States for supremacy in Asia and elsewhere periodically 
from the mid-1860s up through the early 1980s. The United Kingdom, though an ally of the 
United States, also grew in power relative to the U.S. at various times between 1930 and 1996. 
The rest of the chapter will examine these challenges to American dominance and how the U.S. 





United States vis-à-vis Russia/Soviet Union 
 Between 1816 and 1860, Russia was in a dominant position over the United States. In 
1861, the United States surpassed Russia and maintained that dominance, with only short breaks 
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until the early 1970s. However, between 1863 and 1970, there were three periods in which the 
United States, while still dominant, was in relative decline to either Russia or the Soviet Union. 





United States vis-à-vis the United Kingdom 
 In 1892, the United States reached parity with the United Kingdom. However, it was not 
until 1897 that the U.S. successfully took the lead for good. Still, as was the case with Russia, the 
U.S. was in relative decline vis-à-vis the UK at various times during the twentieth century. We 










United States vis-à-vis Prussia/Germany 
 
In the year 1844, the United States matched the power of Prussia for the first time. For 
most of the next century and a half, the United States would maintain a dominant position over 
the Prussian and then the German state. There were three periods during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, however, in which the U.S. did decline relative to Prussia and Russia. We 













United States vis-à-vis Japan 
 
 The United States has dominated the relationship with Japan since the island nation 
joined the modern international system in the 1860s. Like the other relationships outlined above, 
however, there were periods in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which the U.S. declined 






















 In summary, this chapter examines the following instances in which the United States 
was in a dominant but relatively declining position in relation to the challenger: 
United States – Russia/Soviet Union: 1863 – 1875, 1925 – 1938, 1946 – 1970 
United States – Prussia/Germany: 1849 – 1858, 1873 – 1888, 1920 – 1939 
United States – Japan: 1865 – 1876, 1930 – 1939, 1952 – 1982 




Nature of the Threat 
 
Robert Kagan argues that Americans in the nineteenth century did not view the world 
through the lens of power but instead ―evaluated other nations and their relationship to the 
United States according to where they stood on the continuum of progress.‖ Some nations were 
advancing on this continuum at a rapid pace, some were moving ahead more slowly, and others 
were not moving at all or perhaps even sliding backward. In the contemporary American view, 
the global achievement of Western liberal civilization was the ultimate goal, since Americans 
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equated progress and civilization with peace and their own national security. They believed 
that the more advanced, liberal, and commercial a people were, the more attuned they would 
be to modern concepts of justice and morality and the less inclined to war and aggression.
10
 
This view of the world as a continuum of progress and civilization helped Americans 
organize their international affairs. It created a moral compass by which countries could be 
judged ―bad,‖ ―good,‖ ―improving,‖ etc. The more backward and despotic a nation, the more 
dangerous it was considered. Russia was usually viewed in this light . Germany too was 
seen as backward and repressive as the expectation of budding liberalism faded. These 
countries were considered dangerous both because their concepts of justice and morality were 
less developed than liberal democracies, and because they retained the warlike spirit 
characteristic of societies in the ―barbaric‖ stage. 
Kagan notes that these moral judgments often blurred into strategic judgments. 
Since Russia was ―bad,‖ it needed to be constantly scrutinized and beaten back when 
necessary. Some Americans were also concerned that advanced liberal societies like the United States 
were in danger of losing the martial spirit necessary to defend themselves, and therefore civilizing the  
world‘s barbaric peoples was all the more urgent. The world had to be made safe for civilized 
peoples before they lost the will or the capacity to destroy the barbarians. 
On a more positive side, many Americans saw ―opening‖ other nations to commerce in 
the American interest not only because of the possibility of making money, but also because of 
a belief that over time commercial interaction would lead to the progress of backward 
peoples toward civilization. They would become more liberal, more commercial, and therefore 
less threatening to the United States and to the civilized world in general. The spread of 
                                                 
10




civilization would bring order worldwide through the spread of morality and the 
reinforcement of virtue. For example, Japan was often viewed as a good candidate for progress 
and on the path toward western style liberalism. It, therefore, could be allowed to expand at 







 In the late nineteenth century, the United States emerged as an economic powerhouse. 
Europeans warned of an ―American invasion‖ of U.S.-made goods and U.S. based multinational 
corporations long before they worried about U.S. military, political, or cultural power. One 
example of this was that by 1914, Russia‘s largest integrated commercial enterprises were two 
American based multinational corporations: Singer Sewing Machine and International 
Harvester.
12
 During the twentieth century, this economic prowess would only grow, but there 





Russia and then the Soviet Union never presented much of an economic threat to the 
United States, with the exception of the mid 1880s, when Russia represented an economic 
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 The primary period of German economic challenge to the United States (at least for the 
purposes of this study) was during the 1870s and1880s. During this period, German commercial 
interests were growing in Latin America. By the 1880s, Germany was second only to the British 
in Costa Rica‘s coffee export industry. The Germans were also becoming a dominant force in 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. German commercial interests in the area also 
manifested other, perhaps more threatening, undertones. In the 1870s, Berlin sent a six-ship war 
fleet to Nicaragua to protect German investors and collect an indemnity. In the early 1880s, the 
German minister to the region accused the United States of harboring imperial designs on the 
region. At the same time, Germany attempted to establish naval bases and colonies in the region. 
Secretary of State James G. Blaine responded to these challenges to U.S. leadership in Latin 
America by pushing for a Pan-American movement. The united response of the various 







 Early conflicts between the United States and Japan, though occurring during a period of 
relative American decline, are not at all clearly of a preventive nature. For example, Japan, still 
trying to close itself off from the West in 1864, apparently burned the U.S. legation. It then 
closed the Strait of Shimoneseki to all foreign shipping. Secretary of State William H. Seward 
reacted viscerally to any nation that tried to shut itself off from trade. He saw such moves as 
unnatural and immoral. Seward especially grew angry because the Japanese opposed the 
promotion and practicing of Christianity. Because of these indignities, the U.S.S. Wyoming 
                                                 
14
 Ibid., 72. 
175 
 
joined British, French, and Dutch ships that blasted their way into the Strait of Shimoneseki and 
then, in 1866, dictated trade treaties.
15
 It is difficult to characterize these actions as preventive. 
On the contrary, they seem to be actions designed to open Japan to the West and thus, at least in 
accordance with the thinking of the time, advance its development.  
 Beginning in 1868, Japan transformed its government and committed to modernize the 
country along Western industrial lines. The U.S. minister to Japan in the mid-1870s, Judge John 
A. Bingham, rewarded the Japanese by showing sympathy to Japanese demands for tariff 
autonomy. He also understood that U.S.-Japan cooperation could undercut the powerful British 
position in the Japanese market.
16
 
Japan again challenged American economic dominance in the decades following the 
Second World War. In the early 1960s, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato decided that Japan would 
adopt a policy of ―low posture‖ on defense and would avoid international quarrels, concentrating 
instead on economic development. This was the beginning of the Ikeda ―income-doubling‖ 
program that led ultimately to the Japanese ―economic miracle.‖ Still, it was not until the 1970s 
that Japanese automobiles, TV sets, and other electronic products began to make serious inroads 
into the American market. Once this did occur, however, it created problems for American 
companies. This in turn aroused strong congressional sentiment and heralded the era of ―Japan-
bashing‖ in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This challenge had created economic, political, and 
philosophical conditions that were taxing the viability and strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
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Competition between the two nations was turning adversarial, so that rivalry rather than 
accommodation set the tone.
17
 
Although the 1960s started out inauspiciously, the decade saw the beginning of the 
remarkable economic growth that was to bring Japan in a few years to the position of third 
greatest economic power in the world. The Korean War (1950-1953) provided a sharp spurt to 
Japan‘s economy, as American procurement for the war could be most economically 
accomplished in Japan. The period thereafter, especially the 1960s, became Japan‘s takeoff for 
economic growth, averaging in excess of 10 percent per year throughout the decade. In 1962, the 
Gross National Product (GNP) was already three times that of the prewar period 1934-1936.
18
 
Until 1965, the United States exported more goods to Japan than it imported; but in that 
year, the balance turned the other way. By 1972, two-way trade amounted to $14 billion, with a 
surplus for Japan of $4.9 billion. By 1981, there was a trade deficit, on the American side of the 
ledger of $16 billion. By 1982, total trade had climbed to $60 billion, and the American deficit 
had amounted to $17 billion.
19
 
 The relationship between the United States and Japan in the post World War II era, 
however, is a complex one. While many Americans railed against Japanese imports, the United 
States provided 80 percent of Japan‘s grain imports and 95 percent of its requirements for 
soybeans. Japan, in fact, was the leading customer for American farmers. Annually, American 
farmers supplied over $7 billion worth of agricultural products to Japan.
20
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This complicated relationship extended to Japanese investments in the U.S. where 
Japanese investment had generally been welcomed. However, starting in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, there were the beginning signs of what some Japanese called ―investment frictions.‖ Even 
the appearance that Japan was freely buying up American properties with profits from an unfair 
trade system—whether true or not—could create an explosive political situation. However, even 
under these circumstances, Japanese investors could count on significant political allies in the 
United States. Besides businesses, their American partners included local populations and 
mayors, governors and members of Congress who saw jobs being created and economic activity 






 The United Kingdom never presented an economic threat to the United States (during the 
periods under consideration in this chapter). Therefore, we will now turn to various military 









Despite the fact that Russia was rising relative to the United States during the American 
Civil War, most Union supporters viewed Russia favorably. They mistakenly believed that the 
tsar had intervened on the Union‘s side when the Russian fleet had entered New York harbor.
22
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Furthermore, Alexander II had endeared himself to Northern antislavery leaders when he freed 
the serfs in 1861.
23
 
This atmosphere of goodwill helped pave the way to the purchase of Alaska in 1867. A 
deal to buy Alaska from Russia had been in the works for decades since the Russians had long 
understood, at least since the 1830s, that they had lost control of Alaska‘s trade and even its food 
supply to New England traders who had been exploiting the region for decades. Nor, the 
Russians reasoned, could the territory be defended against a British attack from neighboring 
Canada, or against the Americans should they choose to settle in the territory. In the face of this 
no-win-situation, officials around Tsar Nicholas I wanted to divest Russia of Alaska. By the mid-
1850s, the tsar was ready to sell, but the American Civil War precluded any transaction. The 
afterglow of Russia‘s perceived support during the Civil War helped warm the political 
atmosphere. This, in turn, allowed Secretary of State William H. Seward to sign the treaty to 
purchase the territory.
24
 The sale of Alaska was significant because, by selling the territory to the 
U.S., Russia essentially abandoned the Western Hemisphere. By doing so, and for the next three 
decades, Russia posed little danger to perceived American interests.
25
 
The goodwill between the two countries began to evaporate, however, even before the 
ink was dry on the Alaska purchase treaty. Starting in the 1860s, Alexander II began enforcing 
old anti-Semitic regulations. Tsarist authorities often did not bother to distinguish between 
Russian Jews and American Jews, abusing and sometimes arresting American Jews. In the late 
1860s, and for the next three decades, this issue (and other human rights issues) came to 
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Before the Cold War
27
 
During the 1920s and up until 1933, the official policy of the United States government 
regarding the Soviet Union was ―nonrecognition.‖ This policy allowed the United States to make 
clear its dislike for what was happening in the Soviet Union without actually doing anything 
about it. While American officials would welcome the overthrow of Bolshevism, the American 
government was not prepared to take active measures—beyond denying normal diplomatic 
relations—to bring that event about. Instead the government would rely upon the effects of 
isolation and the passage of time to produce the desired results.
28
 
This policy ultimately backfired during the 1920s. By the mid 1920s, most of the world‘s 
nations had established diplomatic ties with Moscow. The Republican administrations of the 
1920s also inadvertently helped to stabilize the Soviet regime through the Republican 
commitment to the ideals of limited government and free enterprise. According to these 
principles, the government had no authority to force private American individuals and 
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corporations into compliance with official policy. Therefore, American trade, investment, and 
famine relief, played a major role in stabilizing the new Soviet government.
29
 
American diplomatic recognition for the Soviet regime finally came in 1933.
30
 Goodwill 
from the recognition, however, had largely dissipated by 1939. The Nazi-Soviet pact and the 
invasion of Finland caused whatever amity was left to disappear altogether. Still, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt took the consistent position that Germany posed a greater threat to world 
order than did the Soviet Union. He resisted pressures to break diplomatic relations with 
Moscow following the pact with Germany and the attack on Finland. He shared intelligence with 
Stalin pointing to the likelihood of a German attack; and when that attack finally came, in June 
1941, he immediately embraced the Russians as allies and within months made them eligible for 
Lend Lease. As Gaddis points out, ―These were not the actions of a nation determined to exploit 
the vulnerabilities of another.‖
31
 
Gaddis also suggests, ―There is simply no evidence that the Roosevelt administration at 
any point contemplated taking advantage of what in retrospect was the most obvious opportunity 
since 1917 to eliminate the Soviet regime: alignment, whether openly or surreptitiously, with the 
geopolitical objectives of Adolf Hitler.‖ While it is true that the United States was content to 
allow the Red Army to bear the main burden of ground fighting in Europe, it is not clear at all 
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that the United States and Great Britain could have created a successful second front much 




The Cold War 
At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union was a crippled giant. It was in no 
condition to engage in any kind of protracted economic or military competition with its 
American rival. The United States, on the other hand, was at the height of its strength. It had 
suffered relatively few casualties and little civilian dislocation. Its industrial capacity was 
actually twice what it had been before the war. Perhaps most importantly, it possessed a 
monopoly over atomic weapons and the means to deliver them.
33
 
While the United States government at no point committed itself to overthrowing the 
Soviet regime, after 1945 it did take the lead in containing the expansion of Moscow‘s influence 
in the postwar world.
34
 After the death of President Roosevelt, President Harry S Truman tilted 
to the side of the hard-liners in his government almost immediately after assuming the 
presidency. Many of the hard-liners stayed on as the new president‘s chief policy advisers, while 
former FDR intimates began to leave. The hardliners offered clear-cut advice that was consistent 
with the new president‘s general outlook.
35
 The new president had a dislike for communism and 
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was more critical of the Soviet Union than Roosevelt had been.
36
 Truman also hoped to 
demonstrate his toughness and decisiveness as a policymaker. 
However, Truman also understood the importance of the wartime alliance.
37
 As a result, 
his get-tough attitude did not immediately translate into a clear shift in policy.
38
 Instead, there 
was a gradual change in tone toward the Soviets. This was, in part, due to a changing view about 
the role the U.S. should play in Korea after the war.
39
 Despite these new concerns about the 
Soviet Union, there was never any real attempt to engage them through militarized preventive 
action. 
Not everyone in the Truman administration agreed that the United States should be taking 
a harder line with the Soviets. Henry Wallace, Truman‘s Secretary of Commerce, delivered a 
speech in September 1946 in which he argued that containment was not the appropriate approach 
to take regarding the Soviet Union. The president soon fired him.
40
 
By 1946 and especially in 1947, the ascendant attitude in Washington found expression 
in a general policy of containment. The new policy was announced by Truman in March 1947 
along with a request to Congress for support for embattled Greece and Turkey. The president 
took the occasion to articulate the fundamental principle behind the containment policy: the 
United States would support any free people threatened by communist aggression or subversion. 
In June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a program of economic aid to ensure 
stability in the vital western European sector of the containment line. The next month, in a 
widely read essay, Director of the State Department‘s policy-planning staff, George F. Kennan 
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(disguised as ―X‖), published an article in Foreign Affairs in which he laid out the strategic and 
moral implications of the Truman administration‘s new course.
41
 
Kennan argued that the task of American diplomacy should be to ensure that Moscow‘s 
attempts to widen its influence were unsuccessful, and to persuade Soviet leaders to moderate 
their hostility toward the outside world. In an attempt to accomplish these goals, Kennan wanted 
to build countervailing centers of power along the periphery of the Soviet Union, through 
mechanisms like the Marshall Plan. He also hoped that these countervailing centers of power 
would erode Moscow‘s control over its own satellites. He believed that given such a situation, 
Soviet leaders would be forced to moderate their suspicion of the outside world.
42
 
Despite the increasingly belligerent tone coming from Washington, Stalin continued to 
remain hopeful through the first half of 1947 that the Soviet Union and the United States would 
be able to remain friendly in the post war environment. When Truman stated his doctrine, 
drawing an ideological line across the world, Stalin responded with a cool reaffirmation of the 
possibilities of cooperation. Nor did Stalin approve of the leftist resistance in Greece. In fact, as 
Hunt notes, he called on Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria to terminate their support of the 
movement. Moreover, Stalin did not immediately reject the Marshall Plan. Instead, he sent a 




When Molotov reported to Moscow, however, Stalin had to conclude finally that the 
United States was trying to use its economic power to tighten its grip on Western Europe and to 
dislodge the Soviet Union from its advanced position in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, Soviet 
intelligence in London had sent word of Anglo-American consultations over how best to direct 
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the Marshall Plan against Soviet interests. At the same time, Molotov reported from his 
preliminary soundings in Paris that Britain and France were ―now in dire straits,‖ so that only 
submission to U.S. interference would enable them ―to overcome their economic difficulties.‖ 
Stalin decided to withdraw his delegation from the Paris meetings and forbade participation in 
the Marshall Plan by the eastern Europeans.
44
 
As relations between the two countries began to cool, there was talk about initiating a 
preventive war against the Soviet Union, though few people took it seriously.
45
 However, there 
was a real question regarding how much military strength would be necessary to discourage a 
Soviet attack against the West. The United States wanted to have enough military power to deter 
the Soviet Union, but not so much that the Soviet Union was provoked. Kennan was convinced 
that the Russians had nothing to gain by starting a war. The Truman administration in 1947 and 
1948, accepting this assessment and accepting the calculated risk that the Russians would not 
attack, concentrated on economic rather than military instruments of containment. However, 
provocations in Europe such as the coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin set off 
calls from Europeans themselves for American military guarantees. The Truman administration 
would ultimately respond by creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
46
 
The year1948 proved to be a watershed year in American-Soviet relations. In June, 
Stalin—in an attempt to disrupt the Anglo-American-French effort to unite their zones of 
occupation in Germany—placed a blockade on Berlin. Once it was clear that the blockade had 
failed, Stalin abandoned crude pressure and turned to diplomacy to achieve his foreign policy 
goals. As the United States moved toward the creation of NATO and toward West German 
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membership in that military alliance, the Soviet leader proposed a united but demilitarized 
Germany. Washington was no longer interested in Soviet plans regarding Germany.
47
 
The lines of the Cold War solidified when the Soviets tested their first nuclear weapon in 
1949. It was also in 1949 that Communist forces achieved victory in China over U.S.-backed 
Nationalist forces. Despite this seemingly good fortune for the communist bloc, Stalin‘s worst 
fears were realized with the Creation of NATO in 1949, and the integration of West Germany 
into that military alliance. From the Soviet perspective, they now faced a capitalist line of 
encirclement stretching from Turkey to Norway. It was becoming increasingly clear that Western 
Europe was lost. In order to counter the new American policy of containment, Stalin began to 
look elsewhere for revolutionary allies, especially among national-liberation movements. Then, 
in 1950, American policymakers were shaken by the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet alliance.
48
 
Policymakers had also been dazed by the development of the Soviet atomic bomb. This 
event opened the possibility of nuclear retaliation against the United States or its allies. It also set 
off a debate about whether the United States should respond by building a ―super‖ or hydrogen 
bomb. Opponents of the H-bomb questioned whether the new weapon would add any measure of 
security not already provided by atomic bombs. They also wondered whether it would 
irreparably damage prospects for the eventual control of atomic weapons and whether it would 
provoke the Russians into developing H-bombs of their own. Furthermore, they questioned the 
wisdom of nuclear weapons as the principal deterrent to Soviet aggression in the first place. 
Proponents of the H-bomb argued that whatever the military value of the new weapon, it was 
necessary to build it because the Russians surely would.
49
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A related issue to the ongoing discussion about the H-bomb was the development of a 
new national security strategy in 1950. In response to these and other developments, the National 
Security Council put forward a fresh appraisal of the global situation. This report, NSC-68, 
offered a stark, even cataclysmic picture of ideological struggle between the American-led West 
and the Soviet-dominated East. NSC-68 concluded with proposals for a major increase in the 
defense budget. Truman immediately approved the general outlines of NSC-68 but asked for 
more information on the costs of the programs recommended in its conclusion. With the 




Like Kennan, the authors of NSC-68 foresaw the possibility of exploiting potential cracks 
and weaknesses within the international Communist movement. The assumptions and goals of 
containment suggested that though the Soviet Union held an expansionist ideology, it was up to 
the United States to maintain the balance of power. Furthermore, containment of the Soviet 
Union could be accomplished without war between the two powers, but if war should occur 
between the U.S. and a Soviet proxy, the war could be kept carefully limited. The policy of 
containment also suggested that while internal change within the Soviet Union itself was not a 
prerequisite for the success of containment, the success of containment might bring about 
internal change. Finally, if containment was successful in bringing about internal changes to the 
Soviet Union, the Soviet Union might then be assimilated into the established international order. 
Containment promised no immediate results and no one could predict how long it might take. It 
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Korea as an Early Theater 
Containment started to manifest itself even before the end of the Second World War. 
General Marshall and his colleagues in the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the U.S. should occupy 
at least part of Korea in order to increase American power in the postwar balance between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Far East. Still, it was only after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki 
on 9 August 1945 that the U.S. planning for the occupation of Korea began in earnest. While the 
U.S. did not want to see the Soviet Union take control of the entire peninsula, there was a lack of 
commitment from Washington to support a government in the south.
 
In essence, Korea was not 
important enough to warrant a deep commitment, but was too important to allow it to fall to the 
communists. Because of this American desire to reduce its presence in Korea, and still minimize 
the risk of the entire peninsula becoming communist in the short term, the UN became heavily 
involved in Korean affairs.
 
The priority for the United States was clearly the occupation of Japan, 
and preventing the Soviets from having any role in its occupation. The Soviets ultimately agreed 
to the 38
th
 parallel as the demarcation line in Korea.
52
 
Despite the fact that the U.S. government at first did not see Korea as the cornerstone of 
the policy of containment, Korea was important to Truman for two main reasons. First, he did 
not want to open himself up to accusations of ―losing‖ another country to communism. Second, 
he viewed a communist Korean peninsula as a threat to Japan, which was seen as a key element 
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Post Korea Cold War 
Despite the increasing competition between the East and West in the aftermath of the 
Korean War, by the mid-1950s President Dwight D. Eisenhower acknowledged that nuclear war 
with the Soviet Union was unwinnable by either side. About that same time, Moscow was also 
ready to concede that there could be no winner in a nuclear war with the West.
54
 Instead of an 
actual war with the Soviet Union, Eisenhower and his advisers foresaw a long-term competitive 
relationship with the Soviet Union. This conclusion was based on two developments that 
manifested themselves in the late 1940s and early 1950s. First, Moscow‘s progress in developing 
nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them meant that war could destroy the United States 
itself. Because of this fact, Eisenhower quietly ruled out direct military confrontation between 
the two superpowers. Second, Eisenhower believed that the strategy of building centers of 
resistance to the Russians in all parts of the world threatened by Soviet expansion ran the risk of 
bankrupting the United States and ultimately undermining its way of life. The president thus 
neither expected nor sought a quick end to Soviet-American competition. Instead, he 
concentrated on finding ways to allow the U.S. to sustain that rivalry over an extended period, 
and to do so while reducing the chances of war between the superpowers.
55
 
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did not see the Sino-
Soviet bloc as a unified monolith. Dulles, in fact, sought to implement strategies for driving a 
wedge between the Soviet Union and China. The public, however, knew nothing of this. Official 
rhetoric continued, well into the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, to portray a monolithic 
communist threat to the ―free world.‖ Gaddis suggests that this was done ―for fear that the 
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domestic consensus in support of containment might crumble if the threat came to seem less 
awesome than in fact it appeared to be.‖
56
 
Eisenhower‘s preferred strategy was the so-called ―New Look.‖ This approach relied 
heavily upon the prospect of nuclear retaliation to deter Soviet expansionism while at the same 
time conserving limited American resources. Official strategists came to emphasize deterrence 
through the accumulation of overwhelming and instantly deliverable force. The strategy, 
however, did not depend wholly upon the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower also 
endorsed negotiations as a way of reducing the danger of war while lowering the costs of 
confrontation. Gaddis argues, ―Since surrender was unthinkable, military victory impossible, and 
the cost of long-term containment unacceptable,‖ it seemed reasonable to find ways in which the 
Soviet-American rivalry—which was seen as inevitable—could be carried on within a mutually 
acceptable framework. Through such a framework, the two sides would be able to coexist 




John F. Kennedy had made much of the issue of a ―missile gap‖ between the Soviet 
Union and the United States during the 1960 campaign. Even after he learned what Eisenhower 
had known all along—that the Soviet threat had been grossly overrated—Kennedy continued to 
carry out a massive missile-building program. This buildup probably set off the actual Soviet 
building program that would bring the Russians to the point of parity with the United States in 
missile launchers by the end of the decade.
58
 
By the time President Lyndon Johnson left office, the conditions of competition had 
dramatically changed, and not to the advantage of the United States. The U.S.‘s military exploits 
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in Southeast Asia had severely weakened its standing, both at home and in the world at large. In 
the meantime, the Soviet Union had used the opportunity to strengthen its own military position, 
and with somewhat less success, to widen its influence in the rest of the world. Still, no one in 




The incoming Nixon administration, however, saw the Kennedy-Johnson strategy as a 
failure that had allowed the Soviet Union to approach military parity with the United States. The 
new administration was determined to reverse this trend. However, Nixon‘s critics argued that 
the new administration was simply accommodating itself to the unfavorable reality. Nixon‘s 





Americans—at least Northerners, Republicans, and the U.S. government they 
controlled—supported Bismarck‘s Germany for a brief time during and just after the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870-71. Prussia‘s pro-Union leanings during the American Civil War and 
German immigrants—an ethnic population that outnumbered French immigrants fifteen to one—
had contributed to the northern cause and was also a crucial Republican voting bloc in several 
states.
61
 It also helped that Germany‘s opponent was France, a country that many northerners 
despised because of France‘s pro-southern sympathies during the U.S. Civil War and its imperial 
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pretensions manifested in its attempt to implant a European monarch in Mexico.
62
 Furthermore, 
many Americans also convinced themselves that Bismarck‘s newly unified Germany would be a 




Unfortunately for German-American relations, the high expectations many Americans 
held for a liberal Germany were severely disappointed over the coming decades. The reality of 
conservative rule under Bismarck and the Kaiser gradually dismantled the mistaken image of a 
liberal constitutional government in Germany. Trade battles between the two countries in the 
1880s did not help matters, and by the 1890s many Americans hated and feared Germany as 
much as they hated and feared Russia. Americans tended to view both of these nations as 
somehow backward, hostile to progress, despotic, and therefore aggressive.
 64 
 
The Crisis over Samoa 
American perceptions of Germany as a backward, hostile, and aggressive power shaped 
American strategic judgment and provided an ideological backdrop for the confrontation 
between the United States and Germany over the tiny islands of Samoa in the 1880s. Given this 
ideological environment, it should not be surprising that Americans would react strongly to 
Germany‘s attempts to gain a foothold in the South Pacific.
65
 
The Samoan islands stood across the path of transpacific travel and through much of the 
nineteenth century had been a port of call for American whalers. The tribes and foreign 
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settlers who lived there had often engaged in internecine struggles. The various factions 
often looked to outside powers for help and offered their harbors as inducements.
66
 The 
Samoans, fearing British and German attention, were attempting to pit foreigner against 
foreigner. 
Land speculators and American firms, arrived first to Samoa hoping the islands would 
serve as a strategic base that would help open trade to Asia and relieve the growing glut of 
U.S. goods. However, it was the 1872 treaty, signed by Navy Commander Richard W. Meade 
without advance authorization from the U.S. government, that for the first time truly involved 
the United States government in Samoan affairs. Mead was primarily interested in the fine, 
protected harbor of Pago Pago, for which he received a lease in return for a protectorate. The 
Senate accepted the harbor but rejected the responsibility of a protectorate. In a modified 
pact, the U.S. promised that it would mediate in any conflict between Samoa and foreign 
powers in exchange for rights to a naval station at Pago Pago. This proved more acceptable to 
the Senate. Later, the Samoans made similar agreements with both Germany and Great Britain. 
Though the Samoans attempted to play the foreigners off each other, in reality the U.S., 
British, and German consuls worked out a tripartite agreement for joint protection of the 
islands. The Americans were also encouraged by the appointment of the pro-American King 
Malietoa Laupepain. The tripartite arrangement existed for the next eight years, although not 
without growing conflict between U.S. and German claims.
 67
 
By the mid-1880s, German commercial interests were expanding in the South Pacific. 
As this expansion occurred, Germany began to demand greater control over the Samoan islands. 
In 1885, Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard warned Berlin that he would ―not allow any 
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one power to have a commercial preference.‖ Powerful German business interests also began 
to support a rebel group who, if successful, vowed to overthrow King Malietoa Laupepain and 
install a more German-friendly king.
68
 
Bismarck tried to reassure the Americans that German moves were not hostile to 
American interests. He announced, ―We have no interest whatsoever in gaining a foothold 
anywhere in the Americas, and we acknowledge unequivocally that, with regard to the entire 
continent, the predominant influence of the United States is founded in the nature of things and 
corresponds most closely with our own interests.‖ Such pronouncements from the Chancellor did 
little to ease American concerns. Neither President Grover Cleveland nor Secretary of State 
Bayard was prepared to back down in the face of what they regarded as German bullying. They 
wanted to uphold the independence and autonomy of the Samoan people free from ―foreign 
interference.‖ In so doing, they hoped to prevent Germany from dominating Samoa.
69
 
By 1887, the Germans, having grown impatient with the standoff with the United States 
over Samoa, dispatched four warships to the islands. The Germans demanded indemnities 
and apologies from King Malietoa for various alleged offenses. The Germans landed seven 
hundred marines, ravaged several villages, seized Malietoa, and recognized another chieftain 
as king. American officials were outraged by the German actions. The Samoan government 
appealed to the United States government for help.
70
 
The three powers met at Washington in 1887 to sort out the imperial claims. 
Bayard beat down German plans for de facto control with the argument that in U.S. 
eyes, Samoan ports were a vital link in the system that connected the U.S. railroad 
network to Asia. Nothing came out of the conference, and in 1888 Germany moved more 
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directly to seize power. American opinion flared, led by business groups such as the San 
Francisco Chamber of Commerce, which ominously warned that if Samoa fell to the 
Germans, Hawaii would be next. As Washington prepared to respond, the Iron Chancellor 
wondered aloud why Americans were so concerned about these ―remote, inconsiderable 
islands.‖ In a note to Bayard, Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee outlined 
the geopolitics of a rising Pacific empire: 
They may be remote and inconsiderable for Germany, but to us they are proximate and 
considerable, for in the hands of a naval Power they threaten our Pacific flank, and indeed 
they threaten all the Pacific Coast of South America too, and Hawaii besides. Samoa offsets 
Pearl Harbor, and Bismarck so intends it. 
 
President Grover Cleveland adopted Adee‘s ideas and sent a ringing message to Congress 
upholding U.S. rights. Congress began to consider military appropriations. 
While the press of both the Republican and Democratic parties condemned Germany‘s 
mistreatment of the islanders, Bayard was determined to avoid war with Germany. He 
assured the Samoans and the American people that he would do what he could ―to secure a 
measure of justice and fair treatment to these innocent and unhappy islanders,‖ but there was 
little he could do ―without placing in useless jeopardy the vaster interests of our own 
countrymen.‖ He warned that war with Germany would be a terrible thing. His concerns were 
confirmed by a senior naval officer who reported, ―If we go to war with Germany there is an 
extreme probability that the German fleet may threaten to shell New York.... We have 
practically nothing with which to drive the enemy away, and it would take a long time to 
build anything suitable for that purpose.‖ Bayard also declared that the United States had ―no 
policy of annexation or protectorate whatsoever in Samoa or anywhere else.‖ However, he and 
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The year 1888 was also an election year, and the president was feeling political pressure 
to do something about the Germans. Most Americans did not have strong opinions about Samoa, 
but when the Kaiser raised a challenge, many Americans wanted their government to respond 
vigorously and curb German adventurism in the South Pacific. President Cleveland, under 
pressure at home and angry at German behavior, dispatched three warships to Samoa to ―protect 
American interests‖ in the ongoing fighting. By early 1889, the port of Apia was crowded with 
foreign warships: three American, three German, and one British. It was not difficult to 
imagine conflict erupting through miscalculation or misunderstanding. Bismarck called for a 
conference in Berlin, but before it could convene, the three nations‘ warships were struck 
by a mighty typhoon. Only the British vessel escaped to open water and survived. Fifty 
American and ninety German sailors were lost. The sheer magnitude of the tragedy 
temporarily overshadowed the international confrontation. Thanks to the diplomatic breathing 
room created by the typhoon, a settlement was reached later that year temporarily restoring 
tripartite cooperation in Samoa. The United States received its main demand, its own 




The Run-up to the Second World War 
The American reaction to German provocation in the early and mid-1930s was 
understated, to say the least. In 1933, Adolph Hitler denounced the Geneva disarmament 
conference and withdrew Germany from the League of Nations. Two years later Britain entered 
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into a naval agreement with Germany that allowed the German navy to grow to 35 percent of 
Britain‘s naval strength. This was a significant increase for Germany over the levels established 
at the end of the First World War. Then in 1936, German troops marched into the Rhineland and 
reoccupied an area that had been termed a demilitarized zone at the end of World War I. The 
powers, including the United States, did largely nothing.
73
 
In November 1936, President Franklin Roosevelt took a minor step to prevent German 
influence from expanding into the Americas. In that month, Roosevelt travelled to Buenos Aires, 
Argentina where he headed a conference designed to create an atmosphere of cooperation 
between the American nations and prevent outside interference. Curbing German influence in the 
Western Hemisphere was clearly the aim. At this and subsequent meetings, the American nations 
agreed to consult with each other regarding threats to the hemisphere. Also because of this 
conference, cultural exchanges flourished between the American nations.
74
 
Akira Iriye suggests that the United States gradually took steps, starting with the Buenos 
Aires conference, to begin reengaging in foreign affairs. Some of these attempts were abortive, 
such as Roosevelt‘s attempt to reach across the Atlantic to British Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain. Roosevelt had hoped to meet with Chamberlain to discuss cooperation in 
international affairs between the two nations, but nothing came of the invitation. In October 
1937, Roosevelt made a speech in Chicago where he called for international cooperation to 
isolate or ―quarantine‖ aggressive states. While not much attention was paid to the speech at the 
time, in retrospect it shows that Roosevelt‘s thinking regarding the actions of Japan and 
Germany had begun to change. Immediately after the speech, Under Secretary of State Sumner 
Welles proposed a world conference to clarify fundamental principles of international relations. 
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Nothing came of this proposal, but both Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull supported 
the League of Nations when it called for a conference to discuss the Sino-Japanese War. The 
conference was boycotted by Japan and Germany, and not much, other than a condemnation of 
Japanese actions, came of the conference. Still, it is another example that the U.S. was beginning 
to take a more active role on the international stage.
75
 
In March 1938, Germany annexed Austria—in what it called the Anschluss—and 
began preparing ―Mitteleuropa‖ for German hegemony. The United States responded to the 
Anschluss by announcing that it would step up its rearmament program. This rearmament 
would go beyond the ―treaty limits‖ imposed by earlier naval disarmament agreements that 
had been nullified since 1936.
76
 
Between 26 September and 28 September 1938, Roosevelt sent an appeal to all parties 
involved to resolve the Sudetenland crisis—the German invasion of Czechoslovakia—
peacefully. When the Munich conference seemed to settle this dispute, Roosevelt expressed his 
approval. U.S. involvement on the international stage was again seen in November 1938, in the 
wake of Kristallnacht (the night of broken glass) in which Jewish businesses and synagogues 
were destroyed, and Jews killed or jailed by the Nazis. President Roosevelt was outraged and 
withdrew Hugh Wilson, chargé d‘affaires in Berlin. William Dodd, the U.S. ambassador to 
Germany, had already resigned in late 1937 in disgust at Nazi race policies. Hitler responded by 
withdrawing the German ambassador from Washington. Both posts would remain empty for the 
remainder of the prewar period.
77
    
After September 1938, there were increasing calls for some kind of action against Hitler‘s 
Germany. His aggression in September 1938 was so obvious and so revolting that Senator 
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George Norris of Nebraska, a veteran isolationist and the only surviving member of Congress 
who had voted against America‘s entry into the First World War, publicly stated that, faced by 




Other measures were considered at the conference of American states held in December 
1938. In Lima, Peru, the American nations issued a resolution decrying Nazi race doctrines. 
Closer consultative ties were also adopted. At about the same time, Roosevelt decided to start 
selling military aircraft to Britain and France for a possible war against Germany.
79
 
At the beginning of 1939, at the behest of President Roosevelt, the United States 
embarked on a rearmament campaign unparalleled in American history during peacetime. Fifteen 
percent of government outlays were going to be for defense. For fiscal year 1940, this would 
amount to $1.3 billion out of a total $9 billion budget. Total defense spending was actually even 
more than this since Congress granted the president additional appropriations for defense.
80
 
Further steps were being taken that would involve the United States much more in global 
affairs, even at the risk of becoming involved in the emerging conflict in Europe. In November 
1939, after the outbreak of war in Europe, Congress revised the neutrality laws to allow 
belligerents to purchase American arms on a cash-and-carry basis.
81
 This policy was clearly 
aimed at helping supply the British with war materials since the British controlled the seas. 
Even before the United States entered World War II, members of the American General 
Staff proposed that the U.S. should ―take immediate steps to acquire British and French 
possessions in the Atlantic,‖ so as to deny the Germans their use. Plans for American measures 
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―"to protect such [possessions] from falling into the hands of Germany by surrender or cession‖ 
were worked out promptly. Concerns about German moves in South America prompted plans for 




Vagts argues that the intent of the ―policy of the Roosevelt Administration in the pre-
Pearl Harbor period...was clearly preventive.‖
 
In fact, he suggests that the U.S. entered both 
world wars in an attempt to prevent a German victory in Europe. It was imperative, however, 
that the U.S. government avoid all appearance of having preventive war intentions, since the 
long democratic tradition against the waging of preventive war obviously persisted. The 
Roosevelt administration‘s preventive intention was first concretely expressed, Vagts continues, 
by aiding the peoples who were resisting Hitler, so that they would not be ―knocked out of the 
war one by one before our turn came and that we would [not] ultimately be left to face the 
onslaught alone.‖ Modern conditions of warfare, Roosevelt warned, would not permit the United 





When Japan began its steady rise in the 1860s, there was a consensus in the United States 
that Japan was a progressive force in Asia. It was seen as making a determined effort to copy 
Western ways and institutions and Americans admired the Japanese peoples‘ eagerness to adopt 
new ideas. In short, Americans believed that Japan was becoming more like America. At the 
same time, Americans also recognized that as a rising power destined to be a force in East 
Asia—where the United States also hoped someday to be an important player—Japanese and 
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American interests were likely to clash. Nonetheless, Americans rooted for Japan in the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-95 because Japan was viewed as strong and progressive and China was 
seen as backward and pitiful. When Japan attacked and sank the Russian fleet at Port Arthur ten 




The Run-up to the Second World War 
In January 1930, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan held a naval disarmament 
conference in London where the three countries agreed to limitations on naval armaments. This 
would be the last agreement between the three countries for years. Even though the Japanese 
delegation to London accepted the limitations on Japanese naval armaments, Japanese naval 
leaders were not happy and argued that the civilian leadership had sold out to the British and 
Americans. This criticism of the civilian leadership helped weaken the Japanese government and 
made it vulnerable for a military takeover.
85
 Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was assassinated 
shortly after accepting these naval limitations.
86
 
The power of the military was enhanced when, in September 1931, the Japanese army 
stationed in Manchuria began a campaign against the Chinese that resulted in a nearly complete 
Japanese victory. The United States and other powers worked through the League of Nations to 
bring about a diplomatic resolution to the crisis, but this never really had any effect on the 
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actions in Manchuria, and Japan ultimately withdrew from the League of Nations.
87
 Henry L. 
Stimson, Herbert Hoover‘s secretary of state, argued that the United States had an obligation to 
uphold basic standards of decency and international law and should rally the support of the 
international community against the Japanese aggression. President Hoover, however, did not 
want to risk war and felt that his focus should be on the moribund American economy.
88
 
As the Great Depression deepened during the 1930s, American foreign policy faltered. 
Americans were increasingly preoccupied by what was going on within their own country and 
wanted to focus on repairing the ills of the economy at home. They were less interested in what 
was happening abroad. Despite the U.S.‘s new tendency to pay less attention to foreign affairs, 
Americans were not happy with the announcement in 1934 by the Japanese Foreign Ministry that 
the Japanese government would not look favorably on countries who chose to deal directly with 
China without consulting Japan first. In response to these Japanese moves, Roosevelt chose not 
to recognize the puppet state of Manchukuo, which the Japanese had set up in Manchuria. The 
Roosevelt administration would not reward Japanese aggression, but neither would it take any 
significant action to roll the Japanese back.
89
 
This sense of the U.S. abandoning its leadership position in the world was exemplified by 
the Neutrality Act of 1935 in which the U.S. Government outlawed the sales of arms to 
belligerents in a war. This went against the traditional American ideals of neutrality in which a 
neutral country could sell arms to all belligerents. Americans, by 1935, wanted to focus on 
developing the domestic economy, and they did not want to get involved in foreign conflicts.
90
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When the London naval armament agreements expired in 1936, there was no new 
agreement reached between Japan, the U.S., and Great Britain. Japan began to build a powerful 
navy to first catch up to and then surpass the United States in the Pacific. Also of significance in 
1936, Japan, Germany, and Italy signed the anti-Comintern pact in which each country secretly 




Another step towards global conflict came in the form of renewed fighting between 
China and Japan, which broke out in July 1937. Also, at the end of 1937, the Panay incident—in 
which Japanese military aircraft sank an American gunboat on the Yangtze—proved to be 
another step toward renewed American internationalism. The gunboat had been evacuating 
American personnel from Japanese occupied Nanking when it was attacked. The Japanese 
offered an immediate apology and paid an indemnity, but Roosevelt was clearly alarmed by the 
action. He sent Captain Royal Ingersoll—chief of the U.S. Navy‘s intelligence division—to 
London to open secret talks with his British counterpart about possible joint action against Japan 
should such provocation continue. These were the first of what would be ongoing talks regarding 
bilateral military cooperation between the two nations.
92
 
Despite the rising tensions with Japan, the United States continued to sell armaments to 
the island nation. In 1938, American arms shipments to Japan amounted to $9.1 million. 
Increasing public outcry over the Japanese aggression regarding China put mounting pressure on 
the U.S. government to halt these sales. In July 1938, the State Department announced a moral 
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embargo of airplanes to Japan. This was not legally binding, but sent a message to Japan that 
they might not be able to rely on American suppliers of armaments in their war against China.
93
 
In November 1938, after conquering much of China but still not being able to defeat 
completely the Chinese, the Japanese called for a ―new order‖ in Asia based on Asian ideals and 
principles, not on Western concepts that had dominated the region for centuries. This clearly 
presented a challenge to the Western nations, including the United States. Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull immediately denounced the Japanese‘s ―new order,‖ arguing that Japan had no right 
to create a new order unilaterally. He stated that the United States would oppose Japanese 
unilateralism and would not recognize any modification in the regional status quo except through 
consultation and cooperation.
94
 Because of this and other provocations, the U.S. began rebuilding 
the U.S. Navy in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
95
 
To drive the point home, in December 1938 the United States issued a loan of $25 
million to the Chinese to use in any way they chose. In 1939, the United States withdrew from 
the treaty of commerce it had with Japan, creating a situation where Japanese shippers, 
merchants, and bankers were no longer protected by treaty rights, thus Japan was more at the 
mercy of American goodwill.
96
 It was becoming clear to both the Chinese and the Japanese 
where the U.S. stood in the Sino-Japanese War.
97
 
 By 1939, war had spread in China and anti-Japanese feeling was on the rise in the United 
States. When the U.S. government announced it was going to terminate the commercial treaty 
with Japan, the American public overwhelmingly approved. Joseph C. Grew, the American 
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ambassador in Japan from 1932 to 1941, was home on leave when the announcement was made, 
and he was astonished at the public support for a trade embargo. He warned the State 




Post World War II 
On 8 September 1951, the U.S. and Japan signed a peace treaty and endorsed a mutual 
security treaty that would guarantee Japan‘s security and provide for the stationing of American 
military forces in Japan. From this point onward, the United States assumed responsibility for the 
security of Japan, especially from nuclear attack. The treaty created a security environment in 
Japan of dependence on the United States.
99
 As the decades wore on, however, there would 
become increasing tensions between the two nations.  
 By the 1960s, Japan began to enjoy remarkable economic growth that would bring, 
within a few years, Japan to the position of third greatest economic power in the world. Prime 
Minister Ikeda Hayato embarked on his policy of the ―low posture‖ (teishisei), meaning that 
Japan would concentrate on its economic development and avoid international quarrels. By 1962, 




The Japanese have used their constitution as a shield against remilitarization and as an 
avenue for the ―low posture‖ of Japanese defense spending. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution 
categorically states that the Japanese people ―forever renounce war as a sovereign right‖ as well 
as the ―threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.‖ Japanese leaders have 
interpreted this article to mean that Japan is prohibited from establishing military forces and from 
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developing war potential. During the 1970s, they also instituted a policy of banning any sales of 
weapons or defense technology to any nation without exception. Many Americans regarded the 
Mutual Security Treaty and the long history of American-generated military aid and sales 
programs as justification for a relaxation of the ban in the case of the United States. The issue in 
Japan was contentious since there was a fear that any change in the interpretation of laws 
regarding security matters could open Pandora‘s Box leading to the remilitarization of Japan. 
Also of significance, by the early 1980s, the U.S. wanted Japan to build up its military, thus 
relieving some of the burden from the United States. Ultimately, Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro yielded to American pressure—and his own concepts of a reasonable defense force for 






Great Britain and the United States often had strained relations during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, but by the twentieth century, most of the issues that divided the two 
countries had been resolved. The status of Canada had been settled and British ambitions in Latin 
America had been quelled.
102
 During the periods under investigation in this study, there was little 
or no military animosity between the United States and Britain. 
The one minor exception to this might be the Suez Crisis of 1956, in which Gamal Abdul 
Nasser, the president of Egypt, nationalized the Suez Canal. For the British, the canal was a vital 
link between Western Europe and Persian Gulf oil. After attempting negotiation at the behest of 
the Americans, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, with cooperation from the French and the 
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Israelis, embarked on military action to prevent Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower was surprised by the invasion and he was furious. He stated, ―How could 
we possibly support Britain and France if in doing so we lose the whole Arab world?‖
103
 The 
United States went on to sponsor resolutions in the United Nations Security Council to end 
British, French, and Israeli military action. The U.S. did this, in part, to prevent Soviet 
intervention in the crisis. Under American pressure, the British, French, and Israelis withdrew 
their forces from Egypt.
104
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In this section, I assess the performance of the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention in 
predicting the outcome of American foreign policy during the periods under consideration. 
Following the method of structured, focused comparison, each of the eleven questions posed in 
the previous chapters are answered, and then an overview of the model‘s performance is outlined 
for each question. The typology for this model appears in table 6.1 while the flowcharts for the 
individual cases appear in Appendix A. 
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1) To what extent is the internal power of the state constrained? 
Prior to its civil war, the United States was very constrained in its foreign policy 
relating to other major powers. It was extremely weak in terms of offensive military 
power. After the Civil War, the United States emerged more powerful and influential 
in world affairs, though still militarily weak vis-à-vis other major powers. Gaddis has 
argued that Americans were not always confident in their ability to wield their power 
wisely, and this military weakness might provide at least a part of the explanation for 
that timidity. This lack of confidence seems to dominate American foreign policy—at 
least in relation to other major powers—until the early to mid-1930s. It is really only 
broken by American successes and ultimate victory during the Second World War. 
After the war, it is clear that the United States took on a real leadership role on the 
international scene. This leadership role and active foreign policy has continued to the 
present day. Obviously, in the post World War II era, particularly with the 
implementation of NSC-68 and other Cold War policy prescriptions, the internal 
power of the United States has been much less constrained than it was during 
previous periods. The United States has had considerable offensive military power, 
especially in terms of nuclear weapons, during this latter period. However, the 
strategy of the United States continued to be mostly defensive in the twentieth 








Russia really removed itself as a threat to the United States in the nineteenth 
century with the sale of Alaska in 1867. There were, of course, other issues between 
the two countries—including the mistreatment of American Jews in Russia—but 
these issues never really translated into foreign policy. With the emergence of the 
Soviet Union, there was an ideological and then a military challenge to the United 
States. The U.S. reacted first with non-recognition and then eventually with 
cooperation during the Second World War. After the war, of course, the U.S. and the 
USSR slid into animosity towards each other. 
After the war, there were minimal internal power constraints placed on the 
American leadership, at least in terms of pure military capability. Demobilization 
after the Second World War somewhat reduced American offensive potential, 
however. More significantly, we see other kinds of restraints placed on the American 
leadership. The policy of containment, by its very nature, tended to be a defensive 
doctrine. While some leaders and commentators advocated rolling back communism, 
the overall goal of containment came to be interpreted as holding the line until 
communism was forced to change or collapse from within. 
It is clear that this defensive strategy placed constraints on internal power. It is 
difficult, however, to determine exactly where American internal power should be 
placed on the above typology. It is conceivable that these constraints were moderate 
since there was clearly capability, particularly in the early years of the Cold War, but 
the policy of containment acted as a constraint on the exercise of that capability. 
Given this, the typology would suggest a defensive-offensive or offensive-defensive 
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strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during this period. The typology, then, seems to 
do a good job of predicting actual American behavior in relation to the Soviet Union. 
During the Cold War, the United States used different strategies at different times to 
include coercion and incentives as well as confrontational diplomacy. 
 
 Germany 
Despite serious internal constraints on power, the United States was able to force 
the tactical retreat of Bismarck from Latin America in the 1880s. Still, this was done 
more through diplomacy and cooperation with the Latin American countries than 
through threats or use of military force against Germany. In this case, Germany chose 
to back down rather than face the U.S. and its Latin American associates. 
Such was not the case in the Samoan crisis. Here, the U.S and Germany nearly 
came to blows over the islands. There was, of course, a tripartite agreement between 
Germany, Britain, and the United States, but this ultimately broke down. This was 
followed by more negotiations, and then the deployment of warships by all three 
nations to the islands. Had it not been for the intervention of nature in the form of a 
typhoon that destroyed most of the warships harbored in Samoa, it is possible that 
militarized conflict could have erupted. This did not occur, however, and the three 
nations ultimately came to an agreement regarding the administration of the islands. 
German-American relations were again strained with the increased militarization 
of Germany in the 1930s and then the outbreak of war in Europe. To counter the 
spread of German influence in Latin America, Franklin Roosevelt took a page out of 
the history books and developed closer relations between the United States and its 
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Latin American neighbors. Roosevelt also moved in the direction of ―quarantining‖ 
aggressive states. 
With the Anschluss of 1938, the United States announced a rearmament program 
clearly aimed at Germany. Despite this new more confrontational stance, the United 
States did little during the Sudetenland crisis. After Kristallnacht, however, the U.S. 
did signal its displeasure by withdrawing Hugh Wilson from Berlin. At the end of 
1938, Roosevelt took the step of selling military aircraft to Britain and France for a 
possible war against Germany. Finally, in early 1939, Roosevelt announced that the 
U.S. would embark on a massive military buildup in anticipation of the coming 
conflict. After the outbreak of war, the U.S. Congress revised the neutrality laws to 
help supply war materials to the British. 
In terms of the above typology, we can see that, up until the eve of the Second 
World War, American leadership was severely constrained in terms of internal 
power—largely because of a relatively weak military and a defensive strategy. The 
typology suggests that in this case, the United States should have acted defensively 
and acquiesced in the face of German aggression. While the U.S. did act defensively 
for the most part, it did not acquiesce to German demands. It took action in Latin 
America (twice) to prevent German interests from developing there. It also 
confronted Bismarck‘s Germany with a show of military force in the Samoan islands. 
The United States‘ record seems weaker in the run-up to the Second World War, but 
even here it did not acquiesce in the face of German aggression, but instead took less 
direct measures to check German power. Therefore, the typology—which predicts 
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acquiescence—does not seem to perform well, at least on this variable, in the case of 
Germany in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. 
 
Japan 
American relations with Japan prior to the Second World War are complex. When 
the U.S. ―opened‖ Japan in the mid 1860s, its military actions were not of a 
preventive nature. On the contrary, the emergence of Japan on the international stage 
and favorable tariff policies would ultimately help the Japanese increase their power. 
At the same time, the majority of Americans saw the Japanese as becoming more 
liberal and modern and therefore less threatening to the United States. 
In 1930, the Japanese, Americans, and British agreed on limitations of naval 
armaments. This was the last agreement between the three until after the end of the 
Second World War. American reaction to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was 
weak. Its attempt to stop Japan by working through the League of Nations was 
ineffective, and the U.S. largely withdrew from the ongoing conflict in Asia with the 
passage of the Neutrality Act of 1935. While the United States would not recognize 
the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, and it denounced Japan‘s attempts to 
establish a ―new order‖ in Asia; the American leadership failed to take any real action 
against Japan. It was only after the Panay incident in 1937 that Roosevelt began to 
coordinate with the British with an eye to eventual confrontation with Japan. By 
1938, the U.S. was engaged in rebuilding its navy. Still, the U.S. continued to sell 
armaments to Japan through 1938. Finally, in 1939, the U.S. withdrew from its 
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commerce treaty with Japan. Nonetheless, this was still a mild response to Japanese 
aggression in China. 
 In terms of the above typology, I would argue that the United States leadership 
was severely constrained in terms of internal power largely because of a relatively 
weak military and a defensive strategy for the period up until the eve of the Second 
World War. This defensive strategy did not lend itself to engaging in strong 
diplomatic or military coercion of Japan. In this case, the typology accurately predicts 
that the United States was likely to acquiesce or do nothing regarding Japan‘s 
aggression against China. 
American-Japanese relations in the post World War II era are also complex, but 
the challenge from Japan—particularly in the 1970s and 1980s—was of an economic 
nature, not a military one. The military alliance made any use of American military 
power against Japan nearly impossible to fathom. Even economic coercion or 
retaliation against Japan for perceived injustices was difficult to implement. While 
―Japan-bashing‖ became a favorite activity for a brief time for some Americans, there 
seems to have been no real discussion of ending the special relationship between the 
two countries. 
In this case, in contrast to minimal internal power constraints in terms of sheer 
military power, there were significant internal constraints due to treaties and the 
special relationship between the two countries. Aggressive action by the United States 
against Japan in the post World War II era has been largely unthinkable. Japan has 
been an important ally and trading partner. In this case, the measurement of 
offensive/defensive military strategy does not seem to apply. In fact, the American 
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desire in the early 1980s to see Japan rebuild its military really runs counter to my 
preventive action theory. However, since Japan represented an economic challenge, 




 Similar to the situation with Japan in the post World War II environment, war 
between the United States and the United Kingdom during the entire twentieth 
century was highly unlikely. After 1930, their relationship actually became friendlier 
as Germany posed an increasing threat. After the war, Britain and the U.S. were 
closer than ever and faced the Soviet Union together. With the possible exception of 
the Suez Crisis, there has been little friction between the two nations. In the post Cold 
War environment, Britain has remained one of the United States‘ closest allies. The 
variable of internal power constraints does not seem applicable in this case. 
 
2) To what extent are pro-preventive action elements constrained? 
Russia/Soviet Union 
One of the big questions this study should answer is the following: So why did the 
United States not exploit the advantages it held in the years after the Second World 
War to eliminate, or at least neutralize, its most likely competitor in the postwar 
world? Prominent individuals—both within and outside the government—urged 





 According to the Socialist Norman Thomas, in 1944-45 Washington 
already ―buzzed with gossip that war with Russia was a paramount subject of 
discussion in the armed forces, with some officers, especially in the Navy, believing 
that since war is so likely we had better have it soon while we, rather than the 
Russians, are at the top of our strength.‖
106
 
Some Americans, eyeing the American monopoly of the atomic bomb, and 
frustrated over the spread of Moscow-centered communism, advocated using this 
ultimate weapon for fighting a preventive war against Russia. Robert M. Hutchins, 
Chancellor of the University of Chicago, told a Senate Committee, ―We ought to start 
[a war] right now because we are in the best position to win it. The assumption that 
there is going to be a war would lead to the conclusion that we had better start the war 




There were, of course, opponents to this way of thinking. Vagts notes that in 
November 1945, ex-Ambassador to Moscow Joseph E. Davies denounced ―a few 
militarists—not among the great war leaders—in this and other countries who 
advocate war with Russia and now rather than later.‖ Davies called such talk 
―insanity‖ and equated it to ―throwing dynamite around.‖
108
 
Similarly, Henry Wallace, relegated to the position of secretary of commerce, 
protested that ―a school of military thinking‖ was advocating ―a preventive war, an 
attack on Russia now before Russia has atomic bombs.‖ To Wallace, such thoughts 
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seemed ―not only immoral but stupid.‖ Unfortunately for Wallace, since he gave no 
names of any advocates of preventive war, he made it easy for the Secretary of War 
and the Secretary of the Navy to deny that there was any basis for his accusations. 
They knew, they said, of no responsible Army or Navy officer ―who has ever 
advocated or even suggested a policy or plan of attacking Russia. There is no such 
military thinking in the War and Navy Departments.‖
109
 
Wallace may have had in mind statements like those of General H. H. Arnold. 
The general argued that there was only one defense against the atomic bomb, ―hit it 
before it starts.... This country should capitalize on the atomic bomb, if necessary to 
assure world peace.‖ Another officer of the Air Force, Lt. General Ira C. Eaker, 
Deputy Commander of the Army Air Force, predicted, ―The next war would be a 
short war of unparalleled destruction, that the first blows would be struck through the 
air, and that to prevent destruction of this country in event of such an attack we must 
strike the enemy first.‖ He went on to argue, ―If we are to prevent the launching of 
atom bombs, guided missiles, or super-rockets against our industrial establishments, 
we must have a force ready to destroy these weapons at their source before they are 
launched.‖ Eaker concluded by stating, ―The only such weapon we have in the United 
States today is our long-range bomber force.‖ Some of this, of course, could have 
been hyperbole and posturing in an attempt to secure more Congressional funding for 
the Air Force, but some strategists went even further. Colonel Louis E. Coira of the 
Air Force Operations Division, emphasizing the need for secrecy and speed in the 





opening of a preventive nuclear war, concluded that the president ―must be prepared 
to accept the responsibility for issuing the order [for a] preventive war.‖
110
 
Military officers were not the only ones advocating preventive war against the 
Soviet Union. The United States had suggested, in the Baruch Plan, that international 
control of all atomic weapons programs be turned over to the United Nations. As a 
science writer who had done much to popularize the atomic bomb, William L. 
Laurence proposed that the United States initiate a new approach to the issue if the 
Soviet Union would not agree to the Baruch Plan. He argued that any nation refusing 
to renounce its sovereign right to manufacture nuclear bombs would be making itself 
an aggressor nation subject to UN Charter sanctions. He advocated that in the 
circumstances of such aggression, Congress should authorize the President ―to take 
whatever action is necessary to meet the challenge of the aggressor.‖ The aggressor, 
in his view, was to be prevented from continuing the production of nuclear weapons. 
He argued that the Kremlin should be told, in effect, that the U.S. would be 
compelled to ―destroy your atomic plants before they are ready to operate.... If that 
means war, it will be a war you will force on us by your insistence on an atomic 
armaments race which must inevitably lead to war anyway.... Under the 
circumstances it would be to our advantage to have it while we are still the sole 
possessors of the atomic bomb.‖
111
 
Former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, like Ambassador Davies and 
Secretary Wallace, viewed preventive war with much skepticism. Stimson called 
preventive war proposals ―worse than nonsense.‖ He argued that preventive war ideas 
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result ―from a cynical incomprehension of what the people of the world will tolerate 
from any nation.... We could not possibly take that opportunity without deserting our 
inheritance. Americans as conquerors would be tragically miscast.‖ John Foster 
Dulles seemed to agree with Stimson by suggesting that it was unthinkable that the 
United States would start a preventive war. Perhaps alluding to the comments made 
by members of the military, he argued, ―military factors were not to be ignored, but in 
accordance with American tradition, let the military be an instrument of national 
policy, and not in itself the maker of that policy.‖
112
 
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, in private talks, and Secretary of the Navy 
Francis P. Mathews, in a speech at the Boston Navy Yard, suggested that the United 
States should be willing to pay ―even the price of instituting a war to compel 
cooperation for peace.‖ This was generally understood as a proposal to launch a 
preventive war against the Soviet Union. The State Department hastened to repudiate 
the idea as not representing official American foreign policy.
113
 
Some American military leaders, concerned with the direct competition between 
the United States and the USSR in the production of atomic bombs, advocated the 
preventive use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union before it had produced a 
substantial number of bombs. Major General Orvil A. Anderson, commandant of the 
Air War College, assuming that Russia would use its nuclear weapons when it had the 
appropriate capability, expounded in classes and publicly on how a preventive war 
through the use of strategic bombing could and should be carried out. Anderson was 
taking the ―cold war‖ metaphor literally. In his view, he was not advocating 
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preventive war since the United States and the Soviet Union were already at war, but 
simply suggesting preventive moves within an already existing state of war. He thus 
argued: 
Since we‘re at war, damn it, I don‘t advocate preventive war, I advocate the 
shedding of illusions. I advocate saying to Stalin: ‗Joe, you‘re not kidding 
anybody. You are saying you‘re going to destroy us?‘ And if he says ‗yes‘—and 
he has been saying ‗yes‘ all the time—we must conclude civilization demands 
that we act. Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia‘s five A-bomb 
nests in a week. 
 
For these remarks, Anderson‘s superiors suspended him from his office and later 
dispensed with his services altogether, explaining that the Air Force‘s primary 
purpose was ―the prevention of war‖ and not the execution of a preventive war.
114
 
With a show of righteousness, the Soviets protested that the warlike statements of 
some Americans violated a UN General Assembly resolution against war propaganda. 
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Vyshinksy attacked the Western Powers as 
―war-mongers‖ and preparers of a ―Pearl Harbor for the USSR.‖ He mentioned by 
name a long list of enemies of the peace and of the Soviet Union, including Winston 




The authoritative military answer to preventive war proposals in the United States 
was given by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, whom 
Vyshinksy had included in his list of warmongers. Bradley assured a congressional 
committee in October 1949 that ―we are never going to start a war,‖ and that his and 
his colleagues‘ strategy was therefore based on the assumption that the United States 
would wait to be attacked. This was something that sober-minded military men had 




 Ibid., 332. 
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told the public before. But, he added, after allowing the enemy to strike first, ―we will 
have to carry the war back to the enemy by all means at our disposal.‖
 116
 
As can be gleaned from some of the statements above, the Truman Administration 
had to contend with an influential school of military members who were becoming 
increasingly political. These politicized military leaders were less respectful of the 
boundaries of the policymaking domain usually reserved for civilian control. These 
men were ready to discard the American tradition against aggressive or preventive 
war as outdated. President Truman answered these calls for preventive war by 
reiterating the traditional American view that preventive wars were ―the weapons of 
dictators, not of free democratic countries like the United States, arming only for 
defense against aggression.‖
117
 The Truman administration never seriously 
considered taking advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities in so cold-blooded a way. 
Gaddis argues that there were several reasons for this lack of preventive action on the 
part of the U.S.: 
First, however things may have appeared in retrospect, it was not all that clear at 
the time that the United States enjoyed so decisive a military edge over the Soviet 
Union. Second, moral considerations—and their very realistic political 
implications—also discouraged any serious thought of initiating military action 
against the Soviet Union. Third, there was the growing realization that the total 




There was also a sense that the Soviet government—unlike the adversaries of 
World War II—was redeemable. Gaddis points out, ―It is significant that this 
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viewpoint existed prior to the Soviet Union‘s acquisition of atomic weapons and of a 
retaliatory capacity that could be used directly against the United States.‖
119
 
Men who prided themselves for holding to the best traditions of democracy 
echoed the conviction that no preventive war should be undertaken, even as part of 
the so-called ―cold war.‖ A barrage of speakers, civilian and military, had to offset 
statements by American politicos—both in and out of uniform—who favored 
preventive war against the Soviet Union. General Omar Bradley assured the 
American people and armed forces alike that ―we will not provoke a war against 
anybody. And we will not wage a preventive war against an archenemy.‖ In May 
1951, while testifying before Congress, Senator Harry P. Cain of Washington asked 
General Bradley ―May I ask if you believe in a preventive war?‖ General Bradley 
responded, ―I do not, because I do not believe that is a solution.‖
120
 
Furthermore, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that proposals in favor of 
a preventive war were ―self-defeating. It is only among those who have lost their 
sense of proportion about the purpose for which we need to build our military 
strength that talk of preventive war is possible. Only among those who have lost sight 
of our goals can there be wisdom in self-destructive hysteria.‖
121
 
In the final analysis, then, while there were certainly Americans advocating the 
use of preventive action, and specifically preventive war against the Soviet Union, 
there were also serious constraints on these individuals. Whether it was a concern at 
the highest levels about American capability or moral restraint, from the above 
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evidence it seems that the civilian leadership did not consider preventive war a viable 
option against the Soviet Union. Instead, the policy of containment was seen as more 
pragmatic. Containment is, of course, a form of preventive action in and of itself, 
however. 
We must conclude that had there been severe political constraints on Americans 
who advocated preventive action, and specifically preventive war, there would have 
been far fewer advocates and far fewer willing to express their views publicly. Since 
we have multiple examples of fairly prominent individuals advocating preventive 
action, an argument can be made that the political constraints were moderate. Given 
this reasoning, the typology once again performs well, predicting a mix of strategies: 
the use of incentives, coercion, and confrontational diplomacy.  
 
Germany 
In the case of Germany, there seems to have been much less talk about 
prevention, both in the last half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the 
twentieth century. Part of this is undoubtedly due to a rather militarily weak United 
States during this period. Secretary Bayard‘s statement that the U.S. would not allow 
any single country to gain a commercial monopoly in the Samoan islands is rather 
vague. Despite the general lack of discussion regarding prevention, the U.S. did act 
forcefully in the Samoan affair. Had it not been for a typhoon, it is possible that 
military confrontation could have arisen between the U.S. and Germany. In this 
instance, the typology does not seem to perform well. There seems to be severe 
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political constraints and yet the United States engaged in confrontational diplomacy 
and even a show of military force. 
In the run-up to the Second World War, the United States at first did nothing. 
Then during and after 1938, the United States started more openly supporting France 
and Britain, and shoring up support in Latin America. Senator Norris‘ remarks 
regarding preventive war and the recommendations of the American General Staff 
suggest that the ideas of prevention were on the minds of some American decision 
makers. Because there were at least some discussions of preventive measures, we can 
conclude that there were moderate political constraints. In this case, the typology 
performs somewhat well. While no incentives were really offered to Hitler, coercion 
and confrontational diplomacy were eventually initiated by the United States. 
 
Japan 
As mentioned earlier, the rise of Japan in the 1860s and 1870s was not viewed by 
most Americans as threatening, and therefore did not lend itself to thoughts of 
preventive action. The rise of Japanese power in the 1930s, however, was seen as a 
threat to American interests in Asia, but the United States was largely on a defensive 
military footing and was unable or unwilling to take substantial economic and 
diplomatic steps to curb Japanese ambition. There was, in fact, little discussion of 
preventive action aimed at Japan before the late 1930s. It was only with the ending of 
the commerce treaty and then later with the economic embargo of oil that the U.S. 
became serious about preventing the further rise of Japan. This later event, 
unfortunately, is outside the scope of this study. For the time period being examined 
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here, American political constraints regarding preventive action against Japan seem to 
have been rather severe. With the Neutrality Act of 1935, the United States really 
turned its back on Asia. The typology is correct in predicting that under such 
circumstances, the United States would do nothing to stop the rise of Japan. 
In the post World War II environment, of course, the relationship between Japan 
and the U.S. was quite different. During this period, the competition between the two 
countries was purely economic. While there was some discussion of economic 
retaliation against Japan during this period, it was not so much of a preventive nature 
as a punishment for Japanese trading policy and an inducement to have those policies 




Again, the DPMP does not seem applicable in the relationship between Britain 
and the United States. If it were applied, we would have to conclude that there have 
been severe political constraints regarding any discussion of preventive action against 
the United Kingdom. Therefore, as predicted by the typology, the U.S. did nothing to 
stop the relative increase in British power either before or after World War II. 
 
3) What is the nature of the ruler belief system? 
Russia/Soviet Union 
American leadership during the nineteenth century in regards to Russia can be 
described as moderate-pragmatic or even moderate-acquiescent after the sale of 
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Alaska. Despite relatively minor issues of oil and human rights, Russia was much less 
on the minds of American policymakers than were some of the other major powers. 
The typology predicts that the American government should largely do nothing or 
accommodate the Russians. In this instance, the typology seems to be correct. 
The leadership of the Roosevelt administration during the 1930s also fits the 
moderate-pragmatic mold. Roosevelt seemed willing to accommodate the Soviets and 
even offer them incentives even when the Soviets seemed to move closer to Nazi 
Germany. This behavior is accurately predicted by my typology, though not the 
specifics of that behavior. 
American-Soviet relations in the post World War II era also seem to fit well with 
the typological predictions. President Truman and his advisors clearly were either 
moderate-pragmatic or perhaps even pragmatic-militant in orientation. The policy of 
containment, in its different variations, continued to cast this hardnosed shadow 
across the rest of the Cold War. Successive administrations continued to straddle this 
moderate-pragmatic/pragmatic-militant line. With these tendencies in mind, the 
typology seems to predict accurately the form American foreign policy would take 
during much of the Cold War. 
 
Germany 
While the ruler belief system was not significantly different in terms of its 
orientation toward Germany than it was toward Russia in the nineteenth century—the 
U.S. leadership took a pragmatic-militant approach—its view of the threat posed by 
Germany was quite different. This had a significant impact on the foreign policy of 
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the United States during this period. Because of the American perception that 
Germany posed a threat to U.S. interests, the typology does not do a good job of 
predicting the outcome of American foreign policy. I will address the issue of threat 
in the next section. 
It can be argued that the American leadership was moderate and pragmatic during 
the run-up to World War II. The typology does a reasonable job in predicting 
American foreign policy during this time. The U.S. did, in fact, accommodate the rise 
of Nazi Germany, especially in the early years of the Third Reich. It then slowly 
started to shift toward more of a carrot and stick diplomacy by arming the British and 
the French.  
 
Japan 
The ruler belief systems of the American leadership towards Japan in the mid-
nineteenth century would have to be classified as moderate-acquiescent to moderate-
pragmatic. It also helped that the Japanese, during this period, were seen as becoming 
more like the United States in terms of ideology and development. The typology 
accurately predicts that American leaders should acquiesce or accommodate the rise 
of Japan during this period. 
During the 1930s, because of the United States‘ own military weakness, the 
Roosevelt administration maintained a moderate-pragmatic stance. The U.S. tended to 
accommodate the ever more aggressive Japanese, especially until about 1938. Under 
these circumstances, the typology predicts everything from accommodation to 
rewards and penalties. After 1938, the Roosevelt administration began to shift to a 
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more pragmatic-militant orientation. The typology does seem to predict fairly 
accurately American foreign policy in the run-up to World War II, especially in the 
later years of the 1930s when the United States started to take a more aggressive 
stance in regards to Japanese maneuvers in Asia. 
American leadership in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s was largely moderate-
acquiescent to moderate pragmatic. The typology would suggest that the United 
States should do nothing to stop the rise of Japan, or should at the most use a mixed 
strategy of incentives and coercion in its relations with Japan. This is, in fact, what we 
see when looking at the foreign policy of the United States. Even in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s at the height of economic tensions between the two countries, talk of 
economic retaliation against Japan was relatively mild. 
 
United Kingdom 
In both the decade before World War II, and the decades since, American 
leadership regarding Britain has been moderate-acquiescent to moderate-pragmatic. 
The typology has accurately predicted that the United States would either acquiesce 
in the face of British growth or would accommodate the UK. 
 
4) What is the nature of the threat (military, non-military)? 
Russia/Soviet Union 
Russia (at least since removing itself from the North American continent with the 
sale of Alaska) and the Soviet Union have never posed an economic threat to the 
United States. As mentioned earlier, with the sale of Alaska, the Russian threat to the 
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United States was minimized for the remainder of the nineteenth century. Nor did the 
Soviet Union really pose a military threat to the United States prior to the Second 
World War. However, because the early Soviet Union was not seen as a military 
threat, but an ideological one, my typology may be seen as accurately predicting that 
the U.S. would accommodate the Soviet Union.
122
 Diplomatic recognition and 
cooperation during World War II would seem to be in line with this prediction. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did pose a militarized threat to the United 
States after the Second World War. However, it is clear from the thinking of George 
Kennan and the authors of NSC-68 that the Soviet leadership was considered a 
rational actor that would not be willing to take unreasonable military risks. They 
believed that the Soviet Union could be contained and waited out. The Soviet Union, 
then, was seen by the majority of American decision makers as a moderate-
militarized threat. This, as predicted by the typology in figure 6.1, resulted in 
sustained coercive and confrontational diplomacy in the form of the containment 
policy during the Cold War period. 
 
Germany 
During Bismarck‘s attempted incursion into Latin America and later during the 
Samoan Crisis, Germany posed both a militarized and economic threat. The threat, 
however, on both accounts was fairly moderate. Given this view of the threat, the 
typology accurately predicts the use of confrontational diplomacy and a show of force 
(in the case of Samoa). 
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German remilitarization in the 1930s also presented a challenge to the United 
States. This combined with the ideological differences between the two countries and 
the human rights violations of the Third Reich created a tense atmosphere. The 
rearming of Germany was clearly seen as a threat to American allies in Europe, 
particularly Britain and France. President Roosevelt took steps to supply them with 
arms in preparation for any conflict that might arise with Germany. He also 
consolidated support in Latin America as a shield against possible German attempts 
to gain a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. In this case, the typology does not 
seem to fail completely, but there are clearly nuances in American foreign policy that 
are not being captured by the typology. 
 
Japan 
 During the 1860s and 1870s, Japan was seen as a possible competitor in Asia. 
However, this was tempered by the general view that Japan was becoming 
ideologically similar to the United States, and therefore any future conflicts were seen 
as solvable through normal diplomatic and economic channels. Therefore, the threat 
was low and non-militarized. The typology accurately predicts that the United States 
would largely do nothing as Japan gained power. 
 The situation was different in the 1930s. As the decade progressed, Japan was 
seen as more of a military threat to U.S. interests in Asia and a challenge to the 
international order. As the 1930s wore on, American leaders came to see Japan as 
first a moderate militarized threat, then perhaps even a high militarized threat. In this 
case, the typology suggests that the U.S. should have taken more aggressive measures 
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earlier than it did vis-à-vis Japan. Part of the reason for this discrepancy, as indicated 
earlier, is that the U.S. was not in a strong military position to act more forcefully. 
In the post World War II era, Japan presented a low to moderate non-militarized 
threat to the United States. The challenge from Japan during this period was 
economic. Therefore, the typology does a good job predicting the behavior of 
American foreign policy during this time. 
  
United Kingdom 
 The threat from the UK in the 1930s and after World War II, if there was any 
threat at all, would have to be classified as low non-militarized. The typology 
accurately predicts that American foreign policy should be acquiescent in these 
circumstances. It is not surprising that the American government did nothing (or very 
little) to prevent the relative rise in power of the United Kingdom. 
 
5) To what extent is conflict seen as likely or inevitable? 
Russia/Soviet Union 
It is clear that conflict with Russia in the nineteenth century was perceived as 
being unlikely. This would lead the DPMP to predict that non-militarized preventive 
action would be unlikely. In this instance, our model is correct; no preventive action 
was taken by the United States against Russia during this period. 
In the years 1925 to 1933, it seems that the U.S. government did not view conflict 
with the Soviet Union as likely. On the contrary, the policy of non-recognition would 
suggest that the U.S. was willing to wait for isolation and time to take its toll on the 
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Soviet regime. Between 1933 and 1938, however, we see a warming of relations 
between the two countries, though strains were placed on the relationship because of 
Stalin‘s overtures toward Hitler. Nonetheless, during this period, conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union was not seen as likely. In this instance, the DPMP 
is correct; no preventive action was taken by the United States against Russia during 
this period. 
Finally, during the Cold War, it is clear that some Americans felt that conflict 
with the Soviet Union was inevitable and pushed for preventive action. This view, 
however, did not dominate the American foreign policy establishment. Instead, 
containment suggested that if the U.S. were able to stop the spread of communism, its 
internal contradictions would ultimately force the Soviet regime itself to change. War 
was seen as possible, but not at all inevitable. I would classify the perceived 
likelihood of war—at least for the key decision makers—as low. Given this (and 
other factors mentioned below such as status quo and cost of militarized action), the 
DPMP accurately predicts that preventive action was likely, but that non-militarized 
preventive action might be preferred. Containment is a form of non-militarized 
preventive action and was the preferred method of dealing with the Soviet Union after 
World War II. 
 
Germany 
Germany in the nineteenth century actually presented both a militarized and non-
militarized threat to the United States. While it is difficult, from the research done in 
this project, to determine how the American leadership felt about the possibility of 
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conflict with Germany, it seems reasonable, given German incursions into Latin 
America and Samoa—and their relatively close proximity to the United States—that 
some Americans would see conflict with Germany as at least somewhat likely. I 
would rate this as high on the DPMP. However, given other factors such as cost 
which will be discussed below, non-militarized preventive action may have seemed 
the more prudent course as predicted by the model. For the most part, this is correct, 
though militarized preventive action was certainly possible after the U.S. and 
Germany sent warships to Samoa. Thanks to the typhoon, however, we will never 
know if militarized conflict was in the cards. 
Conflict with Germany from 1920 to 1933 was probably not a real possibility. 
The Weimar Republic was not seen as a threat by the United States despite it growth. 
After 1933, however, and the remilitarization of Germany under the Nazis, Germany 
was increasingly seen as a militarized threat to America‘s allies. As the 1930s wore 
on and Germany appeared increasingly aggressive, the likelihood of conflict also 
increased. However, due to the likely cost of militarized action, non-militarized 
preventive action may have been preferred. This is predicted by the DPMP. 
  
Japan 
Japan in the nineteenth century, as mentioned earlier, was not seen as a threat by 
either the American public or the American leadership, though it was viewed as a 
potential competitor. Japan in the 1930s, however, was increasingly perceived as a 
militarized threat. Conflict was seen as increasingly likely as the 1930s wore on. 
However, once again, because of the anticipated costs of such action, non-militarized 
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preventive action was chosen as the more prudent course of action, as predicted by 
the DPMP. 
Japan in the post World War II era has presented an economic challenge to the 
United States. As predicted by our model, non-militarized preventive action would be 
the preferred method to deal with such a circumstance. However, given that the 
likelihood of conflict would have been low and that the general feeling in the U.S., 
particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was that the status quo was getting 
worse for the United States, non-militarized preventive action should have been seen 
as a possibility. The wave of ―Japan bashing‖ and discussion in the halls of Congress 
would suggest that economic retaliation was indeed considered. However, the DPMP 
also suggests that if the cost of non-militarized preventive action is high, then 
preventive action is unlikely. This seems to have played out in American foreign 
policy. A trade war with Japan would have certainly been expensive. As a result, we 




 As mentioned earlier, conflict was not seen as likely between the United States 
and the United Kingdom during the periods under consideration. Therefore, the 






6) To what extent do domestic elements believe that a war would not be costly? 
Russia/Soviet Union 
The cost of war does not seem to be a factor in determining American policy 
towards Russia in the nineteenth century or the period 1925-1938. Since it was such a 
remote possibility, there seems to have been very little emphasis placed on such 
calculations. After World War II, however, there were many cost calculations, and the 
costs were almost always considered very high, particularly after the Soviets 
developed their own atomic weapons. However, it was also felt by many people, 
particularly in the late 1940s and early 1950s that the cost of militarized conflict, 
while high, would only increase as time went on and the Soviets increased their 
military capability. Because of these two factors, the DPMP predicts that preventive 
action is likely, and that non-militarized preventive action might be preferred. This 
seems to be the thinking of the foreign policy establishment in the U.S. at the time. 
 
Germany 
War with Germany has always been viewed by the United States as being 
costly. As early as 1885, Secretary of State Bayard warned that war with Germany 
would be a terrible thing and that the Germans could possibly shell New York 
City. This would have been as true in 1935 as it was in 1885. Given that 
militarized preventive action in regards to Germany has always been seen as 
costly, it is not surprising that the United States chose to use non-militarized 
means to prevent the growth of German power. 
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The DPMP does a decent job of predicting American foreign policy vis-à-vis 
Germany, with the possible exception of the show of force in Samoa. Still, a show 
of force is less than militarized preventive action. Had the Samoan Crisis evolved 




War with Japan in the 1930s was seen as costly, especially given the weakness of 
American military power at the time. This fact lent itself to non-militarized 
preventive action, if any action was going to be taken at all. This is, in fact, what 
occurred in American foreign policy during the period, and it is what is predicted by 
the DPMP. 
As mentioned earlier, war with Japan in the post Second World War environment 
has not been presented as a viable option by any American administration. Japan has 
been a close American ally for the past sixty years. However, should war occur 
between the two countries, it would be unbelievably expensive since Japan is one of 
the United States‘ main trading partners. 
 
United Kingdom 
As was the case with postwar Japan, war with the UK during the entire twentieth 
century has been all but unthinkable from a U.S. perspective. The close alliance 
between the two countries precludes any such calculations. The DPMP simply does 
not apply to this case for this variable. 
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Since war was really only an option after the Second World War, I will not 
discuss the other periods here. As seen earlier, there were Americans, particularly 
some military officers, who felt that war with the Soviet Union would only become 
more costly as time went on and the Soviets rebuilt their military. This calculation 
probably permeated to the top of the American government, but the most powerful 
decision makers clearly felt that the U.S. could not engage in preventive war for 
moral and ideological reasons. The DPMP does not take into account moral and 
ideological elements of decision making, but the fact that military action against the 
Soviet Union was seen as costly suggests that the United States should have looked to 
non-militarized means of dealing with the Soviet Union. This is predicted by the 
model and it reflects reality very well. 
  
Germany 
From the evidence gathered in this research, there is no clear indicator of how the 
American leadership felt about the cost of future war with Germany either in the 
nineteenth century or in the run-up to World War II. It is clear, however, that war 
with Germany was always seen as costly, and this was enough to preclude militarized 
preventive action. The DPMP predicts that if any preventive action is to be taken, it 
will be of a non-militarized nature. This is, in fact, how American foreign policy 





There is evidence to suggest that by the late 1930s, American leadership felt that 
the longer they could delay conflict with Japan, the better the chances for the United 
States. It was only in 1938 that the U.S. began to earnestly rearm and to begin 
rebuilding the U.S. Navy. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that American 
leadership wished to postpone any war with Japan for as long as possible to give 
these rearmament programs a chance to bear fruit. Therefore, since militarized 
preventive action would be seen as more costly in the short term than it would be in 
the longer term, the DPMP predicts that non-militarized preventive action, if any, 





Since war was not a real possibility between the UK and the U.S., I will not 
address this issue here. 
 
 
8) To what extent is there the belief that the chances of winning a war now would 
be greater than the chances of winning a later war? 
 
Russia/Soviet Union 
Similar to calculations of the costs of war, for American policymakers after 
World War II, it seemed that the odds of winning a war would decrease as the Soviets 
rebuilt their military machine. However, as discussed earlier, the costs of war in the 
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first place precluded most high-level discussions of preventive war against the Soviet 
Union. This is accurately predicted by the DPMP. 
 
Germany 
There is no real evidence, other than the comments of Secretary of State Bayard, 
that suggest the thinking of the American leadership regarding the probability of 
winning a war with Germany. The costs seem to have been seen as prohibitive, so no 
real discussion of a now-versus-later type took place. Nonetheless, because of the 
perceived costs, according to the DPMP, non-militarized options would have been 
preferred. This is reflected in reality. 
 
Japan 
As stated earlier, it is conceivable that by the late 1930s, American leadership felt 
that the longer they could delay conflict with Japan, the better the chances for the 
United States. Because of the relative late start in rearming, it is reasonable to assume 
that American leadership wished to postpone any war with Japan for as long as 
possible to give these rearmament programs a chance to bear fruit. Therefore, since 
militarized preventive action in the short term would be seen as less likely to succeed 
than it would in the longer term, the DPMP predicts that non-militarized preventive 
action, if any, might be preferred, at least until the United States had sufficiently built 






Since war was not a real possibility between the UK and the U.S., I will not 
address this issue here. 
  
9) To what extent do domestic elements think the status quo will get worse for their 
state if the rising challenger is allowed to continue its ascendancy? 
 
Russia/Soviet Union 
In regards to Russia and then the Soviet Union, there does not seem to have been 
a concern about the status quo prior to World War II. However, after the war, there 
does seem to be this pervasive feeling that the status quo would get worse for the 
United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Soviet development of the atomic 
bomb, communist gains in China, and then the outbreak of the war in Korea only 
reinforced these concerns. However, given the cost of militarized conflict, the DPMP 
accurately predicts that the U.S. would engage in non-militarized preventive action 
during the Cold War. 
 
Germany 
It is difficult to extract American thoughts regarding the status quo vis-à-vis 
Germany in the 1870s and 1880s. Germany was a rising power to be sure, but so was 
the United States. The overall lack of discussion regarding the future of the status quo 
would lead us to assume that this was not a major concern of American decision 
makers. If this were correct, then the DPMP would assume that any preventive action 
taken on the part of the United States would be of a non-militarized nature. This 
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would be correct, with the possible exception of the potential outbreak of hostilities 
over Samoa had nature not intervened. 
Germany in the 1920s, as mentioned above, was not of particular concern to the 
American foreign policy establishment. However, upon the ascendance of Adolf 
Hitler and the remilitarization of Germany, there was increasing unease about the 
rising power in Europe. Still, there does not seem to have been a lot of discussion 
about a deteriorating status quo. Americans were more concerned about their crippled 
economy than what was happening across the Atlantic Ocean. There does not seem to 
be a perception that the status quo is worsening for the United States. If this is 
accurate, then the DPMP correctly predicts that the United States, if it were going to 
do anything, would engage in non-militarized preventive action. 
 
Japan 
The status quo was clearly deteriorating in relation to a rising Japan during the 
1930s, but this did not seem to be a major concern of American leadership for most of 
the decade. Americans, as mentioned before, were focused largely on the domestic 
economy and were trying to avoid getting involved in international conflicts. The 
American concern, at least until 1937, seems to have been more about fair access to 
China than with the rise of Japanese power and Japanese militancy. Therefore, while 
the status quo was objectively deteriorating, the American leadership and American 
public do not seem to have noticed or cared until around 1938. Given this, we have to 
answer ―no‖ to the question ―Will the status quo continue to worsen if no action is 
taken?‖ It seems this is the way the American leadership would have answered the 
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question at the time, had they asked it. Given this, the DPMP predicts that, at least 
until 1938, preventive action of any kind was unlikely. 
After 1938, the awareness of the deteriorating situation seems to have been more 
clearly defined in the minds of American decision makers. However, there is little 
direct evidence from the research here to suggest that the leadership was framing it in 
terms of a deteriorating status quo projected into the future. This is problematic for 
our model, since if we answer ―yes‖ to this question, the DPMP accurately predicts 
U.S. foreign policy after 1938. If we answer ―no‖ to this question, our model 
continues to predict no preventive action, which is incorrect. We must conclude, 
therefore, that on this question, we simply do not have adequate information to 
determine definitively the success or failure of the DPMP. 
American leaders and the American public during the 1970s and early 1980s 
certainly saw Japan as an economic challenge and did see the status quo as continuing 
to worsen. This lead to ―Japan bashing,‖ but little else. Our model predicts that, 
because non-militarized preventive action would have been costly given the important 
trade that occurred with Japan, the U.S. should not take any preventive action. This, 




There is no discussion of the status quo vis-à-vis the United Kingdom during this 
period. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that had the status quo been seen as 
deteriorating, this would have made any difference in British-American relations 
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during the periods being examined here. The United States has shown a tendency to 
accommodate rising powers with which it has good relations. 
 
 
10) What is the nature (polarity) of the international system? 
John Mearsheimer suggests that the period 1816-1902 was characterized by 
balanced multipolarity (war somewhat likely), while the period 1903-1918 was 
characterized by unbalanced multipolarity (war most likely). The period 1919 to 1938 
constituted a balanced multipolar system (war somewhat likely) while 1939 to 1945 
was an unbalanced multipolar system (war most likely). Finally, the period 1947 to 
1990 was bipolar (war most unlikely). According to his theory of offensive realism, 
war was therefore somewhat likely from 1816 to 1902 and again from 1919 to 1938. 
War was most likely during the periods 1903-1918 and 1939 to 1945.
 123
 One 
question this theory does not answer is this: Why did war occur in 1914 and not, in 
say 1910 when the structure was the same? Mearsheimer‘s model comes up short in 
answering this puzzle. 
The typology of preventive action developed in this study also incorporates 
Mearsheimer‘s concepts of polarity (see table 6.1 above). Within the typology, a 
―balanced multipolar‖ system suggests that the United States should have acquiesced 
or have used a mixed strategy, which is at least partially correct. In the case of Russia 
and then the Soviet Union, up until 1938, the typology accurately predicts American 
foreign policy. It also accurately predicts American reaction to the increasing power 
of the UK during the 1930s. In relation to Japan in the 1860s and 1870s, the U.S. 
certainly acquiesced to its rise. In the 1930s, the U.S. acquiesced or accommodated 
                                                 
123
 See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 
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Japan, again in keeping with our typology. The U.S. response to Germany in the 
1870s and 1880s, as noted however, was more forceful. In the case of Germany, our 
typology does not perform well on this variable. In the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. 
largely did nothing as Germany rose, again suggesting our typology is correct. 
However, this begins to break down after 1938 when the U.S. began to supply arms to 
Britain and France. However, as Mearsheimer suggests, in 1939 the world became an 
unbalanced multipolar system in which these actions would be completely 
appropriate. Similarly, after 1938 the U.S. started to take a tougher stance against 
Japan, again in conjunction with the shift toward an unbalanced multipolar system. 
Our typology seems to hold up fairly well in all of these cases except Germany in the 
1870s and 1880s. 
The classification of a bipolar system in the post World War II era is less helpful. 
Our typology predicts everything from acquiescence to accommodation to 
confrontational diplomacy. It is no surprise, then that American foreign policy during 
this time can fit into one of these three categories vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom. While accurate, the typology is not very instructive for 
these cases during this period. 
 




Between 1863 and 1867, the United States is classified as a democracy (it is 
actually classified as a democracy for the entire period under investigation) while 
                                                 
124
 See Ibid. See also Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More 
Pacific?," World Politics 44, no. 2 (1992). 
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Japan and Russia are both classified as autocracies. Therefore, according to 
Schweller‘s model, the U.S. should have formed a defensive alliance against both. In 
this case, Schweller‘s model does a poor job of predicting American foreign policy. 
The United States actually tended to favor Japan during this period, and American-
Russian relations were quite friendly during this period. 
From 1868 to 1877, Prussia/Germany and Russia are classified as autocracies. At 
the same time, Japan is classified as an anocracy. According to Schweller‘s model, 
the United States should have formed a defensive alliance against all three. In this 
instance, Schweller‘s model does better in predicting America‘s foreign policy 
behavior against Germany. American-Russian relations also cooled during this 
period, but not to the point where the United States was seeking alliances against 
Russia. Japan continued to enjoy good relations with the United States during this 
period, counter to the predictions of Schweller‘s model. 
For the period 1878-1888, both Germany and Japan are classified as anocracies 
and Russia is still classified as an autocracy. Schweller‘s model predicts that the 
United States should form a defensive alliance against all three. Schweller‘s model 
again does a decent job of capturing an overall negative relationship between the 
United States and Germany, but it does less well in its prediction of Russian-
American and Japanese-American relations.  
Between 1920 and 1932, Germany and Japan continue to be classified as 
anocracies and the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy. The United Kingdom 
emerged on the scene in 1930 as a new challenger to the United States, but it is 
classified as a democracy. Schweller‘s model predicts that the United States should 
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form a defensive alliance against Germany, Japan, and Russia; but it should 
accommodate the rise of the UK. Schweller‘s model accurately predicts American 
behavior to the relative rise in power of the United Kingdom. It does less well in its 
prediction in regards to the other three. 
From 1933 to 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany are classified as autocracies, 
Japan is classified as an anocracy, and the United Kingdom is classified as a 
democracy. Therefore, according to Schweller‘s model, the United States should have 
formed a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan; and 
should have accommodated the rise of the UK. Again, Schweller‘s model accurately 
predicts American foreign policy behavior regarding the UK. His model also captures 
the emerging alliance against Germany and Japan. However, there is no similar 
alliance forming against the Soviet Union. 
For the period 1946 to 1951, the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy and the 
United Kingdom is classified as a democracy. Schweller‘s model predicts that the 
U.S. should form a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, but it should 
accommodate the rise of the UK. In this case, Schweller‘s model is completely 
accurate. 
Between 1953 and 1970, both the United Kingdom and Japan are classified as 
democracies, while the Soviet Union continues to be classified as an autocracy. 
Schweller‘s model predicts that the U.S. would accommodate the rise of both Japan 
and the UK, but that it would form a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union. 
Schweller‘s model is completely accurate for this period. 
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From 1971 to 1982, both the United Kingdom and Japan are classified as 
democracies. Therefore, Schweller‘s model predicts that the United States would 
accommodate their rise in power. Schweller‘s model is completely accurate for this 
period. 
Finally, from 1983 to 1996, the UK is classified as a democracy. Once again, 
Schweller‘s model predicts that the U.S. would accommodate the UK‘s ascendance. 

























Soviet Union    Predicted Outcome 
1863-1867 Balanced Multipolar Democracy   Autocracy Autocracy 
War Somewhat Likely   Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance 
1868-1877 Balanced Multipolar Democracy  Autocracy Anocracy Autocracy 
War Somewhat Likely  Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance 
1878-1888 Balanced Multipolar Democracy  Anocracy Anocracy Autocracy 
War Somewhat Likely  Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance 
1920-1932 Balanced Multipolar Democracy Democracy* Anocracy Anocracy Autocracy** 
War Somewhat Likely Accommodation Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance 
1933-1938 Balanced Multipolar Democracy Democracy Autocracy Anocracy Autocracy 
War Somewhat Likely Accommodation Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance 
1939 Unbalanced Multipolar Democracy Democracy Autocracy Anocracy Autocracy 
War most likely Accommodation Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance 
1946-1951 Bipolar Democracy Democracy   Autocracy 
War Most Unlikely Accommodation   Defensive Alliance 
1952-1970 Bipolar Democracy Democracy  Democracy Autocracy 
War Most Unlikely Accommodation  Accommodation Defensive Alliance 
1971-1982 Bipolar Democracy Democracy  Democracy  
War Most Unlikely Accommodation  Accommodation  
1983-1996 Bipolar Democracy Democracy    
War Most Unlikely Accommodation    
 
* The UK began to ascend vis-à-vis the United States in 1930 and that rise continued until 1939. 
** The Soviet Union began to rise vis-à-vis the United States in 1925 and that ascendance continued until 1938. 
 
Blank boxes indicate that the United States was no longer in relative decline vis-à-vis the other power or the other power had surpassed the U.S. Either condition 
is outside the scope of this research.
Regime Type 




 American foreign policy is quite complex during the time periods under consideration in 
this chapter. Two major questions should be asked in deciding whether the Domestic Politics 
Model of Prevention is valid and worth further consideration: ―How well does it predict actual 
American foreign policy?‖ and ―Does it do a better job at predicting American foreign policy 
than other models?‖ I will attempt to answer these questions in this section. 
 
Russia/Soviet Union 
In the case of Russia and the early Soviet Union, the DPMP performs very well. For the 
period of the nineteenth century, the model accurately predicts that the American government 
should largely do nothing or accommodate the Russians during the 1860s and 1870s. In addition, 
during the 1920s and 1930s, the DPMP is correct; no preventive action was taken by the United 
States against Russia during this period. 
The behavior of the Roosevelt administration vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the 1930s 
is accurately predicted by my typology, though not the specifics of that behavior. Because the 
Soviet Union prior to the Second World War was not seen as a military threat, but an ideological 
threat, my typology may be seen as accurately predicting that the U.S. would accommodate the 
Soviet Union. 
The DPMP does a good job of predicting actual American behavior in relation to the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. During this period, political constraints were moderate for 
American leaders. Given this condition, the typology once again performs well: predicting a mix 
of strategies including the use of incentives, coercion, and confrontational diplomacy. The model 
accurately predicts that preventive action was likely, but that non-militarized preventive action 
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might be preferred. Containment is a form of non-militarized preventive action and was the 
preferred method of dealing with the Soviet Union after World War II. This, as predicted by the 




The DPMP struggles with American-German relations in the 1870s and 1880s. In this 
case, the model seems to have a split personality. On the one hand, there seems to be severe 
political constraints, and therefore the typology suggests that in this case, the United States 
should have acted defensively and acquiesced in the face of German aggression. Yet the United 
States engaged in confrontational diplomacy and even a show of military force. While the U.S. 
did act defensively for the most part, it did not acquiesce to German demands. In this case, the 
DPMP also does not perform well on the variable of polarity of the international system. On the 
other hand, because of the American perception that Germany posed a threat to U.S. interests 
during the 1870s and 1880s, the typology accurately predicts the use of confrontational 
diplomacy and a show of force (in the case of Samoa) during the 1870s and 1880s. 
The model is redeemed somewhat, though, regarding American-German relations on the 
eve of the Second World War. In the decade before the Second World War, the typology does 
not fail completely, but there are clearly nuances in American foreign policy that are not being 
captured by the typology. During and after 1938, the typology performs reasonably well. While 
no incentives were offered to Hitler, coercion and confrontational diplomacy were initiated by 





 As mentioned earlier, the rise of Japan in the 1860s and 1870s was not viewed by most 
Americans as threatening, and therefore did not lend itself to thoughts of preventive action. The 
typology accurately predicts that American leaders would acquiesce or accommodate the rise of 
Japan during the 1860s and 1870s. 
 Unfortunately, the DPMP does not perform as well in all instances. One variable, the 
perception of a deteriorating status quo vis-à-vis Japan prior to the outbreak of World War II, 
provides a real challenge for our model. On this variable, we simply have insufficient evidence 
to draw a definitive conclusion. 
However, the DPMP does seem to predict accurately American foreign policy vis-à-vis 
Japan in the run-up to World War II. This is especially true for the later years of the 1930s when 
the United States started to take a more aggressive stance in regards to Japanese maneuvers in 
Asia. However, the model does suggest that the U.S. should have taken more aggressive 
measures earlier than it did vis-à-vis Japan. Part of the reason for this discrepancy, as indicated 
earlier, is that the U.S. was not in a strong military position to act more forcefully.  
In terms of the nature of the threat from Japan in the post World War II era, the DPMP 
does an overall good job predicting the behavior of American foreign policy during this time. 
However, some variables for this period cause trouble for our model. The measurement of 
offensive/defensive military strategy does not seem to apply to Japan during this period given 
that Japan was an important ally and trading partner to the United States. In fact, the American 
desire in the early 1980s to see Japan rebuild its military runs counter to my preventive action 
theory. The one redeeming feature in this instance, however, is that since Japan—during this 
period—represented an economic challenge not a military one, the U.S. had little to fear from a 
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rebuilding of Japan‘s military capacity. In addition, some of the variables in the DPMP simply 
do not seem particularly applicable in this instance. For example, in looking at the cost of war or 
the chances of being successful in a war, the American-Japanese relationship in the post World 
War II era does not lend itself to this analysis. 
 
United Kingdom 
 The American-British relationship also poses problems for the DPMP on some variables 
such as internal power constraints, political constraints, the cost of war, and the chances of being 
successful in a war. They simply do not seem to be particularly applicable to US-UK relations. 
Nonetheless, the model does accurately predict American foreign policy vis-à-vis the United 
Kingdom on some of the other variables. Fore instance, in both the decade before World War II, 
and the decades since, American leadership regarding Britain has been moderate-acquiescent to 
moderate-pragmatic. The DPMP has accurately predicted that the United States either would 
acquiesce in the face of British growth or would accommodate the UK. Similarly, the threat from 
the UK in the 1930s and after World War II, if there was any threat at all, would have to be 
classified as low non-militarized. The typology accurately predicts that American foreign policy 
should be acquiescent in these circumstances. 
 
Alternative Models 
Mearsheimer‘s classification of international polarity, as mentioned above, failed to 
predict American-German relations during the 1870s and 1880s. The classification of a bipolar 
system in the post World War II era is also problematic. It predicts everything from acquiescence 
to accommodation to confrontational diplomacy. It is no surprise, then that American foreign 
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policy during this time can fit into one of these three categories vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom. While accurate, the polarity of the international system is not 
very instructive for some these cases. 
Schweller‘s model also has a mixed record in its performance for these cases. For the 
period 1863 to 1867, Schweller‘s model does a poor job of predicting American foreign policy. 
Schweller‘s model also performs only moderately well when looking at Prussia/Germany, 
Russia, and Japan between 1866 and 1877. His model accurately predicts American behavior 
toward Prussia/Germany, but it misses the mark in terms of American foreign policy towards 
Russia and Japan. It has similar problems in the period 1878-1888. However, Schweller‘s model 
does a good job in predicting American reaction to the relative rise of the UK during the 1930s. 
His model also does a good job predicting an American defensive alliance against Germany and 
Japan, but it does not predict an alliance with the Soviet Union during the Second World War. 




 None of the models—the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention, Mearsheimer‘s model 
of offensive realism, or Schweller‘s democratic peace model—accurately predict American 
foreign policy in every instance examined in this chapter. However, it is clear that my model 
performs at least as well as Mearsheimer‘s model, and considerably better than Schweller‘s 
model for all instances except the Cold War. This would suggest that the DPMP has some value 





 This dissertation has sought to answer the basic question of why dominant 
declining states act the way they do regarding rising challengers. In chapter one, two 
basic goals were established concerning the overall framework of this study: 1) 
broadening the concept of preventive action to include non-militarized events, and 2) a 
focus on leaders’ perceptions of the rising challenger and the workings of domestic 
politics. The purpose of this approach was to capture more subtle instances of preventive 
action—moving beyond the traditional view of a dichotomous relationship of war-no-
war—and to help us understand the domestic inputs that go into preventive action 
decisions. 
 In order to determine what causal mechanisms or variables might have a dominant 
influence on the process, a model was developed that captured some important factors in 
this decision making process. The Domestic Politics Model of Prevention, presented in 
chapter three, incorporates aspects of prospect theory and includes the basic causal 
mechanisms of internal power constraints, domestic political constraints, and ruler belief 
systems. The performance of this model is then compared to the performance of two 
well-established structural models: offensive realism and Schweller’s democratic peace 
model. 
 In order to test the DPMP against the other two models, this dissertation utilizes 
three case studies: the decline of the United Kingdom (chapter four), the decline of 
Russia and the Soviet Union (chapter five), and the decline of the United States (chapter 
six). Within each case study, a standardized set of questions are asked of each case—in 
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accordance with the method of process tracing—to determine the importance of each 
causal mechanism as well as the importance of the structure of the international system. 
As was stated at the outset, the idea was to see how my model, based largely on domestic 
factors, would perform in relation to the more established structural models. The hope, of 
course, was that the DPMP would outperform the other two models in predicting the 
behavior of dominant but declining states. 
 The purpose of this last chapter is to answer this grand question: which of these 
competing models does the best job of explaining how dominant declining states actually 
behave vis-à-vis a rising challenger? In looking at this question, several possibilities must 
be considered. First, it could be that only one of these models presents the best 
explanation for the behavior of dominants states when faced with decline and a rising 
challenger. Second, it could be that two of the models, when combined, provide the best 
explanation for this behavior. Third, it is possible that all three models provide equally 
adequate explanations of why dominant declining states respond to challengers the way 
they do. 
 The goal of this chapter is to tie together all the loose ends of the preceding 
chapters and provide an overall look at how the models performed. In order to 
accomplish this, each model will be reviewed in the context of each case, and their 
conclusions will be briefly presented again. Then, the empirical merits of these findings 
and their relevance to dominant declining state behavior will be discussed. Finally, it will 
be determined which model—or models—most convincingly explains the behavior of 
these dominant declining states. Finally, the implications will be mentioned and the study 
concluded. 
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The Models: Reviews and Evaluations 
 In this section, I once again go through the cases in the context of each model. In 
order to refresh the reader’s memory regarding each case, this section recaps the findings 
from the previous three chapters. All of these findings are summarized in Table 7.1 in the 
following section. 
 
Alternative Model 1: John Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism Model   
John Mearsheimer, with his theory of offensive realism, suggests that major 
variations of balance in the international system can affect a nation’s calculations 
regarding the efficacy of war. Mearsheimer proposes a variety of systemic possibilities 
ranging from balanced bipolar systems to unbalanced multipolar systems.
1
 He suggests 
that war is most likely to occur in a system in which a potential hegemon is emerging, 
what he calls an unbalanced multipolarity. On the other hand, war is least likely in a 
bipolar system in which two powers have roughly equal amounts of power. In between 
these two extremes is what he calls balanced multipolarity in which several states have 
roughly equal power, and there is no superior state. He suggests that in such a case, war is 
more likely than in a bipolar system, but less likely than in an unbalanced multipolar 
system.
2
 Mearsheimer lists the polarity of the system as follows: 
1) Napoleonic era I, 1792-93 (1 year), balanced multipolarity 
2) Napoleonic era II, 1793-1815 (22 years), unbalanced multipolarity 
3) Nineteenth century, 1815-1902 (88 years), balanced multipolarity 
4) Kaiserreich era, 1903-18 (16 years), unbalanced multipolarity 
5) Interwar years, 1919-38 (20 years), balanced multipolarity 
 
                                                 
1
 Kenneth Waltz points out that stability and peace do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. See Kenneth N. 
Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18, no. 2 (1993). 
2
 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2001), 42-46. 
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6) Nazi era, 1939-45 (6 years), unbalanced multipolarity 
7) Cold War, 1945-1990 (46 years), bipolarity3 
 
One of the shortcomings of the offensive realism model is its tendency to 
categorize relations between states only as peaceful or not peaceful. In order to overcome 
this problem, I have modified the predictions of this model as such: if preventive actions 
are initiated at a higher rate during periods of unbalanced multipolarity, less so during 
balanced multipolarity, and still less during bipolarity, the offensive realism model will 
be strengthened. This modification is in keeping with Mearsheimer’s original intent. If 
the offensive realism model is able to predict accurately whether preventive action 
occurs, the importance of the DPMP will be weakened. On the other hand, if the 
offensive realism model proves inadequate in its predictions, and the DPMP proves more 
accurate, my ideas should be given more importance. 
 
***United Kingdom*** 
John Mearsheimer suggests that the period 1816-1902 was characterized by 
balanced multipolarity, while the period 1903-1918 was characterized by unbalanced 
multipolarity. According to his theory of offensive realism, war was therefore somewhat 
likely from 1816 to 1902 and most likely during the period 1903-1918.
4
 
According to this model, a “balanced multipolar” system suggests that Britain 
should have acquiesced, which is largely correct. However, in the later “unbalanced 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. (New York and London), 348. Dale Copeland also suggests that the polarity of the system and the 
relationship of the declining state’s military power in comparison to its economic and potential power 
largely determine the extent to which decline leads to war. See Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major 
War, ed. Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 21. 
4
 See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
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multipolar” system, the typology predicts that Britain should have used 
coercive/confrontational diplomacy. On this point, offensive realism does not do a good 
job of accurately predicting the outcome of its foreign policy decision vis-à-vis rising 
powers. As we have seen, British foreign policy vis-à-vis rising states from 1816 to the 
second decade of the twentieth century was largely acquiescent and accommodating. In 
essence, the UK allowed the United States, Germany, Japan, and Russia to rise relative to 
it, and in some cases to surpass it, with little or no effort to check their ascendance. 
 
***Russia/Soviet Union*** 
John Mearsheimer suggests that the period 1816-1902 was characterized by 
balanced multipolarity (war somewhat likely), while the period 1903-1918 was 
characterized by unbalanced multipolarity (war most likely). 1919 to 1938 constituted a 
balanced multipolar system (war somewhat likely) while 1939 to 1945 was an 
unbalanced multipolar system (war most likely). According to his theory of offensive 
realism, war was therefore somewhat likely from 1816 to 1902 and again from 1919 to 
1938. War was most likely during the periods 1903-1918 and 1939 to 1945.
5
 
A “balanced multipolar” system suggests that Russia should have acquiesced or 
have used a mixed strategy, which is at least partially correct. However, in the later 
“unbalanced multipolar” system, the offensive realism model predicts that Russia should 
have used coercive/confrontational diplomacy, which it did not. The Soviet belief that 
time was on their side and that they would only continue to get stronger led to a 
conviction that conflict with other great powers should be avoided whenever possible. 




The model, therefore, does not do a good job of accurately predicting the behavior of 
Russia/the Soviet Union in this later instance. 
 
***United States*** 
 Mearsheimer’s classification of international polarity failed to predict American-
German relations during the 1870s and 1880s. The classification of a bipolar system in 
the post World War II era is also problematic. It predicts everything from acquiescence to 
accommodation to confrontational diplomacy. It is no surprise, then that American 
foreign policy during this time can fit into one of these three categories vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom. While accurate, the polarity of the 
international system is not very instructive in this instance. 
 
Alternative Model 2: Schweller’s Democratic Peace as a Model of Preventive 
War/Action 
The second alternative model I use to test the DPMP is based on Schweller’s 
predictions about the domestic structure of states and proclivity to initiate preventive war. 
Schweller argues that it is the internal domestic structure—whether democratic or not—
that determines how a declining dominant power responds to a rising challenger. He 
concludes that when faced with a democratic rising challenger, democracies do not 
initiate preventive war, but instead accommodate the challenger. When it comes to non-
democratic challengers, however, democratic states attempt to form defensive alliance 
systems. Also of interest, though, is that he leaves open the possibility that a democracy 
may initiate preventive war against a non-democratic challenger if the dominant 
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democratic state believes that such a war would not be long or costly. Meanwhile, non-
democratic states, when faced with a challenger (whether democratic or not), will either 
form a defensive alliance or will initiate preventive war. Accommodation is not in their 
nature. In all, Schweller suggests that there are four possible responses by a dominant 
state facing a challenger: 1) accommodation, 2) internal balancing, 3) alliance formation, 
and 4) preventive war.
6
 If Schweller’s model accurately predicts the behavior of states in 
my cases, the importance of the DPMP will be weakened. I predict, however, that my 
model will outperform both Schweller’s model and the offensive realism model. 
 
***United Kingdom*** 
The most striking aspect of British foreign policy vis-à-vis rising states from 1816 
to the second decade of the twentieth century is its acquiescence and accommodation. In 
essence, it allowed the United States, Germany, Japan, and Russia to rise relative to it, 
and in some cases to surpass it, with little or no effort to check their ascendance. The 
periphery was increasingly left to powerful, but for the moment at least, friendly nations. 
Whether the threat was economic or financial, as in the case of the United States and 
Germany, or primarily military—as in the case of Russia, Japan, and Germany—the 
United Kingdom did little to stop the rise of the threatening power. British public 
officials came to accept a geographically constrained form of naval superiority in which 
England could maintain its two-power standard only in European waters. This strategy 
implied coming to some accommodation with the peripheral powers and perhaps, as the 
European states increased their naval strength, with one or more of them as well. 
                                                 
6
 Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?," World 
Politics 44, no. 2 (1992). 
 260 
Between 1816 and 1879, the United Kingdom was an anocracy. During this 
period, Prussia/Germany and Russia are classified as autocracies and Japan as an 
anocracy. The United States was a full democracy during this period. Therefore, 
according to Schweller’s model, the United Kingdom should have either formed a 
defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against Germany/Prussia, Japan, Russia, 
and the U.S.
7
 Of course, what we have seen is that Britain was moving toward a 
defensive alliance with Japan and acquiesced to American demands in the Western 
Hemisphere. Schweller’s model does not provide an adequate explanation for this. 
From 1880 to 1896, the UK was a full democracy. Germany and Russia were 
autocracies, Japan is classified as an anocracy, and the U.S. was a full democracy. 
Schweller’s model predicts that the UK should have formed a defensive alliance against 
Germany, Russia, and Japan and should have accommodated the rise of the United States. 
While the UK did accommodate the rise of the U.S., it did not form a defensive alliance 
against Japan, but instead moved still closer to accommodation with Japan. 
From 1897 to 1902, the UK was a full democracy. Germany and Russia, on the 
other hand, were autocracies during this period and Japan is classified as an anocracy.
8
 
Therefore, according to Schweller’s model, the UK should have formed a defensive 
alliance against Germany, Russia, and Japan. Contrary to this model, however, in 1902 
Britain and Japan formally signed a defensive alliance. This is not explained by 
Schweller’s model. 
                                                 
7
 All statements about the level of democracy are based on the Polity IV rating. If a state is rated 7 to 10, 
then I consider it a full democracy. If it is rated a 1 to 6 it is an anocracy, and I treat it as a non-democracy. 
States receiving a zero or negative rating are considered autocracies by Polity IV. See Appendix C for 
selected Polity IV scores. 
8
 Japan was undergoing an “adverse transition” from 1860 to 1867, and then it was an anocracy. 
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During 1903 and 1904, the United Kingdom was a full democracy. Germany and 
Japan were anocracies and Russia was an autocracy during this period. Schweller’s 
model predicts that the United Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance against 
Germany, Russia, and Japan during this period. Instead, Britain and Japan were allied. 
Germany and Russia, however, were still seen as adversaries by British political leaders. 
Between 1905 and 1913, the United Kingdom was a full democracy. Japan, on the 
other hand, was an anocracy during this period. Therefore, according to Schweller, the 
United Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance against Japan during this 
period. Finally, from 1914 to 1918, the United Kingdom was a full democracy while 
Russia and Japan were anocracies. Therefore, according to Schweller, the United 
Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance against Russia and Japan during this 
period. Of course, as has been seen above, this did not occur. Furthermore, it does not 
explain why Britain was willing to enter into a defensive alliance with Japan but not with 
the anocratic Germany (after 1903). 
 Clearly, Schweller’s model has some problems when examining the case of 
British decline. Repeatedly, the model fails to predict accurately the United Kingdom’s 
response to rising challengers. This casts real doubt on its usefulness as a comprehensive 
model in regards to preventive action. 
 
***Russia/Soviet Union*** 
Russian and Soviet leadership had a largely optimistic view of the future for their 
state. Despite chronic economic and military weakness, leaders of both Imperial Russia 
and the Soviet Union saw their state as a great power at least equivalent to the most 
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powerful states in Europe, Asia, and North America. Moreover, their belief that time was 
on their side and that they would only continue to get stronger led them to conclude that 
conflict with other great powers should be avoided whenever possible. This was taken to 
an extreme in communist ideology, which suggested that the capitalist nations would 
fight amongst themselves, and a neutral Soviet Union would be the true beneficiary of 
such a conflict. 
This optimism about the future precluded a strong preventive school of thought 
from taking root in either Imperial Russia or the Soviet Union. Russia and the Soviet 
Union both largely accommodated rising powers, in much the same way that Britain had 
done, though for very different reasons. British leadership was largely resigned to a fate 
of declining power, while Russian and Soviet leadership were optimistic about their 
power potential. 
Between 1816 and 1879, Russia is classified as an autocracy as is 
Prussia/Germany. During this period, Japan is classified as an anocracy. The United 
States was a full democracy during this period. Therefore, according to Schweller’s 
model, Russia should have either formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war 
against Germany/Prussia, Japan, Russia, and the U.S.
9
 Many of the agreements reached 
during this period could be viewed as defensive alliances, so Schweller’s model seems to 
hold up during this time. However, Russia did not engage in preventive war, or 
militarized preventive action of any kind during this entire period. Schweller’s model 
seems to be at least partially correct during this period. 
                                                 
9
 All statements about the level of democracy are based on the Polity IV rating. If a state is rated 7 to 10, 
then I consider it a full democracy. If it is rated a 1 to 6 it is an anocracy, and I treat it as a non-democracy. 
States receiving a zero or negative rating are considered autocracies by Polity IV. See Appendix C for 
selected Polity IV scores. 
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From 1880 to 1896, Russia and Germany were classified as autocracies. The UK 
is classified as a full democracy and Japan is classified as an anocracy. Therefore, Russia 
should have, according to Schweller’s model, formed a defensive alliance or initiated 
preventive war against Germany, Japan, the UK and the United States. Russia continued 
to be involved in European affairs, but not in an overly aggressive way. Defensive 
agreements were made, but no real preventive action was taken. Therefore, we must 
conclude that Schweller’s model does not perform well in this instance. 
From 1897 to 1902, Russia and Germany were still autocracies. Japan was still 
classified as an anocracy while the United States and the United Kingdom are classified 
as full democracies.
10
 Therefore, according to Schweller’s model, Russia should have 
formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against Germany, Japan, the UK 
and the United States. Again, Schweller’s model somewhat predicts what Russia did 
during this time. Russia did not engage in preventive war, but its agreements at The 
Hague and elsewhere could be seen as entering into defensive alliances with other 
powers. 
During 1903 and 1904, Russia is classified as an autocracy while Japan is 
classified as an anocracy. Therefore, according to Schweller’s model, Russia should have 
formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against Japan. In reality, Russia 
did neither. It attempted to continue its expansion in Asia, but Russia was humiliated 
when Japan launched a war against it in an attempt to put a halt to its expansionist dreams 
in Asia. 
Between 1906 and 1918, Russia and Japan are classified as anocracies. Therefore, 
Russia should have formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against Japan. 
                                                 
10
 Japan was undergoing an “adverse transition” from 1860 to 1867, and then it was an anocracy. 
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What we really see, though, is a turning inward and westward by Russia during this time. 
With the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea, there was less incentive for Russia to 
continue attempted expansion in Asia. In any case, the events in Europe began to demand 
more attention than events in Asia. 
Between 1932 and 1946, the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy. Germany 
is classified as an anocracy in 1932, but then is classified as an autocracy between 1933 
and 1944. Japan is classified as an anocracy between 1932 and 1944. The United 
Kingdom is classified as a democracy between 1932 and 1946. Therefore, Russia should 
have formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against all of these powers. 
Of course, this did not happen. The Soviet Union did not engage in preventive action 
during this period, and several of the agreements that it entered into were not defensive 
against these powers. The Soviet-German non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 was not a 
defensive alliance against Germany, as would be predicted by the Schweller model. 
Overall, Schweller’s model seems to fail at predicting Russian Soviet behavior. 
Despite being autocratic for most of past 190 years, Russian and Soviet strategy has 
largely been defensive. Only rarely has it engaged in preventive action, despite the 




Between 1863 and 1867, the United States is classified as a democracy (it is 
actually classified as a democracy for the entire period under investigation) while Japan 
and Russia are both classified as autocracies. Therefore, according to Schweller’s model, 
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the U.S. should have formed a defensive alliance against both. In this case, Schweller’s 
model does a poor job of predicting American foreign policy. The United States actually 
tended to favor Japan during this period, and American-Russian relations were quite 
friendly during this period. 
From 1868 to 1877, Prussia/Germany and Russia are classified as autocracies. At 
the same time, Japan is classified as an anocracy. According to Schweller’s model, the 
United States should have formed a defensive alliance against all three. In this instance, 
Schweller’s model does better in predicting America’s foreign policy behavior against 
Germany. American-Russian relations also cooled during this period, but not to the point 
where the United States was seeking alliances against Russia. Japan continued to enjoy 
good relations with the United States during this period, counter to the predictions of 
Schweller’s model. 
For the period 1878-1888, both Germany and Japan are classified as anocracies 
and Russia is still classified as an autocracy. Schweller’s model predicts that the United 
States should form a defensive alliance against all three. Schweller’s model again does a 
decent job of capturing an overall negative relationship between the United States and 
Germany, but it does less well in its prediction of Russian-American and Japanese-
American relations. 
Between 1920 and 1932, Germany and Japan continue to be classified as 
anocracies and the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy. The United Kingdom 
emerged on the scene in 1930 as a new challenger to the United States, but it is classified 
as a democracy. Schweller’s model predicts that the United States should form a 
defensive alliance against Germany, Japan, and Russia; but it should accommodate the 
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rise of the UK. Schweller’s model accurately predicts American behavior to the relative 
rise in power of the United Kingdom. It does less well in its prediction in regards to the 
other three. 
From 1933 to 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany are classified as autocracies, 
Japan is classified as an anocracy, and the United Kingdom is classified as a democracy. 
Therefore, according to Schweller’s model, the United States should have formed a 
defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan; and should have 
accommodated the rise of the UK. Again, Schweller’s model accurately predicts 
American foreign policy behavior regarding the UK. His model also captures the 
emerging alliance against Germany and Japan. However, there is no similar alliance 
forming against the Soviet Union. 
For the period 1946 to 1951, the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy and the 
United Kingdom is classified as a democracy. Schweller’s model predicts that the U.S. 
should form a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, but it should accommodate the 
rise of the UK. In this case, Schweller’s model is completely accurate. 
Between 1953 and 1970, both the United Kingdom and Japan are classified as 
democracies, while the Soviet Union continues to be classified as an autocracy. 
Schweller’s model predicts that the U.S. would accommodate the rise of both Japan and 
the UK, but that it would form a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union. Schweller’s 
model is completely accurate for this period. 
From 1971 to 1982, both the United Kingdom and Japan are classified as 
democracies. Therefore, Schweller’s model predicts that the United States would 
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accommodate their rise in power. Schweller’s model is completely accurate for this 
period. 
Finally, from 1983 to 1996, the UK is classified as a democracy. Once again, 
Schweller’s model predicts that the U.S. would accommodate the UK’s ascendance. 
Schweller’s model is completely accurate for this period. 
  
The Domestic Politics Model of Prevention 
This dissertation suggests that a model based largely on domestic factors will 
yield better predictions than models based on systemic mechanisms. Causal mechanisms 
such as internal power constraints, domestic political constraints, and ruler belief systems 
will allow us to predict not only whether preventive action is likely to occur, but also 
what form that preventive action is likely to take. In determining the reliability of the 




On some dimensions such as internal power constraints and ruler belief systems, 
the DPMP performed very well in this case study. On other dimensions such as perceived 
likelihood of conflict, the model failed to predict accurately British behavior. This 
suggests that while the DPMP is far from perfect, with some modifications it may 





Overall, the DPMP performs well regarding the case of Russia and the Soviet 
Union. Where the model does fall short (nature of threat, expected cost of war, perceived 
chances of winning a war), it does not fail completely. Unfortunately, because it is 
correct some of the time while missing the mark at other times, we must conclude that on 
these dimensions, it performs poorly as a predictor of Russian/Soviet behavior. 





The DPMP struggles with American-German relations in the 1870s and 1880s. In 
this case, the model seems to have a split personality. On the one hand, there seems to be 
severe political constraints, and therefore the typology suggests that in this case, the 
United States should have acted defensively and acquiesced in the face of German 
aggression. Yet the United States engaged in confrontational diplomacy and even a show 
of military force. While the U.S. did act defensively for the most part, it did not acquiesce 
to German demands. On the other hand, because of the American perception that 
Germany posed a threat to U.S. interests during the 1870s and 1880s, the DPMP 
accurately predicts the use of confrontational diplomacy and a show of force (in the case 
of Samoa) during the 1870s and 1880s. 
The DPMP performs even better regarding American-German relations on the eve 
of the Second World War. Though the model fails to capture all of the nuances in 
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American foreign policy in the decade prior to World War II, it does a good job of 




 As mentioned earlier, the rise of Japan in the 1860s and 1870s was not viewed by 
most Americans as threatening, and therefore did not lend itself to thoughts of preventive 
action. The DPMP accurately predicts that American leaders would acquiesce or 
accommodate the rise of Japan during the 1860s and 1870s. 
 Unfortunately, the DPMP does not perform as well in all instances. One variable, 
the perception of a deteriorating status quo vis-à-vis Japan prior to the outbreak of World 
War II, provides a challenge for our model. On this variable, we simply have insufficient 
evidence to draw a definitive conclusion. 
However, the model does seem to predict accurately American foreign policy vis-
à-vis Japan in the run-up to World War II. This is especially true for the later years of the 
1930s when the United States started to take a more aggressive stance in regards to 
Japanese maneuvers in Asia. However, the DPMP does suggest that the U.S. should have 
taken more aggressive measures earlier than it did vis-à-vis Japan. Part of the reason for 
this discrepancy, as indicated earlier, is that the U.S. was not in a strong military position 
to act more forcefully.  
In terms of the nature of the threat from Japan in the post World War II era, the 
DPMP does an overall good job predicting the behavior of American foreign policy 
during this time. However, some variables for this period cause trouble for our model. 
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The measurement of offensive/defensive military strategy does not seem to apply to 
Japan during this period given that Japan was an important ally and trading partner to the 
United States. In fact, the American desire in the early 1980s to see Japan rebuild its 
military runs counter to the preventive action theory. The one redeeming feature in this 
instance, however, is that since Japan—during this period—represented an economic 
challenge not a military one, the U.S. had little to fear from a rebuilding of Japan’s 
military capacity. In addition, some of the variables in the DPMP simply do not seem 
particularly applicable in this instance. For example, in looking at the cost of war or the 
chances of being successful in a war, the American-Japanese relationship in the post 
World War II era does not lend itself to this analysis. 
  
United Kingdom 
 The American-British relationship poses problems for the DPMP on some 
variables such as internal power constraints, political constraints, the cost of war, and the 
chances of being successful in a war. They simply do not seem to be particularly 
applicable to U.S.-UK relations. Nonetheless, the model does accurately predict 
American foreign policy vis-à-vis the United Kingdom on some of the other variables. 
For instance, in both the decade before World War II, and the decades since, American 
leadership regarding Britain has been moderate-acquiescent to moderate-pragmatic. The 
DPMP has accurately predicted that the United States either would acquiesce in the face 
of British growth or would accommodate the UK. Similarly, the threat from the UK in 
the 1930s and after World War II, if there was any threat at all, would have to be 
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classified as low non-militarized. The typology accurately predicts that American foreign 
policy should be acquiescent in these circumstances. 
 
Russia/Soviet Union 
In the case of Russia and the early Soviet Union, the DPMP performs very well. 
For the period of the nineteenth century, the model accurately predicts that the American 
government should largely do nothing or accommodate the Russians during the 1860s 
and 1870s. In addition, during the 1920s and 1930s, our model is correct; no preventive 
action was taken by the United States against Russia during this period. 
The behavior of the Roosevelt administration vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during 
the 1930s is accurately predicted by the DPMP, though not the specifics of that behavior. 
Because the Soviet Union prior to the Second World War was not seen as a military 
threat, but an ideological threat, my model may be seen as accurately predicting that the 
U.S. would accommodate the Soviet Union. 
The DPMP also does a good job of predicting actual American behavior in 
relation to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During this period, political constraints 
were moderate for American leaders. Given this condition, the model once again 
performs well: predicting a mix of strategies including the use of incentives, coercion, 
and confrontational diplomacy. The DPMP accurately predicts that preventive action was 
likely, but that non-militarized preventive action might be preferred. Containment, as a 
form of non-militarized preventive action, was the preferred method of dealing with the 
Soviet Union after World War II. This, as predicted by the model, resulted in sustained 
coercive and confrontational diplomacy during the Cold War period. 
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Which Model—or Models—Works Best? 
 This is a difficult question to answer. In this chapter, the three models were 
briefly reviewed in an effort to sort out the merits of each. All three models attempt to 
present information that can be useful in trying to answer the grand question of when 
preventive action is likely to occur, and what form it is likely to take. 
This dissertation has considered the decline of three major powers and their 
responses to rising challengers. None of the models—the Domestic Politics Model of 
Prevention, Mearsheimer’s model of offensive realism, or Schweller’s democratic peace 
model—accurately predict the three states’ foreign policy in every instance examined in 
this dissertation. However, as shown in Table 7.1, the DPMP performs considerably 
better than the other two models. The offensive realism model, Schweller’s model, and 
my model accurately predict the form preventive action is likely to take, one-third of the 
time, one-half of the time, and three-quarters of the time, respectively. In all fairness, the 
two alternative models used here were not originally designed for this type of prediction, 
and this may account for their relatively poor showing. Nonetheless, the high rate of 
accurate prediction of the DPMP suggests that domestic factors play a large part in 
determining what if any preventive action a state is likely to take. 
 273 





   
UK 1816-1879 Fail 
UK-Japan 1860-1904 Fail 
UK-U.S. 1880-1906 Accurate 
UK-Germany 1897-1904 Accurate 
UK-Russia 1897-1904 Accurate 
Russia 1816-1879 Accurate 
 1880-1896 Fail 
 1897-1902 Accurate 







Soviet Union 1932-1946 Fail 
U.S.-Japan 1863-1867 Fail 
U.S.-Russia 1863-1867 Fail 
U.S.-Germany 1868-1877 Fail 
U.S.-Japan 1868-1877 Accurate 
U.S.-Russia 1868-1888 Fail 
U.S.-Germany 1878-1888 Accurate 
U.S.-Japan 1878-1888 Fail 
U.S.-UK 1920-1932 Accurate 
U.S.-Germany 1920-1932 Fail 











   







U.S.-UK 1933-1939 Accurate 
U.S. 1946-1951 Accurate 
U.S. 1953-1970 Accurate 
U.S. 1971-1996 Accurate 
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UK 1816-1902 Accurate 
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The following shows the ratio of accurate predictions for 
each model: 
 
Offensive Realism: .33 (2/6) 
Schweller’s Democratic Peace Model: .48 (14/29) 






 What does this imply for the future of the study of preventive action? First, it 
indicates the importance of further study, and the disaggregating of causal mechanisms 
and key variables that drive preventive action decisions. Determining when states are 
likely to engage in preventive action is difficult enough, but predicting what form that 
preventive action is likely to take further complicates the issue. The DPMP developed 
here is a good start. 
This study also revealed the importance of looking inside the black box of the 
state and understanding the preventive motivation of various actors and decision makers 
within the state. Understanding the perception of key decision makers is essential in 
successfully determining the direction of national strategy. Decision makers’ perceptions 
about the nature of the threat posed by a rising challenger, and the concern about a 
worsening status quo seem particularly significant. Also of importance in understanding 
the calculations that go into preventive action decisions is the concern about the cost of 
war now versus the cost of war in the future. Much of this, of course, hinges on the 
perceived likelihood of conflict. 
Finally, this study reveals that these different variables are very difficult to 
separate. They are intertwined, especially variables such as the costs of future wars and 
the likelihood of winning future wars. George and Bennett suggest that the case study 
method is particularly useful in specifying and measuring complex qualitative variables. 
Complex causal relations involve interacting causal variables that are not independent of 
each other. This is important in explaining instances when preventive action does not 
occur, even though some criteria suggests a particular form of preventive action is likely. 
 278 
For example, in any given case, the military status quo might be deteriorating—which 
would suggest some form of militarized preventive action is likely. However, if the costs 
of militarized preventive action are already high, the country might shy away from 
militarized preventive action and towards non-militarized preventive action. Because of 
the complexity of these causal mechanisms, this study is necessarily concerned with the 
probability of a given form of preventive action. It might be possible, in future iterations 
of this research, to combine some of these variables and to dissect others. Nonetheless, 
this dissertation has shown a path to future research of preventive action. 
 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation has sought to answer the basic question, “When is preventive 
action likely to occur, and what form is it likely to take?” In the examinations of internal 
power constraints, domestic political constraints, and ruler belief systems, it has become 
apparent that perceptions and domestic politics are very influential in determining the 
probability of preventive action. This is an important finding since it provides the crucial 
variables and causal mechanisms that go into the preventive action decision-making 
process. 
Also of interest in this research are its implications regarding tangential fields of 
study. For example, prospect theory suggests that states are risk acceptant when it comes 
to possible losses—whether those losses are something tangible such as territory or 
whether they are less tangible such as international ranking or prestige—and states will 
likely engage in preventive action to avert those losses. What this research shows is that 
leaders make calculations based on a variety of variables, and quite often nations decide 
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they are better off not taking any action at all; the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union 
provide clear examples. While not disproving prospect theory, findings like these suggest 
that prospect theory needs to be examined more closely. 
This research has also called into question one of the issues raised earlier in this 
dissertation. Charles Kupchan has suggested that relatively declining states have allowed 
rising challengers to surpass them, even though elites have a good understanding of the 
balance of power.
11
 I argued in chapter three that if it were true that elites had an 
understanding that the balance of power was shifting against their state, they would not 
voluntarily allow a rising challenger to eclipse their state. This research has shown that 
repeatedly, decision makers have actually allowed this to occur. The answer usually lies 
in the elites’ perceptions of threat posed by the rising challenger or the possibility of a 
future change in the trend that will ultimately put their state back in a superior position. 
Both of these are important findings. 
Another important finding of this research is that outbreaks of preventive general 
war, at least among great powers, are exceedingly rare. More research is needed in this 
area, but it seems that general preventive war against a challenger—who is seen as 
somewhat equal or possibly becoming equal in power—is not a good option for the 
dominant declining power. I would suggest that this calculus will not hold for preventive 
action against states that are far from equal with the dominant declining power. This 
could be a fascinating area of study in the future. 
As I was concluding the final substantive chapter of this project, I began to think 
about ways in which the DPMP could be improved in future iterations or expanded 
                                                 
11
 Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, ed. Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt, 
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), fn. 22, 15-16, 36. 
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beyond the current parameters. One of the limitations of this project was a self-imposed 
one: I wanted to have a systematic way of picking my cases, or at least have a common 
set of parameters to make my cases as comparable as possible. Because of this decision, I 
limited my cases to ones that I could objectively (as much as possible) determine which 
states were rising and which states were declining. I chose the Composite Index of 
National Capability (CINC) score as the barometer for rising and declining power. While 
I believe this accomplished the goal of creating a systematic method for looking at my 
cases, it also proved very limiting. One of the first limitations this placed on this project 
was restricting my cases to those covered in the Correlates of War database, meaning I 
could only look at the years 1816 to 2001. Unfortunately, this meant that some cases that 
might be of interest were necessarily omitted. For example, one interesting case would 
have been Great Britain’s early reactions to the rise of the United States even before the 
American Revolution. Robert Kagan argues that perceptive Britons like James 
Harrington, William Burke, and Adam Smith understood that the colonies would 
eventually rise up against the mother country.
12
 British, Spanish, and French containment 
of the United States during the 1780s would also be of interest.
13
 
 I am also unsure that using the CINC score is necessarily the best measurement 
available for understanding leadership perceptions of the rise of adversaries. Using this 
score is certainly an objective way to look at the rise and fall of nations from a distance, 
but it might not capture the important perceptual shifts that occur at the time. However, 
having said that, developing a reliable index of leader perceptions during times of crisis 
was well beyond the scope of this research project. 
                                                 
12
 Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of 
the Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 30-38. 
13
 Ibid., 53-56. 
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Despite some of these concerns, the research presented in this dissertation has 
provided new insights into the decision making process that can lead to preventive action. 
We have gotten closer to being able to answer the question of whether preventive action 
is likely to occur, and what form it is likely to take. The causal mechanisms, concepts, 
and variables developed here are instructive when determining what type of response 
declining dominant powers are likely to have vis-à-vis rising challengers. Furthermore, 
understanding the interaction of the various parts of the DPMP helps us understand the 
complexities behind these processes. Now that we have moved beyond the simple 
dichotomous view of relations between declining states and rising challengers, it will be 
possible to further refine the model of preventive action and develop more concise causal 
mechanisms. Ultimately, we will be able to gain a better understanding of the preventive 






















Brown, Benjamin H. The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain 1881-1895. New York: 
Colombia University Press, 1943. 
Bush, George W. “The National Security Strategy of the United States.” 2002. 
Cohen, Warren I. America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991, edited by Warren I. Cohen. 
Vol. IV of The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Copeland, Dale C. The Origins of Major War. Edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis and Stephen 
M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
2000. 
Correlates of War. National Material Capabilities v. 3.02. http://www.correlatesofwar.org 
Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. New York: Harper Perennial, 1996. 
DiCicco, Jonathan M. and Jack S. Levy. “The Power Transition Research Program.” Progress in 
International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, edited by Colin Elman and Miriam 
Fendius Elman. The MIT Press, 2003. 
Dictionary of World History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Doran, Charles F. “Confronting the Principles of the Power Cycle: Changing Systems Structure, 
Expectations, and War.” Handbook of War Studies II, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000. 
Emmerson, John K. and Harrison M. Holland. The Eagle and the Rising Sun: America and 
Japan in the Twentieth Century, edited by Miriam Miller. Stanford, California: Stanford 
Alumni Association, 1987. 
Ferguson, Niall. Colossus: The Price of America's Empire. New York: The Penguin Press, 2004. 
———. Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global 
Power. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 
Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895 - 
1905. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
Freeze, Gregory L. "Reform and Counter Reform 1855-1890." In Russia: A History, edited by 
Gregory L. Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Fuller, Thomas. The History of the Holy War. London: William Pickering, 1840. 
283 
 
Fuller, William C., Jr. "The Great Fatherland War and Late Stalinism 1941-1953." In Russia: A 
History, edited by Gregory L. Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Gacek, Christopher M. The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign 
Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American 
National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
———. The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, 
Provocations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Gilpin, Robert. War & Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
Geller, Daniel S. “Status Quo Orientation, Capabilities, and Patters of War Initiation in Dyadic 
Rivalries.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 18, no. 1, 2000. 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, BCSIA Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, 2005. 
George, Alexander L., and Timothy J. McKeown. "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational 
Decision Making." In Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, 21-58. 
Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985. 
Hagan, Joe D. "Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy Restructuring: A 
Framework for Comparative Analysis." In Foreign Policy Restructuring: How 
Governments Respond to Global Change, edited by Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan and 
Martin W. Sampson, III, 138-63. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1994. 
———. "Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness." Mershon International Studies 
Review 38 (1994): 183-207. 
———. "Oppositions, Ruling Strategies, and the Domestic Road to War: Political Explanations 
of Foreign Policy and the Great Powers since 1815." Paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 17-20 2004. 
Hinsely, F. H., ed. The Cambridge Modern History: Volume Xi Material Progress and World-
Wide Problems 1870-1898. Edited by G. N. Clark, J. R. M. Butler, J. P. T. Bury and E. 
A. Benians. XIV vols. Vol. XI, The New Cambridge Modern History. London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1962. 




Husband, William B. "The New Economic Policy (NEP) and the Revolutionary Experiment 
1921-1929." In Russia: A History, edited by Gregory L. Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
Iriye, Akira. The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, edited by Warren I. Cohen. Vol. III of The 
Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993. 
Kadera, Kelly M. The Power-Conflict Story: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Rivalry. Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 2001. 
Kagan, Robert. Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World from Its Earliest Days to the 
Dawn of the Twentieth Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006. 
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Vintage Books, 1987. 
Kim, Woosang and James D. Morrow. “When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?” American 
Journal of Political Science 36, no. 4, 1992. 
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1994. 
Krasner, Stephen D. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S. 
Foreign Policy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978. 
Kugler, Jacek and A.F.K. Organski. “The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective 
Evaluation. Handbook of War Studies, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989. 
Kugler, Jacek and Douglas Lemke, eds. Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War 
Ledger. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996. 
———. “The Power Transition Research Program: Assessing Theoretical and Empirical 
Advances.” Handbook of War Studies II, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2000. 
Kupchan, Charles A. The Vulnerability of Empire. Edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis and 
Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1994. 
———. The Vulnerability of Empire. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994. 
285 
 
LaFeber, Walter. The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, edited by Warren I. Cohen. 
Vol. II of The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993. 
Lebow, Richard Ned. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 
———. “Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?” International Security 9, 
no. 1, 1984. 
Levy, Jack S. “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40, no. 
1 (1987). 
———. "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations." International Studies 
Quarterly 41 (1997): 87-112. 
Levy, Jack S. and Joseph R. Gochal. “When Do Democracies Fight „Preventive Wars‟?: Theory 
and Evidence.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association, Montreal, Canada, March 17-20 2004. 
Lowe, Peter. The Origins of the Korean War. Edited by Harry Hearder, Origins of Modern Wars. 
New York: Longman, 1986. 
Lund, Michael S. Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy. 
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996. 
Mallet, Bernard. British Budgets 1877-88 to 1912-13. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 
1913. 
Maoz, Zeev. Paths to Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982. 
Mead, Walter Russell. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the 
World. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2001. 
Modelski, George and William R. Thompson. “Long Cycles and Global War.” Handbook of War 
Studies, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.  
Morgan, Patrick M. Deterrence Now. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4
th
 ed. New 
York: Knopf, 1967. 
286 
 
Niou, Emerson M. S. and Peter C. Ordeshook. “Preventive War and the Balance of Power: A 
Game Theoretic Approach.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31, September, 1987. 
Organski, A.F.K. World Politics, 2
nd
 ed. New York: Knopf, 1968. 
Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1980. 
———. “The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor.” The Scientific Study of Peace and 
War: A Text Reader, editors John A. Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan. Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 1999. 
Orlovsky, Daniel. "Russia in War and Revolution 1914-1921." In Russia: A History, edited by 
Gregory L. Freeze, 523. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Otte, T.G., ed. The Makers of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt to Thatcher. London: Palgrave, 
2002. 
Oxford English Dictionary Online. http://dictionary.oed.com 
Perkins, Bradford. The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865, edited by Waren I. Cohen. 
Vol. I of The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007. Monty G. 
Marshall, Director. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
Ransel, David L. "Pre-Reform Russia 1801-1855." In Russia: A History, edited by Gregory L. 
Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Rubin, Barnett R., ed. Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action. New York: The Century 
Foundation Press, 1998. 
Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. New York 
and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995. 
Schroeder, Paul W. The Transformation of European Politics 1763 - 1848. Edited by Lord 
Bullock and William Deakin, Oxford History of Modern Europe. New York: Oxford 
University Press, Inc., 1994. 
Schweller, Randall L. "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More 
Pacific?" World Politics 44, no. 2 (1992): 235-69. 
Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Russian Empire 1801-1917. Edited by Alan Bullock and F. W. D. 
Deakin, Oxford History of Modern Europe. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967. 
287 
 
Siegelbaum, Lewis. "Building Stalinism 1929-1941." In Russia: A History, edited by Gregory L. 
Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Snyder, Jack. The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 
1914. Edited by Robert Jervis, Robert J. Art and Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in 
Security Affairs. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984. 
———. “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914.” Psychology and Deterrence, edited by 
Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1985. 
———. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Edited by Robert 
Jervis, Robert J. Art and Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Strassler, Robert B., ed. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the 
Peloponnesian War. New York: Touchstone, 1996. 
Tammen, Ronald L., et al. Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21
st
 Century. New York: 
Chatham House Publishers, 2000.  
Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1954. 
Vagts, Alfred. Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations. New 
York: King's Crown Press, 1956. 
Van Evera, Stephen. “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War I.” International 
Security 9, Summer, 1984. 
———. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1999. 
———. Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997. 
Vasquez, John A. The War Puzzle, Cambridge Studies in International Relations. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." International Security 18, 
no. 2 (1993): 44-79. 
Ward, A.W., and G.P. Gooch. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919. 3 
vols. Vol. III. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. 
Williams, E. E. Made in Germany. Sussex, England: The Harvester Press, 1973. 
288 
 
Zelnik, Reginald E. "Revolutionary Russia 1890-1914." In Russia: A History, edited by Gregory 











Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 











Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 























preventive action now 
less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely 















Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 





militarized preventive action 
may be preferred 


















Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 












Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 
military action is delayed? 
Yes 
No 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 










Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 


























preventive action now 
less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely 
than if PEDA delayed? 
Yes 
No 
Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 




militarized preventive action 
may be preferred 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 















Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 
















Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 





militarized preventive action 
may be preferred 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 
















Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 









Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 






Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 
















Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 
















Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 





militarized preventive action 
may be preferred 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 










Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 





Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 























preventive action now 
less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely 











Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 





militarized preventive action 
may be preferred 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 















Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 
















Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 





militarized preventive action 
may be preferred 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 















Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 







Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 















Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 







Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 




































Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 
military action is delayed? 
Yes 
No 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 













Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 










Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 























Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 











Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 




















Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 










Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 











Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 






















preventive action now 
less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely 











Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 





militarized preventive action 
may be preferred 
* Difficult to Determine 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 









Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 











Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 






















preventive action now 
less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely 











Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 





militarized preventive action 
may be preferred 
This model is indeterminate 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 















Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 










Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 




militarized preventive action 
may be preferred 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 















Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 







Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 




































preventive action now 
less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely 










Is militarized preventive action 
now less costly than it would 
be later, or a favorable 
outcome more likely than if 





militarized preventive action 
may be preferred 
This model is indeterminate 
Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 









Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 
















Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 









Will status quo 
continue to 
worsen if no 












Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP) 











































Mix of Strategies/ 








































































Appendix C: Selected Polity IV Scores 
 
A negative or 0 score means that a state is considered an autocracy. A score of 1 to 6 
suggests an anocracy. For the purposes of this study, I count these as non-democratic 
regimes. A score of 7 to 10 suggests a full democracy. 
 
UK: 1816-1836: 4 
UK: 1837-1879: 6 
UK: 1880-1900: 7 
UK: 1901-1918: 8 
UK: 1919-1921: 8 
UK: 1922-1989: 10 
 
Prussia: 1816-1866: 0 
Prussia: 1867: -66 (adverse transition) 
Germany: 1868-1870: -88 (adverse transition) 
Germany: 1871-1877: 0 
Germany: 1878-1879: 1 
Germany: 1890-1904: 4 
Germany: 1919-9132: 6 
Germany: 1933: 0 
Germany: 1945: -66 (adverse transition) 
West Germany: 1945-1948: -66 (adverse transition) 
West Germany: 1949-1989: 10 
 
Japan: 1860-1867: -88 (adverse transition) 
Japan: 1868-1944: 5 
Japan: 1945-1951: -66 (adverse transition) 
Japan: 1952-1961: 10 
 
Russia: 1816-1904: 0 
Russia: 1914-1918: 1 
Russia: 1919-1920: 1 
USSR: 1924-1926: 0 
 
United States: 1816-1844: 9 
United States: 1845-1849: 10 
United States: 1850-1853: 9 
United States: 1854-1864: 8 
United States: 1865-1870: 9 
United States: 1871-1896: 10 
